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This thesis investigates the root causes of the social vulnerability of Bam and 
examines the role played by the evolution of institutions in the post-earthquake 
reconstruction period in shaping resilience. Through studying the reconstruction 
process of Bam for six years (from 2004 to 2010) the research explains the dynamics 
of institutional interactions of different agents and organizations involved in the 
reconstruction. A synthesis of literature on vulnerability and resilience enables the 
thesis to position post-disaster reconstruction as an opportunity to alter those 
institutional factors that had generated vulnerability, and to move the trajectory of 
institutional evolution towards a more resilient society. In particular the thesis 
focuses on the role played by the formation and character of social capital and its 
transformation or stability from pre- to post-disaster contexts.  
 
The Bam earthquake occurred at an important political juncture in Iranian history 
allowing this kind of analysis on institutional structures which have since retreated. 
Following the earthquake of 2003 in Bam the central government of Iran 
immediately created a group of professionals and administrative officials to design 
the relief and reconstruction programme. One of the main stated objectives of the 
designed plan was to involve people in the reconstruction process. In practice, 
however, people became marginalized from key decision-making fora. The absence 
of local people's voices in the design of the reconstruction plan increased the 
vulnerability of some groups like renters and widows. Further, the approach 
negatively affected the Bamis' sense of belonging exacerbated through different 
factors like influx of workers from all over the country to do labour work, or the 
damage to palm trees (a cultural touchstone in Bam and economically important 
resource) during the reconstruction process. In the absence of local NGOs in the 
aftermath of the earthquake, national and international NGOs filled the gap between 
the local people and the central decision makers. Despite the lack of experience and 
small budgets of the Iranian NGOs and time limitation of international NGOs, NGOs 
were successful in elaborating local participation and social capital. Spaces were 
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created for different socially vulnerable groups especially women to play more 
prominent roles in social activities. According to one of the women of Bam:  
"Women of Bam are much more empowered now. There are more women 
who work outside their home. There are more women in Bam driving cars. 
Women of Bam are more social these days"(2010). 
 
Evidence in this thesis highlights the importance of local participation and the role of 
NGOs in creating vertical links between local people and central and non-central 
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This research elaborates on the concept of social resilience. More people are being 
made vulnerable to the risk of disaster as a result of rapid urbanisation and a lack of 
capacity of urban authorities or the private sector to supply adequate housing or 
basic infrastructure. Reducing Disaster Risk a Challenge for Development (2004), 
reports that the average population size of the world’s one hundred largest cities 
increased from 2.1 million in 1950 to 5.1 million in 1990. However, as the report 
continues, the majority of urban populations live in small and medium towns. Urban 
growth per se does not explain vulnerability to disasters, but in many rapidly 
growing cities, some kinds of disasters like earthquake risk considerations have not 
been factored into the building and planning process.   
 
There is a correlation between natural disasters and the human development index. 
Disaster is a much more serious issue for developing rather than developed 
countries. The studies of Alexander (1997) indicate that though the cost of disasters 





are higher in developed countries compared to developing countries, the relative 
proportion of GNP absorbed in developing countries is higher and so are the death 
tolls. According to Ariabandu (2003, p15), nearly ninety percent of natural disasters 
and ninety five percent of disaster-related deaths worldwide occur in developing 
countries. This research estimates that by the year 2025, eighty percent of the 
world’s population will live in developing countries, and up to sixty percent will be 
highly vulnerable to floods, severe storms and earthquakes (Ariabandu, 2003, p15). 
This trend emphasises the importance of studying disaster from a social point of 
view. 
 
The UNDP's Global Report: Reducing Disaster Risk A Challenge for Development 
(2004) has indicated that between 1980 and 2000 around seventy five percent of the 
world’s population live in areas affected at least once by earthquakes, tropical 
cyclones, floods or drought. Eleven percent of the people exposed to natural hazards 
live in countries classified as low human development, yet they account for more 
than fifty three percent of total recorded deaths: 
Disasters wipe out decades of progress and development in just a few 
seconds. Their impact, both in terms of deaths and economic losses, is 
increasing dramatically. In 2008, the death toll from natural disasters tripled 
to 235,000 from an annual average of 66,000 over the period 2000-2007. 
Economic losses totaled $181 billion, more than double the annual average of 
$82 billion over the same period (Source: Global Facility for Disaster 
Reduction and Recovery, 2009). 
 
Such findings raised international concerns for improving disaster resilience for 
nations and communities. Three of the most prominent international efforts in this 
regard are the creation of the United Nation's (UN) International Strategy for 
Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) in 1999; The Millennium Development Goals (2000); 
and The Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of 
Nations and Communities to Disasters (2005).  
 





On 11 December 1987, the General Assembly of the UN designated the 1990's as the 
International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR). UNISDR was created 
in 1999 as a successor body to carry on IDNDR's work. UNISDR's core areas of 
work concerns Disaster Risk Reduction.  
In 2000, at the Millennium Summit, 189 UN member states and major international 
agencies agreed on eight international development goals called the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) to be achieved by the year 2015. Targets 8A and 8B of 
the MDGs concern poverty reduction through good governance especially in Least 
Developed Countries:  
 Target 8A: Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-
discriminatory trading and financial system  
o Includes a commitment to good governance, development, and poverty 
reduction – both nationally and internationally 
 Target 8B: Address the Special Needs of the Least Developed Countries 
(LDC)  
o Includes: tariff and quota free access for LDC exports; enhanced programme 
of debt relief for HIPC and cancellation of official bilateral debt; and more 
generous ODA (Overseas Development Assistance) for countries committed 
to poverty reduction 
The Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations 
and Communities was an outcome of the 2005 conference held in Kobe, Japan. 168 
Governments adopted the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA); a ten year plan to 
make the world safer from natural hazards. The HFA suggests five specific priorities 
for action: 
1. Making disaster risk reduction a priority; 
2. Improving risk information and early warning; 
3. Building a culture of safety and resilience; 
4. Reducing the risks in key sectors; 
5. Strengthening preparedness for response. 





The aim is for the HFA to contribute towards the achievement of the MDGs through 
integrating disaster risk reduction into sustainable development policies and 
planning. It is apparent that further outcomes and efforts are needed if the MDGs are 
to be realised and DRR factors addressed: 
Greater urgency is now required to address the factors that are driving the 
increase in disaster risk, such as rural poverty and vulnerability, unplanned 
and poorly managed urban growth and declining ecosystems. Urgent action is 
necessary not only to reduce disaster risk, but also to maintain momentum in 
Millennium Development Goal achievement, including poverty reduction, 
adaptation to climate change and better health outcomes (Global Platform for 
Disaster Risk Reduction, June 2009). 
 
Social resilience is increasingly becoming the focus of development studies and 
poverty reduction efforts. Chambers (1995) notes that participatory projects and 
programmes often fail to identify and involve the poorest of the poor and other 
marginalised social groups in participatory processes. Thus one of the key questions 
is how to ensure that the poorest and marginalised participate in development 
processes and have access to development benefits. 
 
Since the mid-1990s, international aid agencies including the UN and World Bank 
have been advocating a move towards tackling poverty. In this regard, a number of 
researchers and development agencies have initiated a livelihood approach as a way 
of improving understanding of the situations faced by the poor. This approach is now 
being used as a basis for designing, implementing and evaluating policy. Various 
decentralised and participatory programmes and projects have been supported to 
achieve this goal.  
Due to inequitable access to resources, poor people in developing countries 
are far more vulnerable to negative environmental changes than their 
wealthier counterparts, since they lack the means to cope and recover from 
the impact of such changes (International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 
(ISDR), 2002, p12). 






Participation in decision-making has been realised as the cornerstone to empowering 
target communities. Post-disaster reconstruction can be seen as an opportunity to 
address the social vulnerability of the affected community and use inclusive 
participation as a tool for empowerment. It is believed that disasters have the 
potential to create a moment of dislocation in the powers of the status quo (Pelling, 
2003). Reconstruction in Bam, Iran is a case in point and can be used to analyse this 
concept.  
 
Iran is one of the most earthquake-prone countries in the world (UNDP, 2004). The 
National Report of Iran (presented in Hyogo at 2005) indicates that 17.6 per cent of 
153 destructive earthquakes occurred in Iran during the last century. Thirty five 
percent of Asian earthquakes in the twentieth century took place in Iran (ibid). In the 
first four months of 2002, more than 100 earthquakes were registered by the 
International Institute of Earthquake Engineering and Seismology (IIEES). More 
than 180,000 people have been killed as a result of earthquakes in Iran during the last 
ninety years (National Report on Disaster Reduction, 2005). Four of the most 
disastrous earthquakes in Iran occurred in the last four decades: Boeen Zahra in 1961 
with 10,000 dead; Tabas in 1978 with 19,600; Manjil in 1990 with 35,000; and 
recently Bam with more than 30,000 fatalities (Khatam, 2006). These figures 
highlight how serious threat earthquakes are to countries, namely Iran in this case.  
 
Due to the vulnerabilities of Iranian cities to earthquakes and the high level of 
exposure to this hazard, the possibility of recurrence in the future is high. This means 
that the country will also be prone to more reconstruction efforts. As mentioned 
earlier, reconstruction brings about the opportunity to apply empowerment policies. 
This highlights the importance of reconstruction studies to the country. 
 
On 26 December 2003 at 05:27am (local time), the region of Bam in southeast Iran 
was struck by an earthquake registering 6.3 on the Richter scale which killed 31,828 
people. It was one of the most disastrous earthquakes in Iran. The high death toll was 
due to susceptible buildings, and the time of the earthquake which was in the early 





morning of the weekend and most people were asleep at that time (05:27am on 
Friday). 
 
This research aims to establish the social resilience of the Bami people after the 
earthquake by studying the implementation of a participatory approach and how 
successful it was at addressing the vulnerability of urban residents from Bam.  
According to Cleaver (2001, p36): 
 
There is little evidence of the long-term effectiveness of participation in 
materially improving the conditions of the most vulnerable people or as 
strategy for social change. 
 
This research attempts to fill the gap by furthering the participatory approach debate. 
The structure of the thesis will be as outlined below.  
1.2 Thesis Structure 
Chapter two focuses on the research methodology, in particular, the epistemological 
and ontological approaches of this research; methods of data collection; sampling; 
questionnaire design; and research strategy. 
 
Chapter three discusses the theoretical framework. There are six sections: The first 
two sections review the literature on the relationship between disaster and 
development and disaster and urbanisation. The third section, divided into seven sub-
sections, explores the concept of vulnerability through different approaches. The 
concepts of social resilience and a sense of belonging are also discussed in this 
section. Section four provides a framework of the relevant literature examining the 
notion of social capital. The ideas on this issue from prominent scholars are 
discussed. Section five explores the role of civil society and non-governmental-
organisations (NGOs) in reducing social vulnerability. In this section, the 
weaknesses of state-centred development projects will be highlighted and an 





examination of how these projects can improve through implementing participatory 
approaches by means of social capital will be presented. The final section considers 
existing literature on post-disaster reconstruction, in particular, highlighting the 
importance of reconstruction in shaping the social resilience of the affected 
community and reshaping local power structures.  
 
Chapter four gives an introduction to the institutional context of disaster 
management and reconstruction in Iran. In particular  the state structure in Iran after 
the revolution, urban governance, the situation of NGOs, the system of disaster 
management in Iran, and experiences of post-war and post-earthquake 
reconstructions.    
 
Chapter five contextualises Bam before and after the earthquake with a historical 
introduction before moving on to: The sources of livelihoods which shaped the 
structure of power, examining landownership and entitlement, the effects of the 1979 
Islamic Revolution, citizenship and entitlement, pre-earthquake Bam, the earthquake, 
and the designed structure of reconstruction management and governance.  
 
The thesis then follows three empirical chapters. Chapter six studies the resilience of 
residents of six of the most affected districts of Bam. This chapter is the outcome of 
field work and a questionnaire survey which took place in 2008. It explores the 
changes these districts experienced since the earthquake, notably in relation to family 
bonding ties, dependency rates, age and gender distribution in the districts, access to 
shelter and financial resources, neighbouring trust, trust towards new residents of 
Bam, social networking, and peoples’ perceptions of governance and empowerment.  
 
Chapter seven is titled "Bam Participatory Housing Reconstruction Approach and 
Outcomes". Through six sections, this chapter examines how reconstruction policy 
which was designed in Tehran by Tehrani professionals and how government 
members were successful in addressing the social vulnerability of Bami people 
through its participatory housing project. Furthermore it discusses how the housing 
project affected the residents’ sense of belonging. 






Chapter eight, the third empirical chapter, explores the roles and effectiveness of 
national and international NGOs on increasing the social resilience of Bam. It 
analyses how NGOs (with a focus on Iranian NGOs) at the later phases of 
reconstruction tried to connect to the local community, their main subject areas and 
communities, and how they affected the structure of power. The activities of foreign 
NGOs and international agencies and their relationship with Iranian NGOs are also 
considered. 
 
Chapter nine concludes the thesis. It presents a summary of key research findings. 
Some recommendations are suggested regarding more effective participatory 
approaches in development projects to increase the social resilience of communities. 
The chapter ends by summarising study limitations and future research areas 
requiring exploration. 
1.3 Conclusion 
This chapter provided an overview of the research. It discussed how recent disasters 
have made international organisations put important steps in place regarding 
increasing the social resilience of vulnerable communities, especially in less 
developed countries. It was argued that post-earthquake Bam can be helpful in 
enriching the debate on social resilience: through studying how in a country highly 
exposed to earthquake risk and with many experiences of reconstruction how the 
post-earthquake reconstruction phase of Bam was used by different stake-holders to 



















2.1  Introduction 
Disasters provide opportunities for change and empowerment for affected 
communities, but the people directly involved are often left out of the 
reconstruction planning process. This thesis addresses the effect of reconstruction 
policies and opportunity it provided on the social resilience of Bam. According 
to Flybjerg: 
"There does not and probably cannot exist predictive theory in social science. 
Social science has not succeeded in producing general, context-independent 
theory and, thus, has in the final instance nothing else to offer than concrete, 
context-dependent knowledge" (Flybjerg, 2006, p224). 





This chapter is structured into eleven main sections. After the introduction, the next 
section looks at the epistemological approach of the research, which will be followed 
by the presentation of the ontological approach. Section four delineates the 
justification of this study‟s qualitative and quantitative strategies. Section five will 
look at the research design of this study; it will discuss what this research is looking 
for and how it has aimed to address the identified issues. The next section explains 
the data collection methodology. Section eight examines the data analysis employed 
and the final section explores the ethical and moral issues that the author considered 
during the research. The chapter ends with some concluding facts.  
2.2  Epistemology of the Research 
Justification of our choice of methodology and methods depends on our theoretical 
perspective and epistemology: What kind of knowledge do we believe will be 
attained by our research? What characteristics do we believe that knowledge to 
have? According to Maynard (1994, p10): "epistemology is concerned with 
providing a philosophical grounding for deciding what kinds of knowledge are 
possible and how we can ensure that they are both adequate and legitimate". 
In conducting social research there is a need to clarify how research methods and 
practice connect with the wider social scientific enterprise. Research is largely 
undertaken in order to answer questions posed by theoretical considerations. 
However, an alternative view posits theory as something that occurs after the 
collection and analysis of data (Bryman, 2004).  
This research takes the epistemological perspective of hermeneutic-
phenomenological interpretivism. Interpretivism critiques the application of the 
scientific model to the study of the social world.  Unlike positivism, interpretivism 
looks for culturally derived and historically situated interpretations of social life 
world (Crotty, 1998, p67).  
There is a fundamental difference between the subject matter of the natural 
sciences and the social sciences and that an epistemology is required that will 
reflect and capitalize upon that difference. The fundamental difference 





resides in the fact that social reality has a meaning for human beings and 
therefore human action is meaningful (Bryman, 2004, p14). 
The forms of interpretivism are usually presented as symbolic interactionism, 
phenomenology and hermeneutics. This research applies the hermeneutic-
phenomenological approach since it tries to probe the influence of cultural and 
institutional factors of agencies affected by the earthquake of Bam on the nature of 
their social interactions and perspectives. The difference between symbolic 
interactionism and phenomenology according to Crotty (1998) is: 
Symbolic interactionism and phenomenology contrast with each other quite 
sharply in their attitudes towards culture as our inherited meaning system. 
Symbolic interactionism explores the understandings abroad in culture as the 
meaningful matrix that guides our lives. Phenomenology, however, treats 
culture with a good measure of caution and suspicion. Our culture may be 
enabling but paradoxically it is also crippling. While it offers us entrée to a 
comprehensive set of meanings, it shuts us off from an abundant font of 
untapped significance. (Crotty, 1998, p71) 
 
 
 Interpreting the actions and social world of the studied community from their 
point of view is a task hard to accomplish by social scientists. According to Bryman 
(2004), the social scientist has to place his or her interpretations into a social 
scientific frame. There is a double interpretation of others' interpretations. And then 
Box 2.1: phenomenology: a philosophy that is concerned with the question of 
how individuals make sense of the world around them and how in particular 
the philosopher should bracket out the preconceptions in his or her grasp of 
that world.  
Hermeneutic: a term that is drawn from theology and that when imported into 
the social sciences is concerned with the theory and method of the 
interpretation of human action 
Symbolic interactionists: argue that interaction takes place in such a way that 
the individual is continually interpreting the symbolic meaning of his or her 
environment (which includes the actions of others) and acts on the basis of 
this imputed meaning. Bryman (2004) p14 
 





there is a third level of interpretations because the researcher's interpretations have to 
be further interpreted in terms of the concepts, theories and literature of a discipline. 
This thesis‟ findings are the author's interpretation of the interviewees' 
interpretations. The author then placed her findings into a social scientific frame, by 
relating them to existing concepts and discussions in development studies like 
vulnerability, social capital, participatory approach debates and the role of NGOs as 
a possible factor for generating social capital.  
According to May et al (2001), however hard the sociologists may try to stand aside 
from the objects of their study, they are part of the experience and cannot separate 
completely from the knowledge that they seek to comprehend. "How do our 
individual biographies intertwine with the history we share with other human 
beings?" (May et al, 2001, p7).  
Being an Iranian-woman from Tehran, the researcher found strong connections with 
the agencies affected by Bam's earthquake. Despite the minor differences between 
the semi-urban culture of Bam and the urban culture of Tehran, the researcher shared 
similar religious and national values and norms with the researched community. This 
had both advantages and disadvantages. One advantage, from a social point of view, 
was that it facilitated the researcher to communicate with individuals and access their 
'common-sense thinking'. A disadvantage was that the researcher shared similar 
cultural perspectives with the studied community and hence had some limitations in 
her perspective on identifying any social shortcomings and problems. A Japanese or 
South American researcher, applying the same methodology, may determine 
different findings about the subject. 
"It is clear that different people may construct meaning in different ways, 
even in relation to the same phenomenon…in this view of things, subject and 
object emerge as partners in the generation of meaning". (Crotty, 1998, p9) 
 
 





2.3  Ontology of the Research 
This research adopts a constructionism ontology. Here it is assumed that there is no 
precise objective identifiable truth to be discovered. But we construct the meaning 
through our engagement with the realities in our world (Crotty, 1998). Becker 
believes that the constructionist position cannot be pushed to the extreme. As 
Bryman (2004, p19) cites Becker's idea:  
"It is necessary to appreciate that culture has a reality that 'persists and 
antedates the participation of particular people' and shapes their perspectives, 
but it is not an inert objective reality that only possesses a sense of constraint: 
it acts as a point of reference but is always in the process of being formed". 
Becker (1982, as cited by Bryman 2004, p17) stresses the active role of individuals 
in the social construction of social reality. According to him since there is no set of 
cultural understandings that embody the solution of all problems, people create new 
solutions to their day to day problems and subsequently adapt to the new situation 
and hence new cultural settings are created. 
2.4  Quantitative and Qualitative Strategies 
This research benefited from both qualitative and quantitative research strategies. 
The differences between quantitative and qualitative research is often presented as: 
quantitative research embodies an objective view of social reality, incorporates the 
practices of natural scientific model and of positivism and entails a deductive 
approach in which the accent is on the testing of theories; while qualitative research, 
unlike positivism, sees social reality as a constantly shifting emergent property of 
individuals' creation and emphasises an inductive approach to the relationship 
between theory and research in which the emphasis is placed on the generation of 
theories (Bryman, 2004).   
However, according to Bryman (2004), despite the differences in terms of the role of 
theory, epistemological issues and ontological concerns, the distinction between 
quantitative and qualitative research is not a "hard-and-fast" one. Studies that have 





the characteristics of one research study may have a characteristic of the other and it 
is believed that the two can be combined within an overall research project. 
By combining qualitative data with quantitative data the process of understanding 
the situation and the institutional framework that lies behind it can be facilitated. 
Qualitative methods, according to Snape and Spencer (2003), are useful tools for 
probing and understanding the nature and multiple dimensions of social phenomena 
and for identifying factors affecting these phenomena. According to Bell:  
“Researchers adopting a qualitative perspective are more concerned to 
understand individuals‟ perceptions of the world. They seek insight rather 
than statistical perceptions of the world. They doubt whether social „facts‟ 
exist and question whether a „scientific‟ approach can be used when dealing 
with human beings” (Bell, 2005, p7-8).  
Qualitative methods can feed the explanatory nature of the research. They are more 
open to the respondents than a structured questionnaire. Semi-structured interviews, 
as a qualitative method, reflect the behaviour and attitude of the interviewee towards 
the subject, which can be difficult to realise through questionnaires. However, this 
characteristic of open interviews along with observation as the main tools of 
qualitative research, expose it to the criticism of subjectivity and questions the 
validity of findings (Ritchie, 2003).  
Quantitative methods, on the other hand, can be used to modify the subjectivity of 
the findings and enrich the research. According to Burns and Grove (2001, p30)  
“Quantitative research is a systematic process of obtaining formal objective 
data to describe the variables and their relationships. Quantitative research 
uses structured tools to generate numerical data and uses statistics to 
interpret, organize, and represent the collected data”.  
However quantitative methods are less effective in understanding and explaining 
why people act and believe in a certain way instead of any other way. The 
incompetency is inevitable. According to Campbell: 





"After all, man is, in his ordinary way, a very competent knower, and 
qualitative common-sense knowing is not replaced by quantitative knowing. . 
.This is not to say that such common sense naturalistic observation is 
objective, dependable, or unbiased. But it is all that we have. It is the only 
route to knowledge—noisy, fallible, and biased though it be" (Campbell, 
1975, pp. 179, 191).  
2.5  Research Design 
This research focuses on the social resilience of Bam in reconstruction. The aim of 
this research is to probe the social vulnerability of Bam and to determine the success 
of the institutional arrangements and solutions adopted to address the vulnerability 
and increase the resilience of the Bami people. This analysis relies on the existing 
and current literature on social resilience. The researcher tried to understand and 
explain the findings through the academic lenses of: disaster, vulnerability, 
resilience, social capital, NGOs, State-community synergy, reconstruction 
opportunity and civil society concepts.  
The aim was to realise how existing norms guided the process of reconstruction, to 
what extent they were flexible and to determine how the obstacles (or opportunities) 
that appeared through the process may have transformed the existing norms. The 
hypothesis is that the institutions that emerge from the subjective process of post-
disaster reconstruction can be regarded as an opportunity to alter those institutional 
factors that increase vulnerability and move the trajectory of institutional evolution 
towards a more resilient society by means of social capital. 
The research tries to fulfil its aims through the following questions: 
 What are main informal institutions that shaped social capital in Bam? How 
did informal institutions form the reconstruction? How did Bam‟s social 
capital direct the reconstruction process and change as a result of 
reconstruction? What are the most vulnerable groups and what causes their 
vulnerability?  
 How did reconstruction influence informal institutions?  





 How did reconstruction affect the social capital of Bam? 
 What was the role of NGOs? How did NGOs transfer the notion of 
civil society, social determination and social inclusion in the 
reconstruction of Bam? What were their aims? What were their 
incentives? What was their recognition of empowerment? How did 
the reconstruction of Bam become an opportunity for Iranian NGOs' 
evolution? 
 What was the role of the government‟s reconstruction plan and policy 
guidelines? How did they infer participatory reconstruction? How did 
they implement it? How successful were they in using the approach? 
  How the findings from this research add to the debates on governance of 
reconstruction and social capital? 
Seven years have passed since the earthquake. The emergency phase has ended and 
the focus of media on the city has decreased. It is a good time to evaluate the 
outcomes of the reconstruction project and find out any evidence and success of 
empowerment policies applied through the participatory reconstruction.  
2.6  Collecting Data 
In order to find the answers to the above questions the research tried to determine 
indexes to measure and evaluate the key concepts such as vulnerability and social 
capital.  The research endeavoured to establish the most prominent and powerful 
social institutions that were active in Bam before and after the earthquake to shape 
and/or address the vulnerability of Bami people.  
It was realised that central government, as a social institution, had a great effect on 
the Bami's situation and perspective: having access to national resources and being 
legitimised through its link with religious beliefs of the community. The central 
government was seen as one of the most powerful stake-holders in conducting the 
reconstruction process and resilience of Bami people. It was understood through 
initial observation, conversations and interviews that, unlike the local government, 
there were great expectations from Bami people towards central government in 





directing resources to the area in terms of improvement of livelihoods and 
infrastructure.  
The government‟s perspective towards the reconstruction process and 
implementation of its projects were studied to probe the effectiveness of the 
government's policies in addressing the people's need. First the author met key 
informants, like lecturers in public policy, to determine the relevant representatives 
and branches of the central government concerned with reconstruction policies. In 
order to understand the government‟s centralised policy for reconstruction, some 
institutions including the Department of Risk Management and Disaster Risk 
Reduction in the Ministry of Interior, the Department of Reconstruction in the 
Housing Foundation, the Department of Urban Planning in the Ministry of Urban 
Planning and Housing, and the Department of Disaster Reduction in the University 
of Shaheed Beheshti of Tehran were visited and the highest available chair of these 
organizations were interviewed. Moreover, some of the main architects involved in 
designing the Housing Reconstruction Policy of Bam were also interviewed.  
To gain a better understanding of the subject, some of the other researchers who had 
studied the disaster discussed and shared their findings. In addition, documents 
related to Bam‟s reconstruction were either collected from professional libraries like 
the library of the Ministry of Urban Planning and Housing, University of Shaheed 
Beheshty, Housing Foundation, National Statistics Center, and the University of 
Social Welfare or were borrowed from professional agencies that were encountered 
and/or interviewed. The national parliament's website along with formal national 
newspapers' websites were also among the contributors to this research. 
The researcher visited Bam during the different phases of reconstruction to study the 
implementation process of the centralised design projects. The author's first visit to 
Bam took place on summer 2005 and lasted for one month. On spring 2008, for the 
purpose of the research, a visit was made to Bam that lasted for about two months: 
the questionnaire survey and some of the interviews with officials and NGO staffs 
took place at this period. To enrich the data a two week visit occurred to Bam on 
October 2008. Two more visits were made on summer and autumn 2009 to study the 





progress of reconstruction projects and NGOs' functions. To fulfil the research, in 
winter 2010 an in-depth interview survey took place with thirty seven Bami people 
to get a better understanding of the changes in the sense of belongings of Bami 
people seven years after the earthquake. Interviewees were selected randomly 
through the encounter of the researcher with local people. They were met by chance 
in the streets or public social spaces like the bazaar or through the use of public 
transport.   
To see the reconstruction from the eyes of Housing Foundation executives different 
methods were used. The head of the Reconstruction Bureau of the Housing 
Foundation as the chief executer of the central government's reconstruction policies 
was interviewed, along with other senior staff members; the Housing Foundation‟s 
reports of reconstruction were studied; and the previous and current heads of the City 
Council of Bam were also interviewed.  
Contacts were made with social activists and NGO workers in Bam who were in 
contact with the most vulnerable affected populations. Civil society shared their 
ideas about the housing reconstruction policy and acted as the gatekeeper to connect 
the researcher to the most vulnerable households. Finally, a few contractors 
responsible for implementing the reconstruction in Bam were interviewed. 
Available secondary data were collated to enrich the research. The local newspapers 
were also studied to understand the Bami's interpretation of the reconstruction 
policies. The local bulletin Shahrvandan-va-mosharekat reflected the local problems 
expressed by local people through many interviews. For six months (from January 
2004 to July 2004) the bulletin publicised people's problems. The author used data to 
get a better understanding about the level of sense of belonging and security of the 
residents at the early stages of reconstruction through the following indexes: the 
most troubling problems mentioned by the residents; the feeling of alienation of 
residents with their social surroundings through their view about change of social 
values; the influx of new comers to their area; and the new threats residents 
identified.   





The author considered that NGOs were another prominent, active and powerful 
institution in the reconstruction of Bam. This interpretation came from both the 
outstanding debates of the role of NGOs in development projects, which 
demonstrated that NGOs are important in fostering civil society, and the novelty of 
NGOs operational in Bam on a large scale after the earthquake.  
Through different stages of reconstruction, a number of visits were made by the 
author to Bam to study the activities of NGOs. Two NGOs, which were both 
historically and currently active NGOs in Bam: House of Mother and Child; and 
Ehya were studied. These two NGOs were also considered the best sources for 
creating links to the most vulnerable groups to capture their life histories. The 




 The life histories of twenty five households were documented. These twenty 
five households were the total number of households that resided in the 
House of Mother and Child‟s (HMC) housing project for the most 
vulnerable. 
 Seven households not residing in the housing project but supported by HMC 
were visited and their life histories and situation documented.  
 The researcher resided for a month with the NGO Ehya to observe, visit, and 
communicate with the Bami households supported by their work.  
Other NGOs were chosen based on snowball sampling. Through interviews with the 
management and staff of different NGOs the author was introduced to new NGOs 
and their activities. Available documents about the active NGOs in Bam were also 
studied. These documents were either introduced by the interviewees or found in 
professional libraries and bookstores in Bam, Tehran and Kerman. 
The considerable number of foreign NGOs that entered Bam after the earthquake 
made it hard for the researcher to ignore their influence on governance of post-
earthquake Bam. However, the government of Iran gave foreign NGOs limited time 
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 Life histories of the members of these NGOs are presented in chapter eight. These life histories are 
different from the thirty seven cases that are documented in chapter seven.  





to be active in Bam. Most of them left Bam by the end of the emergency phase, i.e. 
three months after the earthquake. Some stayed longer for a maximum of two years. 
Hence by the time of the research most of the foreign NGOs had left the field. To 
study their activity the researcher approached the Iranians who worked for those 
foreign NGOs during their activities in Bam. In some cases where there was need to 
contact an informant that was not in Iran, the contact was made through email. 
Foreign NGOs were mostly involved in physical infrastructure or service delivery 
projects. Because of the time limitations they had, they preferred either not to get 
involved in social empowering projects or did it through a local national NGO. To 
choose which foreign NGO to study with relevance to the research a visit was made 
to the department of management of NGOs in the local government of Bam. A list of 
all foreign NGOs active in Bam was collected and those few agencies with social 
empowering projects were studied. UNICEF and UN-Habitat were also among the 
foreign organisations that were studied and had long-term influences in Bam and are 
still active in that field. To study their activities, visits were made to their branches in 
Tehran. Data were collected through interviews and studying published documents. 
A survey using questionnaires was conducted across 196 Bami households to study 
the role of social capital in directing the reconstruction of Bam.  The questionnaire 
was designed to measure the social capital of Bam as close to reality as possible. In 
designing the questionnaire, the author drew upon existing literature on measuring 
social capital; namely the World Bank-published book "Measuring Social Capital" 
by Narayan, Grootaert, Nyhan Jones and Woolcock (2004). Based on their 
experiences studying social capital, the authors of the book designed a structure for 
questionnaires regarding measuring social capital. According to the book: 
"Though a survey tool is designed to generate quantitative data, we are 
conscious that a rich tradition of social capital research has drawn on 
qualitative methods" (p2). 
There is a debate that operationalising social capital in research is difficult in 
anything other than a qualitative way, and indicators always seem partial and 
deficient (Bebbington, 2008). Moreover, according to Krishna (2001) measures of 





social capital which are relevant for one set of cultures can be irrelevant for others. 
However, quantitative analysis would help to enrich research along with qualitative 
analysis to determine the extent of social capital in neighbourhood networks, civil 
networks, trust, bonding ties, and bridging ties especially in the large scale of a city 
like Bam with approximately one hundred thousand residents. Therefore quantitative 
analysis was also utilised. Furthermore the questionnaires became a means for the 
researcher to encounter the residents and observe the interviewee's situation, view 
points and informal responses. Through questionnaires general information about 
residents‟ socio-economic situation was gathered. This data informed a status report 
of the sample areas. The intention was that each questionnaire lasted no longer than 
fifteen minutes.  
Whilst conducting the survey, some questions seemed inappropriate or did not suit 
the context of Bam. Consequently, some changes were made to the design of the 
questionnaire, which further enriched the research and put the interviewees at ease. 
For example, one of the first questions of the questionnaire was asking about the 
number of members of the household who were killed or injured by the earthquake. 
This question made initial respondents uncomfortable. The author hence decided to 
move the question to near the end of the questionnaire when interviewees were more 
at ease with being questioned.  
Life histories of fourteen households from the questionnaire survey were document 
which seemed useful to the research. Moreover eight life histories from people who 
were encountered in daily routine activities (like the driver of the taxi that the author 
traveled with or some passer-by who were randomly chosen by the author to 
interview) also enriched the research. These interviews mostly took place in 2008. 
The stories of these people are presented mostly in Boxes in chapters seven and 
eight. These are different from the research of thirty seven cases (chapter seven) that 
were interviewed in 2010.  
 
The life histories collected in 2008 were helpful in designing the theme of the later 
interviews in 2010. Through the former interviews a better knowledge about Bami 
people and their viewpoint towards their surrounding was achieved. It was realized 





that palm groves were important factors in shaping the sense of belonging of Bami 
people and could be considered as important social capital. It also was realized that 
reconstruction of houses was the most important means to link people to the officials 
and executives of reconstruction. Reconstruction of houses was the most important 
factor in affecting the trust of people towards officials and increasing (or decreasing) 
their hope for future. In this regard the main themes of the semi-structured interviews 
of thirty seven households in 2010 were the effect of reconstruction on the palm 
groves and the viewpoints towards the effectiveness of the process of the 
reconstruction of houses. 
The unit of the research at this level is household. The household, as Pelling asserts 
(2003) is the most fundamental institution and basic unit of social organisation. A 
household in this research is defined as „a person or co-resident group of people who 
contribute to and/or benefit from a joint economy in either cash or domestic labour 
and share a shelter‟, or more simply, a group of people who live and eat together.  
2.7  Research Methods 
This research benefited from a variety of research methods and techniques. They 
include interviews composed of semi-structured interviews, life histories and 
structured interviews (questionnaire survey); case studies; observation; and 
document analysis. 
2.7.1 Interview Techniques 
2.7.1.1 Face-to-face and semi-structured 
 The interviews composed of introduction questions, follow-up questions, direct and 
indirect questions and in places where greater specificity was required probing 
questions. Semi-structured interviews took place with heads of NGOs and their staff; 
central and local government; the Housing Foundation's administrative officials; 
designers of the reconstruction plan; and researchers who had studied Bam.  Through 
semi-structured interviews with the researchers and NGOs the interviewees were 





asked questions such as how and why did they become involved in the 
reconstruction of Bam? How did they gradually communicated with and adapted into 
the field? What links were created through their work? What was their interpretation 
about the situation of Bami people after the earthquake? What were the main factors 
of vulnerability and how did they try to address them? To what extent were their 
presumptions close to the reality? What have they learned?  
The questions asked to the governmental and Housing Foundation's officials and 
designers of the reconstruction plan included what were their sources in designing 
the reconstruction plan? What were their priorities and why? How did they conduct 
the reconstruction? What were their challenges? Through what links did they 
connect to Bami people and how did they hear the Bami people's voices? What were 
the shortcomings according to them? If the same incident occurred again what would 
they change about their efforts? 
2.7.1.2  Questionnaire Technique 
The aim of the questionnaire is to explore the socio-economic characteristics of the 
sample community and the governance structure of reconstruction. Moreover, it is 
expected that questionnaires would shed light on how the governance structure and 
social capital affected the social and institutional structure of the community.  
 Questionnaire Design: 
Questionnaires are designed from a base of general questions followed by more 
specific questions. In this way the respondent should better understand the purpose 
and the aim of the research. The questions are mostly closed form to allow the 
respondent to give a clear definitive response. Moreover, as Bell states “the more 
structured a question, the easier it will be to analyse” (Bell, 2005, p137). Other 
advantages of closed questions are that they are easy to process, time-efficient and 
increase the validity of the information (since it reduces the variability in recording 
the answers) (Bryman, 2004, p148). At the same time, the benefit of open-ended 
questions is taken into account in terms of capturing information not expected by the 





researcher. Therefore an open-ended question was often ncluded at the end of some 
questions to elicit more qualitative data.  
For the purpose of this research the questionnaire was designed in four parts: (A) 
livelihood access characteristics of the household (Q 1-16, App 1); (B) social capital 
in forms of: membership in groups (Q 17, App 1), social networks (Q 18-23, App 1), 
trust and integrity (Q 24-26, App 1), cooperation and group activity (Q 27-30, App 
1), social interactions (Q 31 & 32, App 1), and sense of empowerment (Q 33 & 34, 
App 1). Part A was designed to collect general information about the interviewee and 
about the social structure and livelihood resources of the household. Part B aimed to 
figure out the social trust among neighbours and citizens and organisations, 
addressed the kind and intensity of social capital in community through networking, 
social gathering and bonding ties, and tried to measure empowerment through 
neighbours‟ cooperation and grievance processes. 
 Sampling:  
A total of 196 households were interviewed in six districts. Compared to Bam's
2
 
population of about one hundred thousand, 196 households cannot be regarded as a 
reliable representative sample of the city. It can be better considered as a rapid urban 
appraisal of the most affected regions of Bam. A rapid urban appraisal is more 
flexible, feasible and faster than a comprehensive citywide survey, considering the 
time and resource dedicated to this research. Through the appraisal the researcher 
learned directly from the local inhabitants (all questionnaires were completed by the 
researcher herself), which helped the thesis to reflect the voices of local residents and 
get closer to the local 'common sense'.  
Districts were chosen according to the following criteria: they must be located in one 
of the two areas most affected by the earthquake: the northeast of the city (citadel 
and surrounding districts), and the southeast. Bam is considered as a garden city i.e. 
Palm groves (Nakhlestan) and dense urban areas exist together.  
                                                 
2 The city of Bam, not the region of Bam 





Notwithstanding that the two areas both have been severely damaged, they were 
formed in different ways. The northeast area was shaped through the historical 
process of city expansion across the city walls, close to the old bazaar and the 
citadel, and includes the most affluent areas like Ferdosi district. The southeast 
region, on the other hand, was formed later in the city‟s periphery partly to 
accommodate the temporary workers districts like Eishabad and Fakhrabad are 
situated in this area.  
Three districts in each area were chosen to give a broader view of the affected people 
and to document the experiences households from different classes had undergone 
after the earthquake. In selecting the study areas, the author endeavoured to survey a 
cross-section of the most affluent, the most deprived, and middle class districts. Here 
it should be noted that in contrast to service or industrial based cities, Bam 
traditionally being an agricultural city does not benefit from clear distinction of areas 
in regard to division of class. The most common response when asking where the 
most affluent and most deprived districts of Bam were was “Bam does not have an 
uptown and downtown per se”. One local Bami suggested that “since Khans [i.e. the 
traditional landlords] and servants lived in the same neighborhoods and the city‟s 
economy has not yet expanded in service and industry that much, the uptown-
downtown style has not been shaped in Bam.”  
The six districts selected for the research are: Ferdosi (as the most affluent district), 
Hafezabad (as the most marginalized being the center of drug dealer, often called as 
Black area), and Takhti (one of the most earthquake damaged areas) in the northeast; 
and Janbazan, Bethat, and Eishabad (in the southeast) (Figure 2.1). The figure is an 
amalgamation of the Housing Ministry‟s Map of Districts of Bam and Ikonos map of 










Figure 2.1: Allocating sample wards on Map of Bam 
 
 
2.7.1.3 Life History 
 
Life history interview is described as documenting the "inner experience of 
individuals, how they interpret, understand, and define the world around them" 
(Faraday and Plummer, 1979, p776). The aim through recording life histories was to 
answer the following questions: what was the struggle that each household 
experienced during the emergency and reconstruction process? What kind of coping 
strategies did they use? What were the most important and troubling problems 
according to the households? What were their survival sources? What have they 
learned? To record the questionnaires the researcher actively tried to be a good 
listener and gave the interviewees times and confidence to share their experiences as 
much as possible. Life histories were beneficial in covering the issues that may not 
have been addressed through questionnaires and semi-structured interviews. 
Moreover it gave the interviewees the opportunity to share their interpretation of 
reconstruction in a better way than through questionnaires or semi-structured 
interviews. 





Along with the life histories collected from vulnerable groups approached through 
NGOs, a minimum of fourteen households was selected from interviewees of the 
questionnaire survey. The most vulnerable households or households that seem to 
have benefited disproportionately from the housing reconstruction policies were 
chosen. This stage gave a more in-depth understanding of the experience of 
reconstruction for social vulnerable groups since the disaster. The aim is to 
understand the experiences these groups had in the subsequent years of 
reconstruction. 
2.7.2 Case Study 
Using the case study of Bam to explore reconstruction allows greater depth in 
analysis and understanding of the ongoing process. According to Bryman (2004) 
case studies help to identify “the various interactive processes at work, to show how 
they affect the implementation of systems and influence the way an organization 
functions” (2004, p10). Yin defines case study as “an empirical enquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context” (Yin 1994: 13). 
Eisenhardt (1989) believes case study represents a strategy which focuses on the 
dynamics present within particular situations, using discourse material (such as 
questionnaire, interview and focus groups) as one element of its data. Thus it can be 
helpful for the investigation of complex social contexts. The case studies in general 
combine data from a number of parallel sources: archives, interviews, questionnaires 
etc. (Eisenhardt, 1989). In this regard, both qualitative and quantitative methods are 
needed to extract data from the field.  
Between April 2007 and October 2010 five visits to Bam took place. Bam is situated 
in a desert area and consequently has very hot weather at the end of spring and 
during summer. As a result, residents prefer to go to cooler areas and government 
staffs usually work part-time. In this regard, conducting the research in summer 
would reduce access to important interviewees, and affect the richness of the 
research. Therefore Trips to Bam occurred mostly in spring, fall and winter.  





2.7.3 Document Analysis 
By studying the news about the Bam earthquake through content analysis the 
following considerations were applied: attempts were made to access the published 
data about Bam as much as possible; the most prominent national, international and 
local resources including ten national newspapers, some international websites 
including BBC, ReliefWeb, ODI, UNICEF, and UN-Habitat and two local 
newspapers were studied and all the news related to reconstruction and socio-
economic issues of Bam since the earthquake were collected. Informal and unreliable 
resources were disregarded. 
2.7.4 Observation Technique 
This research benefited from unstructured observation technique. The aim was to 
record the ongoing process in as much detail as possible. While in the initial visits to 
Bam the observation was general with the aim of gaining a general view about the 
process, in later visits the observations became more purposeful and targeted such as 
studying the evolution of specific NGOs, the quality of life of specific households or 
the relationships of neighbours.  
2.7.5 Tools for Collecting Data 
Various tools for data collection were employed. Interviews were digitally recorded 
or/and transcribed with the consent of the interviewees. Observations were noted 
down in four diaries. On occasions where additional information was needed and 
further questions arose during the data analysis, telephone calls were made with the 
interviewees to complete the information. Internet was also helpful in accessing both 
formal and informal information and email to make contact with key informants. 
  





2.8  Analysing Data 
Different indicators were used through questionnaires to measure social capital.  
For measuring the strength of bonding ties the following indicators were used:  
 the household size,3  
 the number of households living with their extended family (under one roof 
or in adjacent buildings),  
 the number of times per month relatives would meet each other,  
 and how had these factors have changed since the earthquake. 
To measure the level of affluence of households the following indicators were used:  
 the number of members of the households who had jobs,  
 the access of the households to a private car,  
 whether they are supported by the government's social policies in terms of 
benefiting governmental remittance or not,  
 the number of people per room (i.e. how many rooms were shared among 
how many members of the households)  
 and the dependency rate (i.e. the number of members who earn money to the 
number of members who consume money in the household).  
 The number of completed houses was another factor that was studied to find 
out the speed of housing reconstruction in different areas and relate this rate 
of reconstruction to other factors including age and the affluence of the 
households. 
To measure the level of trust, networking and norms of reciprocity of households 
they were asked the following questions:  
 did they know their neighbours?  
                                                 
3  Household composition is both a determinant of the capabilities, choices and strategies 
available to a household, and may be an outcome of strategic decisions about fertility or 
where members of the family reside (Rakodi, 2002). 





 To what extent did they trust their neighbours?  
 Would they leave their children with them?  
 Have they done anything with their neighbours in benefit of the district since 
the earthquake?  
To study their coping strategies households were asked:  
 in time of financial difficulty from whom would they borrow money?  
 Have they sent any grievance letters to the government or any other informal 
organisations?  
 How powerful do they think they are in governing their city? 
To analyse the questionnaires' data, an indicator for each question was defined and a 
frequency table was used to determine the number and percentage belonging to each 
category. Diagrams were used to present the results and facilitate understanding and 
interpretation of the data. 
Coding was used based on the theme of the answers to analyse the semi-structured 
interviews. The researcher examined the answers to semi-structured questions in 
interviews and grouped them into different categories. In coding the data, efforts 
were made to avoid any overlap of the categories and to ensure all the factors 
revealed in the responses from the interviewees were categorised.  
2.9   Ethical and Moral Issues  
The role of researcher in social science and especially field work is a highly sensitive 
position in conducting the process. Social research, in contrast with scientific 
research, does not deal with objects. Its targets are humans. Humans shape their 
attitude and behaviour depending on their perception of each other. A social 
researcher is not excluded from this fact and his/her presence will influence 
respondents‟ attitudes towards the research. During the research the fact that the 
researcher was a woman facilitated the process of research in many occasions. Bamis 
are religious Muslims and many of the women in Bam, especially in more deprived 
areas, remain indoor and not comfortable communicating with unknown men. Being 





a woman, the author had the advantage of gaining the trust of Bami women to 
communicate with them openly. Especially in life history cases Bami women shared 
their stories with comfort. Not to trigger their sense of alienation and to respect the 
culture of Bam, the author adopted a culturally sensitive dress similar to Bami 
culture and avoided western style or Teherani style clothing.  
During interviews the researcher applied a passive position. It should be mentioned 
that at the early stages of the research it was harder for the author to control her 
emotions, but gradually the researcher became more self-aware and experienced to 
play a solid listener role. 
Another issue that this research will pay attention to is the protection of respondents‟ 
information in terms of confidentiality. In this regard, the identities of respondents 
are concealed and are only used by the author for the selection of key informants in 
the later stages of the study. In terms of government staff, the intention was to state 
only their positions instead of their names.  
All interviews occurred with informed consent of the interviewees. At the beginning 
of each interview the researcher introduced herself and explained the purpose of the 
study. Interviewees were free to participate in sharing data.  
The researcher was loyal to the research and views are presented as they were 
revealed. Considerable effort was made to transfer the meaning of the questions to 
the respondents in order to ensure that all the questions were understood and had 
consistent meanings to all respondents. In translating the information from Persian to 
English the translations were done by the author and endeavoured to reflect the 
original meaning as far as possible. 
2.10  Conclusion 
This chapter looked at the epistemological and ontological approaches that this 
research applies. It justified the combination of quantitative and qualitative strategies 
to enrich this research. The aims and structure of the research were discussed. The 
logic of the research design was explained and the methods and techniques for data 





collection were presented. The chapter also explored the data analysis techniques and 
process and how the ethical and moral issues confronted by the researcher were 
addressed. 






Literature Review: Addressing 







Understanding the notion of vulnerability is vital in disaster risk reduction discourse. 
Disasters, as Quarantelli (1986) believes, are the manifestations of the vulnerabilities 
of a social system, where doing something about such vulnerabilities, should be 
given attention. Social vulnerability is the main aspect of vulnerability that this 
research examines. Social aspects of vulnerability are those social factors that shape 
the susceptibility of various groups to harm and that govern their ability to respond 
(Cutter, 2003). 





This literature review begins with defining the notion of disaster and its relationship 
to development. The concept of vulnerability will be explored through prominent 
approaches found in the social science literature. This chapter is divided into six 
sections. The first section discusses the importance of disaster discourse in the 
development literature. The second section will discuss the relationship between 
urbanisation and disaster. The third section analyses the concept of social 
vulnerability in relation to disaster and development. This section is divided into 
seven sub-sections: Studying vulnerability through a livelihood or entitlement 
approach; vulnerability and poverty; the Pressure and Release model; vulnerability 
and resilience; an Institutional approach to Vulnerability; vulnerability and 
participatory approaches; and vulnerability coupled with a sense of belonging. 
The chapter then sketches out a conceptual framework for understanding the notion 
of social capital. It will be argued that different forms of social capital, namely 
cognitive and structural forms, are useful in reducing social vulnerabilities. This 
research studies the notion of social capital through the following titles: Origin of 
social capital; Putnam's social capital; the dark side of social capital; and the 
contribution of social capital to development studies.  
This research further explores the dynamics between the national state, NGOs and 
local communities. This section discusses the role of state and civil society in 
governance with a focus on the debates of Habermas about the relationship between 
the state and civil society. It further presents some of the examples of state-centred 
development projects. The section additionally highlights some of the problems 
associated with centralised development programmes and presents possible 
solutions, for example, by developing transformative participation with NGOs, and 
by giving attention to cognitive social capital. Post-disaster reconstruction is one of 
the principal opportunities for states, local communities and NGOs to practice 
participatory approaches and thereby create opportunities for social capital. 
 






3.2 Development and Disaster 
Natural disasters are defined as a serious disruption of the functioning of a 
community or a society involving widespread human, material, economic or 
environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected 
community or society to cope using its own resources (UNISDR Terminology, 
2007). Studies on natural disasters have revealed a correlation with the development 
level of the affected community (Alexander 1993, Pelling 2003, Blaikie et al 2003). 
With the creation in 2005 of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) the focus on 
disaster risk reduction has increased, and its link to social resilience has been 
highlighted. On page 23 of the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building 
the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters, the strategic goals are 
presented as: 
1. The integration of disaster risk reduction into sustainable development 
policies and planning. 
2. The development and strengthening of institutions, mechanisms and 
capacities to build resilience to hazards. 
3. The systematic incorporation of risk reduction approaches into the 
implementation of emergency preparedness, response and recovery 
programmes. 
Evidence from recent disasters has proved that natural disasters can hinder the 
development process. Hurricane Mitch in 1998 is eminent in this regard for affecting 
Nicaragua and Honduras so severely that, according to Carlos Flores, (then President 
of Honduras), "we lost in 72 hours what we have taken more than 50 years to build 
bit by bit" (Cannon, 2008, p301). Disaster, as a manifestation of development failure, 





reduces the well-being and quality of life for the people in the affected area. For this 
reason, post-disaster recovery is seen by some scholars as an opportunity to apply 
development factors in the affected community: 
It is important to realize that the post-disaster „recovery process‟ is one in 
which an underdeveloped system is forced to achieve a re-adaptation to an 
environment using limited resources, a process not unlike the processes by 
which development or underdevelopment are produced to begin with…in 
other words we must recognize that „recovery‟ especially in an 
underdeveloped society, is a „development process‟ in and of itself. It 
amounts to the establishment of a set of patterns which reassert the 
adjustment of a human population to an environment. After all, development 
itself amounts to a process by which a population improves its level of 
adaptation an environment and through such improvements raises the level at 
which it satisfies human needs and wants, and at the same time lowers its 
level of vulnerability to disruption. For these reasons, the recovery process 
can be one which either increases or decreases the level of development of a 
community. (Bates and Peacock, 1989, p362-363) 
Disaster discourses have helped the development discourse to incorporate social and 
political views because disasters are deeply embedded within social vulnerability. 
Cannon (2008) believes disasters cannot be separated from problems encountered in 
daily life. Anderson and Woodrow (1989 as cited by Moser 1998) argue that 
development should be regarded as a process through which people's physical, social 
and attitudinal vulnerabilities are reduced.  
3.3 Urbanisation and Disaster 
Urbanisation has close links with economic growth since goods and services are 
often produced most efficiently in densely populated areas that provide (1) access to 
a collection of skilled labour, (2) a network of complementary firms that act as 





suppliers, and (3) a significant number of customers (Rakodi, 2002). This fact (often 
contributed by the neglect of rural areas by policymakers) attracts people from rural 
areas and small towns to bigger cities lured by the attraction of job opportunities. 
Dense patterns of urban living are one of the key reasons that contribute to risk 
generation. Cities constitute only 1 percent of the land area of the earth, but they 
accommodate more than half of the world‟s population and the majority of its 
physical capital (building, infrastructure) (Pelling, 2003, p22). Hewitt (1997) realises 
four factors that increase urban vulnerability to hazard in terms of its high density: 
First, due to the increasing scale and dense pattern of urban areas, energy routes are 
concentrated close to residential areas; second, the high density of cities facilitates 
disease transmission, which along with congestion, constrains disaster relief; third, 
the complexity of the cities and links between different elements and activities 
expose people to the domino factor – damage on one sector easily affects another 
sector; fourth, urban populations can become targets of political conflict and be 
mistreated (as cited by Pelling, 2003). 
The rapid population growth of cities because of in-migration has decreased the 
ability of planners and decision makers to control the city. Studies conducted by the 
United Nations suggest that 80 percent of population growth in the next few decades 
will occur in urban areas. According to the UNDP's global report (2004): Reducing 
Disaster Risk: A Challenge for Development, when populations expand faster than 
the capacity of urban authorities or the private sector to supply housing or basic 
infrastructure, the risk in informal settlements increases.  
This rapid growth and inability of authorities to control the process has resulted in 
the mushrooming of urban populations living in the peripheries, and of squatter 
settlements which are mostly inhabited by the urban poor who live in sub-standard, 
small dwellings and prone to landslides and floods (Aysan, 1992). These groups are 
often marginalised and excluded from formal housing, credit and loan facilities 
reducing options for households to improve their physical vulnerability and reduce 





their exposure to hazard (Pelling, 2003). In times of natural hazard, they are often the 
most affected people who have the least coping strategies. 
There is also the risk of vulnerability for transient or migrant populations. For these 
people, social and economic networks in cities tend to be loose. Their 
marginalisation leads to a lack of access to resources and increased vulnerability. 
These people are often forced to make difficult decisions about risk. Living in 
hazardous locations is sometimes „chosen‟ if it provides access to work, for example, 
in the city centre (UNDP's global report: Reducing Disaster Risk: A Challenge for 
Development, 2004).  
Cities are expanding not only in size but also in number; cities which until recently 
were sparsely populated, are now home to hundreds of thousands of inhabitants 
(Aysan, 1992). Rapid housing construction in response to this increasing demand has 
resulted in sub-standard construction.  
3.4 Introducing Social Vulnerability to Disaster Discourse 
Whilst physical phenomena are necessary for the production of natural 
hazard, their translation into risk and potential for disaster is contingent upon 
human exposure and a lack of capacity to cope with the negative impacts that 
exposure might bring to individuals or human systems (Pelling, 2003, p4). 
The literature on disaster is linked to the concepts of vulnerability, resilience and 
coping capacity. According to Bankoff (2004), vulnerability is the key concept in 
understanding disaster. There are different stances on the definition of vulnerability 
in social science. Understanding vulnerability helps to better define the problem and 
find sustainable and effective solutions to urban disaster risk and integrate better 
reconstruction and development.   





In the 1990s, the focus of disaster studies was directed to social vulnerability. As 
Lewis argues: 
…instead of regarding disasters as purely physical occurrences requiring 
largely technological solutions, as was widespread until the 1970s, such 
events are better viewed primarily as the result of human actions, as the 
actualization of social vulnerability (1999, p8). 
Hewitt (1983) and Quarantelli (1978) were among the premier scholars who 
challenged the dominant view to focus on technology and expert solutions to 
disaster. They stated that disasters were not physical happenings, but social events:   
It is a misnomer to talk about natural disasters as if they could exist outside 
of the actions and decisions of human beings and societies. For instance, 
floods, tornadoes, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, tsunamis, and other so 
called natural disaster agents have social consequences only as a result of the 
pre-, trans-, and post-impact activities of individuals and communities 
(Quarantelli, 1992, p3). 
Hewitt (1983) directed attention towards viewing disasters as social and 
anthropogenic and not only as „accidental‟ and ‟natural‟ occurrences: 
In hazards work one can see how language is used to maintain a sense of 
discontinuity and otherness, which severs these problems from the rest of 
man-environment relations and social life. That is most obvious in the 
recurrent use of words stressing the "un"-ness of the problem. Disasters are 
unmanaged phenomena. They are the unexpected, the unprecedented. They 
derive from natural processes or events that are highly uncertain. 
Unawareness and unreadiness are said to typify the condition of their human 
victims. Even the common use of the word (disaster) "event" can reinforce 
the idea of a discrete unit in time and space (Hewitt 1983, p10).  





3.4.1 Entitlement/Livelihood Approach 
Sen‟s argument, in his 1981 seminal work „Poverty and Famine', about the 
importance of individual entitlements to resources in shaping vulnerability towards 
famine enriched the development and disaster debate. In his book, he argues that 
famine is not always a consequence of the shortage of food, but can be the result of 
the lack of command of specific people over food. He believes famine is not always 
about the problem of there being enough food in a community, but it more about 
people having enough food. Entitlement (as the legal and customary rights to 
exercise command over food and other necessities of life) was presented as the main 
cause of famine. 
The studies of entitlement have close connections with the notion of power. To Sen 
(1981), a person‟s ability to command any commodity he wishes depends on what he 
owns, what exchange possibilities are offered to him, what is given to him for free, 
what is taken away from him, and in sum, on the entitlement relations that govern 
possession and use in that community. According to Sen (1984): 
Entitlements are the set of alternative commodity bundles that a person can 
command in a society using the totality of rights and opportunities that he or 
she faces (Sen, 1984, p497). 
The entitlement approach has been incorporated into thinking about vulnerability in 
relation to hazards more generally. In development studies, this can also be seen 
occurring through the livelihood approach. According to Chambers and Conway 
(1992), a livelihood is defined as comprising, „the capabilities, assets (including both 
material and social resources) and activities required for means of living‟ (DFID, 
1992, p1). Applying this thinking to urban disaster impact, loss of household assets 
due to shocks or any other reason reduces the entitlements of households and 
exposes them to threatening situations (Pelling 2003, Carney 1998), as Carney 
recognises:  





A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses 
and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and 
in the future (Carney, 1998, p4). 
3.4.2 Vulnerability and Poverty 
It can be argued that the loss of productive assets, if not addressed properly, exposes 
households to long-term poverty: 
Household or individuals are considered poor when the resources they 
command are insufficient to enable them to consume sufficient goods and 
services to achieve a reasonable minimum level of welfare… Deprivation 
occurs when people are unable to reach a certain level of functioning or 
capability (Rakodi, 2002, p4).  
Chambers (1989) adds physical weakness, isolation and powerlessness as factors 
exposing people to poverty. Poverty can also be defined, not only by lack of assets 
and inability to accumulate a variety of them, but also by “lack of choice with 
respect to alternative coping strategies” (Rakodi, 2002, p6). As Rakodi (2002) 
argues, households can have access to a portfolio of both tangible  (cash, food and 
land) and intangible (claims on others and the government, and access to rights‟ 
services) assets. They decide on how to use this portfolio. The strategy that 
households apply depends both on the portfolio held and on the household‟s 
capability to use livelihood opportunities. The most vulnerable households have to 
adopt strategies that enable them to survive but strategies which will not help to 
improve their welfare (Rakodi, 2002). 
 






Figure 3.1: Pressure and Release Model (Source: Blaikie et al., 1994 ) 





3.4.3 Pressure and Release (PAR) model of Vulnerability 
Blaikie et al (1994) in their seminal work: "At Risk: natural hazards, people's 
vulnerability and disaster" (1994), synthesized Hewitt's and Sen's approaches in 
dealing with disasters. They argue that disasters are natural hazards transformed into 
disasters due to the level of vulnerability of the affected community. People‟s 
vulnerability is generated by social, economic, and political processes that influence 
how hazards affect people in different ways. In contrast to Hewitt (1983), who was 
not very precise in defining the concepts of disaster and tended to use the concepts of 
hazard, disaster and catastrophe interchangeably, Blaikie et al (1994) created explicit 
definitions for the main concepts of disaster studies to such a degree that "At Risk" 










Box 3. 1. Disaster: A disaster consists of three interrelated factors; hazard (H), 
vulnerability (V), and risk (R). These three factors relate to each other via the 
equation R = H + V, which is the definition of a disaster.  
Hazard: A hazard is the physical agent in a disaster. A hazard can be 
forecasted via probability studies. However, the statistical likelihood of a given 
hazard to occur says very little of the actual level of risk a given society or 
segment of a population is subjected to (Blaikie et al 1994, p21) 
Risk: The risk concept is somewhat more problematic as it is hard to separate 
it analytically from the concept of disaster as "risk is a compound function of 
this complex (but knowable) natural hazard and the number of people 
characterised by their varying degrees of vulnerability who occupies the space 
and time of exposure to extreme events" (Blaikie et al 1994, p21).  
Vulnerability: The characteristics of a person or group and their situation that 
influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist or recover from the 
impact of hazard" (Blaikie et al 1994, p11). 
 





Blaikie et al (1994) presented a comprehensive hazard and vulnerability model 
called the Pressure and Release (PAR) model (Figure 3.1). Despite the fact that 
vulnerability factors are numerous, complex and very context-based, a diagrammatic 
summary presentation can be helpful. PAR is an acceptable and simplified 
manifestation of the relation between vulnerability and disaster. The PAR model 
identifies a chain of factors that affect vulnerability as root causes (like power 
structure, debt crisis and civil security) and dynamic pressures (like women's status, 
rights, and livelihoods) which lead to unsafe conditions (like fragile self-protection 
and social protection). In the PAR model, the risk of being harmed by a hazard (like 
earthquakes, floods, and drought) is represented by the pressure of the hazard on one 
side against the vulnerability conditions on the other: 
The basis for the Pressure and Release model (PAR) idea is that a disaster is 
the intersection of two opposing forces: those processes generating 
vulnerability on one side, and physical exposure to a hazard on the other. The 
image resembles a nutcracker, with increasing pressure on people arising from 
either side - from the vulnerability and from the impact (and severity) of the 
hazard on those people at different degrees of vulnerability. The "release" idea 
is incorporated to conceptualise the reduction of disaster: to relieve the 
pressure, vulnerability has to be reduced (Blaikie et al. 1994, p22). 
3.4.4 Vulnerability and Resilience 
Analyzing vulnerability involves identifying not only the threat but also the 
„resilience‟, or responsiveness in exploiting opportunities, and in resisting or 
recovering from the negative effects of a changing environment (Moser 1998, 
p3). 
In vulnerability studies, the concept of resilience has gained wide currency. Holling 
et al (1995) define resilience as “the buffer capacity or the ability of a system to 
absorb perturbations, or the magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before a 





system changes its structure by changing the variables and processes that control 
behaviour (as cited by Adger, 2000, p349). 
For Pelling (2003), resilience is one of the components of vulnerability. He divides 
vulnerability into three components: Exposure (as a product of physical location and 
character of the surrounding built and natural environment); resistance (as the 
capacity of an individual or group of people to withstand the impact of hazards in 
economic, psychological and physical health terms); and resilience (as the ability of 
an actor to cope with or adapt to hazard stress).  
Davis (2006) also believes in the importance of paying attention to two forms of 
dealing with hazards namely: The ability to absorb the shocks of the hazard impact 
(what Pelling calls resistance) and the capacity to bounce back during and after 
disaster (what Pelling calls resilience). However, Davis entitles both forms as phases 
of resilience. He also adds another phase: "The opportunity for change and 
adaptation following a disaster (thus to reduce the time needed for recovery as well 
as patterns of vulnerability)” (Ian Davis, 2006, p12).   
Pelling (2003) believes all three components are shaped by an actor's access to 
rights, resources and assets. In a way, Pelling meets Sen's argument about individual 
entitlements to resources and rights which shape (and is shaped by) the structure of 
power. For a community to absorb the shock and escape from deprivation depends 
on their initial assets and on their ability to transform those assets into income, food 
or other basic necessities (Moser, 1996).  
3.4.5 Vulnerability through an Institutional approach 
An institutional approach can contribute to a better analysis of vulnerability, 
resilience and reconstruction. Institutions are an outcome of the interaction of social 
structures with agency. North defines institutions as: 





The rules of the game of a society, or more formally, are the humanly devised 
constraints that structure human interaction. They are composed of formal 
rules (status law, common law, and regulations), informal constraints 
(conventions, norms of behaviour and self imposed codes of conduct) and the 
enforcement characteristics of both (North, 1997, 23). 
Institutions and the relationship between the formal rules and the norms of the 
society are key elements in explaining development and risk relations. They reflect 
and shape the power relations that define interaction among actors and represent the 
relationship between humans with their surrounding environment. Mushtaq Khan 
(1995) argues that it is political power that defines the ranking of institutions: 
The performance ranking of institutions is specific to the inherited political 
power of classes or groups subject to the institution (Mushtaq Khan, 1995, 
p71). 
Through institutional change, the vulnerability of people can either be exacerbated or 
reduced to enhance human security (Adger 1999, Pelling 2003). According to Adger 
(2000), the social resilience of a community depends on the institutions of that 
society; both modes of socialised behaviour, and formal structures of governance or 
law.  
Pelling‟s idea (2003), is that to reduce vulnerabilities, and for the entitlements of the 
locally marginalised to be enhanced, attention needs to be paid to the formal and 
more importantly informal institutions that lead to such marginalisation within the 
local community.  
People with lower access to resources, civil rights, supporting networks and health 
conditions suffer more from natural disasters due to their higher level of 
vulnerability. Societal institutions (including state, law, religion, kinship and family), 
norms and policies shape the power structures and distribution of resources in a 





society. Thus, they play a crucial role in excluding individuals from full participation 
in the social and political life of the societies; hence social vulnerability, or what 
Adger (1999) calls "collective vulnerability": 
Extensive research over the past thirty years has shown that in general, it is 
the weaker groups in society that suffer worst from disasters: the poor 
(especially), the very young and the very old, women, the disabled and those 
who are marginalized by race or caste. Those who are already at an economic 
or social disadvantage tend to be more likely to suffer during disasters 
(Twigg, 2004, p16). 
3.4.6 Vulnerability and Participatory approaches  
The role of inclusive participation in opening space for actors to challenge existing 
structures of power through changing institutions has gained increasing attention in 
recent years. 
Oliver-Smith (1996) states that disasters can accelerate changes that were underway 
before the disaster by manifesting the weaknesses in political-economic power 
structures which may then result in reinterpretation of development structure and 
processes. He believes that rapid local, state, national or international aid and the 
convergence of local and non-local people and goods that result from the disaster can 
be as great a source of change as the disaster itself.  
Pelling (2003) also agrees that disasters and the phases that follow have the potential 
to create substantial socio-political changes. He believes that disasters can institute a 
new form of governance through informal responses that operate outside established 
social frameworks: 
At the heart of the political actions [after disasters]… is a tension between 
formal responses to disaster that come from, and so potentially give political 





power to, the state and its institutions on one hand, and on the other, informal 
responses that operate outside of established planning and social frameworks 
and potentially weaken the established socio-political order. Such responses 
may not have it as a goal to challenge the authority of the state or local social 
elite, but by operating outside of established norms they create an example of 
an alternative form of social organization that can stimulate subsequent 
critiques of the pre-disaster social system (Pelling, 2003, p42). 
To Pelling (2003), the optimum institutional position is when grassroots and NGO 
participation facilitates engagement of urban citizens in the democratization process. 
Progressive civil society and local government can create opportunities for those 
previously excluded from full participation in society. They can play the role of 
advocate for the powerless as well as spreading information throughout the 
community. Through synergy between civil society and the state, resources can be 
distributed more equally and transparently among communities.  
Reality however, does not conform to the theoretical optimism of change of 
governance in favour of democratization. A study by Christoplos et al (2001) on 
Post-Mitch Nicaragua shows that the centralised decision-making of the central 
government of devolving authority to municipal governments, and its strategy of 
retaining control over relief and rehabilitation resources, resulted in weakening of the 
incomplete process underway before the disaster. 
Disasters provide a window of opportunity for advocacy, but experiences 
suggest that it is doubtful if this advocacy has had any impact on policies or 
their implementations (Christoplos et al, 2001, p250).  
If we are going to accept the fact that disasters are outcomes of social vulnerabilities 
and such vulnerabilities continue to appear after the occurrence of a hazard, then the 
recovery and reconstruction phases following a disaster are great opportunities for 
addressing such vulnerabilities. For solving the vulnerability problem, it is crucial to 





define the problem precisely and correctly. Through this approach, the development 
trajectory following disaster would take the community to a higher level of resilience 
than they were before the disaster. To try to keep the status quo ante would block the 
evolution of the affected community and show a lack of the third phase of Davis's 
resilience (i.e. the opportunity for change and adaptation following a disaster).  
Though vulnerability factors are very context based and differ in communities, 
recent studies on disaster and development suggest that there is much to be gained 
from participatory approaches. Vulnerabilities are alleged to be outcomes of social 
marginalisation and exclusion (which are consequences of entitlement framework 
shaped through different facts: History, modern global pressures, religion, 
geographical boundaries, etc). In this regard, participation appears as a sound answer 
to enhance local resilience (especially when promoted in tandem with structural 
advances in governance for risk reduction).  
Trends in reconstruction are greatly influenced by development trajectories prior to 
the disaster (Kates, Haas and Bowden 1977, Quarantelli 1982, Alexander 1997). The 
efforts made during the reconstruction period have a critical role in decreasing or 
exacerbating the vulnerability of the community. In other words, while the condition 
of a community affected by disaster is the product of the development process of the 
area before the disaster, the community that arises after the reconstruction is the 
consequence of reconstruction policies and the way they are implemented. 
Kelman et al (2008) believe for community-based projects it is initially important to 
ask "who is the community?" They argue (2008) that communities are rarely 
homogeneous and there are always divisions by gender, age, experience, leadership 
capability, leadership style, culture and religion. Hence, the importance of 
indentifying how a community is defined by itself and by others (for example 
geographically or culturally); who purports to represent the community and how they 
achieved that position; and who is marginalised from a community. The answers 





might assist in understanding the different views and characteristics of communities 
(Kelman et al, 2008). 
According to Kelman et al (2008), to move towards achieving a just, inclusive 
participatory and community-based approach, it is also important to combine 
external and internal knowledge through some form of participatory action-oriented 
community risk assessment. In this way, some solutions will be provided externally, 
some locally, and many will be developed through collaboration. The result will 
encompass the risks which are identified by the local community and those where 
there is marginal awareness by people but no direct experience (Kelman et al, 2008). 
3.4.7 Vulnerability and Sense of Belonging 
To study the effect of a disaster on a community, it is helpful to find out what the 
disaster has damaged and what this reveals about the pre-disaster society. Damage 
depends on the type of hazard, but for the sake of this research, earthquake is more 
relevant to the debate. When an earthquake strikes along with physical and human 
losses, it also leaves social and psychological damage. Through destruction of the 
built environment, the individual loses his or her connection with the surrounding 
environment which, before the earthquake, accommodated home, memories, social 
and private spaces. The places that an individual once communicated with and 
posited oneself in vanish in a moment.  In an extreme case like Bam, with high death 
tolls, the very demography of the place changes as well. With loss of the familiar 
built environment and social networks, individuals face problems of interpretation 
and identity. The individual has to posit oneself in a new space and adapt 
perceptions, expectations, and resources in accordance with this new space. Based on 
the individual‟s ability, the person tries to remake the destroyed social as well as 
physical space. Capacity to adapt to new situations is one way of interpreting and 
indicating levels of individual and group resilience. To expand on this hypothesis, it 
is helpful to understand the theoretical debates around the subject of „sense of 
belonging‟. 





Social structure existing in a community creates a safe culture that Shaw defines as: 
…a set of norms, rules, beliefs, attitudes and social and technical practices… 
which are concerned with minimizing the exposure of individuals to 
conditions considered dangerous (2004, p23).  
This research adopts this definition for a „sense of belonging‟. 
Community and place are factors that give individuals a sense of security, identity 
and belonging. Place (i.e. a space imbued with meaning) gives a person collective 
and individual identity (Simpson and Corbridge, 2006). In this way, location alone 
does not in itself make a community (Martin 2003). This is important for 
reconstruction where most emphasis is on the reconstruction of a physical space, not 
on the reconstruction of place. To many scholars, the important factor that 
contributes to the creation of group identity is the memory of a place that its 
inhabitants share (Alderman and Hoelscher 2004, Simpson and Corbridge 2006). 
The discourse of memory and place emphasises the importance of the built 
environment in the formation of memory and social identity. In this way, built 
environments are shaped by, and in turn, influence the society that produces them 
(Dwyer, 2000). 
Here, the work of French historian Pierre Nora (1989) is of great significance. He 
quotes; “self-consciousness emerges under the sign of that which has already 
happened, as the fulfilment of something always already begun” (1989, p7). He 
relates memories to sites to explain how memories are spatially constituted. To him, 
sites of memory, or lieux de memoire, are the crystallisation of the physical 
environment that does not exist anymore. Sites can be demarcated through material 
(like churches, schools, and neighbourhoods) as well as non-material entities (like 
stories, song, celebration and rituals). 
 





To stress the importance of collective memory and nostalgia in reconstruction, it is 
of use to note that such sharing of the past can ease stress and loss for community 
members. Knowing that there are other members who have experienced a situation 
can reduce the pain and strengthen social ties which are crucial for personal and 
collective processes of social reconstruction. Davis (1979) argues that nostalgia 
(defined as the positive evocation of the past against negative feelings towards 
present (Davis, 1979, p18)), can help to diffuse panic, uncritical reactivity, and 
uncertainty, as well as offering stability in times of conversion (i.e., reconstruction). 
Due to the high death toll in Bam's incident, which killed more than one third of the 
population, the post-earthquake Bami social recovery can theoretically be resembled 
by displacement discourses after the disaster (i.e. accommodating residents of a 
disaster affected area into new places). Field studies have documented various 
manifestations of social disarticulation, such as growing alienation and anomie, the 
loosening of kinship bonds and increasing social inequality through displacements 
following a disaster. Some of these field studies are presented in the chapter titled: 
Some Examples of Reconstruction and are extracted through reviewing existing 
literature. This marginalisation and displacement results in a reduction in the quality 
of life for a group of society, whereby their situation deteriorates over the long term, 
making them even more vulnerable. The fragmentation of social support networks 
that exist in communities subject to displacement has far-reaching consequences. It:  
...compounds individual losses with a loss of social capital: dismantled 
patterns of social organization, able to mobilize people for action of common 
interests and for meeting immediate family needs are difficult to rebuild 
(Cernea, 1995, p96). 
In a study by Nayek in 1986 (as Cernea cited 1995) in the Rengali dam project in 
India, a sociological study found evidence of social problems. Marriages were 
deferred because dowries, feasts, and gifts became unaffordable. Re-settlers‟ 
obligations towards and relationships with non-displaced kinsmen were damaged 





and interaction between individual families was reduced. As a result, participation in 
group action decreased and daily informal social interaction was severely shortened 
(Nayek, 1986 as cited by Cernea, 1995, p96). 
If forced post-disaster out-migration occurs and decreases the resident population 
significantly, then the rate of return remains low for a few years and the social 
reconstruction of a city may become complicated – especially if migrants are 
replaced by in-migrants, potentially from damaged satellite urban and hinterland 
rural settlements. Demographic and associated social changes could cause 
infrastructures to malfunction as a result of not being used to capacity, for example; 
schools, public transportation, and hospitals (see examples in Chapter Four: The 
Post-war Reconstruction in Iran). 
One factor playing a part in the deteriorating well-being of displaced communities is 
the loss of what Abramowitz (2005) calls the “social self”. Displacement following 
disasters damages social bonds and the sense of community. This accentuates the 
feeling of insecurity as community is an important source of support. According to 
Walzer:  
The primary good that we distribute to one another is membership in some 
human community…Men and women without membership are stateless… 
statelessness is a condition of infinite danger (1992, p65-66).  
Erikson calls this situation “collective trauma” and believes it is a gradual realisation 
that the community no longer exists as an effective source of support and that an 
important part of the self has disappeared: 
As people begin to emerge hesitantly from the protective shells into which 
they have withdrawn, they learn that things are isolated and alone wholly 
dependent upon their own individual resources (Erikson, 1978, p154). 





Along with a sense of security, community gives our lives their moral meaning. 
Taylor, as cited by Avineri (1992), sees the community as a good because “only by 
virtue of our being members in communities we can find a deep meaning and 
substance to our moral beliefs” (1992, p2). A study by Abramowitz (2005) on Yende 
residents in Guinea following a civil attack and social deformation revealed that 
residents were unsatisfied with the present situation in terms of community value. 
One of the residents complained that “there is no respect in my community. No more 
value or morals exist in my community…nobody has time for anyone any longer, no 
regard and no respect… there are no good relationships between people” (2005, 
p2112). 
This loss of the social self shows itself also in the studies of Cernea (1997). He 
believes the loss of a family‟s home linked with the loss of a group‟s cultural space 
results in alienation of the families subjected to forced displacement and a lasting 
experience of placelessness. This in turn fragments patterns of social fabric including 
reciprocal help and voluntary associations and transforms displacement zones to 
what Atteslander (1995) calls “anomic regions”. 
3.5 Social Capital 
The concept of social capital makes a valuable contribution towards probing further 
into the subject of agency in this environment. This research presents the reasons 
how and why this concept became popular and how it continues to be so. 
Furthermore, this research studies the evolution of the concept through development 
studies. 
3.5.1 Origin of Social Capital 
In primary studies of social capital the studies of three social scientists are most 
prominent: Glen Loury (1977), Pierre Bourdieu (1985), and James Coleman (1988).  





Loury‟s contribution to social capital was that social positions held by individuals 
can result in not being given equal opportunities. He presented his seminal work: A 
Dynamic Theory of Racial Income Differences in 1977 as a critique to racial income 
inequality in the United States. The social class origins of individuals denote the 
amount of resources that are ultimately invested in their development. Therefore, the 
opportunity to succeed does not merely depend on a person‟s capabilities. In this 
regard, he used the term “social capital” as “the consequences of social position in 
facilitating acquisition of the standard human capital characteristics” (Loury, 1977, p 
176). In 1992, he states: 
[Social capital refers to] occurring social relationships among persons which 
promote or assist the acquisition of skills… [It is] an asset which may be as 
significant as financial bequests in accounting for the maintenance of 
inequality in our society (Loury, 1992, p100 as Woolcock cited 1998). 
Inferred from these quotes, Loury sees social capital as an outcome as well as a 
relationship between social actors and groups that significantly influences the 
structure of power and access to resources. He presents social capital as an asset 
possessed by an individual. 
An alternative approach that has also used the term social capital was developed by 
the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. Portes (1998) believes Bourdieu‟s definition 
of social capital is the most theoretically refined among those introducing the term in 
contemporary sociology. Bourdieu uses social capital as a theory to describe 
stratification and production of social classes. Bourdieu present social capital as an 
asset that belongs to both the individual and the group: 
 [social capital is] the sum of resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an 
individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or 
less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition 
(Bourdieu, 1992, p 119). 





This quotation reveals that, to Bourdieu, social capital is first of all the level of 
access individuals or groups have to resources; second, this access occurs through 
social networks (cited by Portes (1998), Bourdieu believes these social networks are 
not a natural given but are socially constructed); and third, these social relationships 
are shaped by institutions. These institutions are outcomes of cultural factors and in 
turn influence the culture. It is due to this notion that Woolcock presents Bourdieu‟s 
definition of social capital as “a cultural mechanism used to define and reinforce the 
boundaries of particular status groups” (Woolcock, 1998, p156). 
The significance of Bourdieu‟s work is the notion that he clearly distinguishes 
between social relationships and the outcomes of those relationships. He 
distinguishes between networks and the outcome of social capital as access to 
resources; networks are tools to achieve social capital. Such clear division is not 
visible in works on social capital of his counterparts; especially in the works of 
Loury and Coleman. 
Coleman is another theorist of social capital who, according to DeFilippis (2001), 
brought social capital into the mainstream American social sciences. Coleman used 
the term „social capital‟ in 1988 as an important variable in the creation of human 
capital. 
Social capital is defined by its functions. It is not a single entity but a variety 
of different entities with two elements in common: they all consist of some 
aspect of social structures, and they all facilitate certain actions of actors -
whether persons or the corporate actors - within the structure. Like other 
forms of capital, social capital is productive: making possible the 
achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence 
(Coleman 1988, S98). 





Coleman‟s view of social capital includes any entity that facilitates action. It is 
neither an outcome nor a mechanism: It is a “thing”, an “entity” but embodied in 
social interactions and intangible like trustworthiness, information and norms. 
Coleman does not see social capital as an asset that can be possessed by an 
individual; to him, social capital is a public good:  
…as an attribute of the social structure in which a person is embedded, social 
capital is not the private property of any of the persons who benefit from it… 
A property shared by most forms of social capital that differentiates it from 
other forms of capital is its public good aspect (Coleman, 1990, p315). 
The difference between Coleman‟s perspective of social capital with Bourdieu‟s is 
that Bourdieu used the term as an explanation of stratification, and Coleman used it 
to describe a facilitator for social relations. While Bourdieu uses social capital as a 
tool to determine who has the agency and power of access to resources in society, in 
his view, any social relationship contains an unequal institutional arrangement. In 
terms of the possessions of social capital, Coleman gives neutral value to social 
capital and applies a descriptive approach to explain the way action is shaped by the 
social context. 
Coleman (1988) identifies three forms of social capital: obligations and expectations 
(which depend on trustworthiness of the social environment), information-flow 
capability of the social structure, and norms accompanied by sanctions. This is in 
accordance with Putnams' main sources of social capital as trust, networks and 
norms of reciprocity. Since ongoing debates of social capital are greatly raised and 
influenced by Putnam's work, it is necessary to discuss his view on social capital 
further. 
 





3.5.2 Putnam’s Social Capital 
While Loury, Bourdieu and Coleman are foundational contributors to the concept of 
social capital, ongoing debates on social capital have been reinvigorated by the 
seminal work of Putnam from 1993 onwards. 
His view of social capital is that “social capital refers to the norms and networks of 
civil society that lubricate cooperative action among both citizens and their 
institutions” (Putnam, 1998). To Putnam, social capital describes the “features”, or 
the “characteristics”, in comparison with Coleman‟s definition of social capital as an 
observable entity or Bourdieu‟s as level of access to resources. But Putnam‟s focus is 
not on the social capital itself, but on its outcome: On what it does. 
The core of Putnam‟s work on the concept of social capital, which is the main source 
of the attraction of his work especially for the World Bank, is participation. He refers 
to social capital as “features of social organizations, such as networks, norms and 
trust that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared 
objectives” (Putnam, 1995, p664-665). As Mohan and Mohan (2002) rightly state, 
Putnam‟s model suggests a sequence in which participation is associational activity 
producing greater levels of trust and civic engagement (Mohan and Mohan, 2002). 
Putnam sees social capital as a tool for economic development. Through his seminal 
work in 1993, Putnam presents the different levels of participation in north and south 
of Italy as having resulted in different levels of economic development. His 
argument was that networks of civic engagement fostered communication and 
coordination, and reduced transaction costs through linking ties across group 
boundaries in a vertical direction. 
Another advantage of social capital based on Putnam‟s interpretation is good 
democratic governance. In his defence of participation, Putnam places emphasis on 
civic engagement and the role of the state and formal institutions like the law in this 





regard. In arriving at this position, Putnam was influenced by Alexis de 
Tocqueville‟s (1835) construction of civil society (DeFilippis, 2001). De Tocquville 
believes democracy in America was built on the tendency of Americans to create and 
join voluntary associations that were in the domains of neither the state nor the 
market (DeFilippis, 2001). Putnam‟s interpretation of de Tocqueville‟s idea was that 
social networks and the norms of trustworthiness in a society are influenced by 
networks of civic engagement: 
Recently, American social scientists of a neo-Tocqueville bent have 
unearthed a wide range of empirical evidence that the quality of public life 
and the performance of social institutions are indeed powerfully influenced 
by norms and networks of civic engagement (Putnam, 1995, p66). 
The essential component of Putnam‟s social capital is „trust‟ that arises from two 
sources: Norms of reciprocity and social networks.  
The norm of generalized reciprocity is a highly productive component of 
social capital. Communities in which this norm is followed can more 
efficiently restrain opportunism and resolve problems of collective action 
(Putnam, 1993, p 172). 
Networks of civic engagement meanwhile facilitate personal interaction that can 
generate information about the trustworthiness of individuals, and foster increasingly 
robust norms of reciprocity (Putnam, 1993).  
3.5.3 The Dark Side of Social Capital 
Despite the fact that social capital is often presented as a positive thing that should 
be maximised, it can be argued that it also has a negative side. 





Portes (1998) recognises four disadvantages of social capital: The first disadvantage 
is strong bonding ties that exclude non-members from participation and access. The 
example for this is the traditional monopoly of Jewish merchants over the New York 
diamond trade or the caste system in India. As Portes states, “the same strong ties 
that bring benefits to members of a group commonly enable it to bar others from 
access” (1998, p15). Woolcock (1998) sees this problem from a different angle. His 
idea is that not only strong ties exclude others from access to group resources, but it 
also limits members‟ economic benefit by restricting their access to outside 
opportunities through obligating norms. He argues that: 
Strong civic groups may stifle macroeconomic growth by securing a 
disproportionate share of national resources or inhibiting individual 
economic advancement by placing heavy personal obligations on members 
that prevent them from participating in broader social networks (Woolcock, 
1998, p158). 
The second disadvantage of social capital, according to Portes (1998), is the claims 
made on one‟s own resources from other members of the group. The strong ties 
among groups raise the level of expectations of fellow members to have shares of 
each other‟s success and thereby increase free-riding problems. As Narayan 
indicates, “poor people from Mali report that accumulation assets at the individual or 
household levels are difficult or impossible because of the claims that family 
members make on those assets” (Narayan, 2000, p55). 
The third disadvantage, as Portes (1998) indicates, is the severe restriction on the 
privacy and autonomy of individuals, especially young people and women in highly 
dense network societies. As Portes (1998) argues, “dense network tying inhabitants 
together created the ground for an intense community life and strong enforcement of 
local norms” (1998, p16), which in turn reduces the freedom and autonomy of 
individuals. Example can be found in many rural areas of developing countries like 





India or Iran where women undergo severe restrictions in their social lives due to 
traditional norms. 
The final disadvantage of social capital in the study of Portes (1998) is the kind of 
solidarity that creates opposition to mainstream society and results in downward 
levelling norms. Social capital often appears in the form of groups started through 
common experience of adversity and opposition to mainstream society; like Mafia 
families, young gangs and prostitution groups. Any success or harmony of 
individuals within mainstream society weakens the cohesion of the group and results 
in downward levelling norms. 
In the post disaster environment, social capital can be regarded as a useful 
contributor to the well-being of the affected, defined as the sense of belonging. 
However, in some circumstances, if the policies fail to address the cultural factors, 
this capital may be abused or neglected and more negative forms or uses of social 
capital arise leading to marginalisation. This in turn leads to future vulnerability by 
undermining individual and collective social resilience.  
3.5.4 The Contribution of Social Capital to Development 
Studies 
The concept of social capital has gained currency in recent development literature 
and has been applied to explain the links that connect people to each other, state, 
market, resources, rights, and sources that distribute power among any society.  
Social capital might facilitate access to other assets, or to the institutions 
providing those assets. A person's social network might influence their access 
to schools, health care or institutions providing financial services…another 
strand in this writing has seen social capital as an important safety net, a 
means of reducing vulnerability. Here social relationships (formal or 





informal) are valued for the role they can play in helping people recover from 
or cope with crisis, violence or other sources of risk and perturbations 
(Bebbington, p135, 2008). 
Along with behavioural approaches, that use social capital to explain how networks 
can be beneficial in reducing vulnerabilities through distributing resources and 
transferring knowledge (Bebbington 2008), a debate on „synergy‟ has evolved that 
highlights the importance of vertical ties that connect people to the main political 
decision-makers and give social capital and its analysis a more overtly political 
aspect.  
Probing the relationship between the state and the community through the concept of 
social capital was initially presented by Putnam (1993), and then developed by 
scholars like Evans (1996) and Woolcock (1998). Synergy for these authors 
expresses the type of social capital created between state and society. According to 
Evans: “State-society synergy can be a catalyst for development” (Evans, 1996, 
p178). Through this link between ordinary citizens and government agencies, the 
efficiency of plans increases. Putnam presents synergy in this way: 
Social capital is not a substitute for effective public policy but rather a 
prerequisite for it and in part, a consequence of it. Social capital, as our 
Italian study suggests, works through and with states and markets, not in 
place of them…wise policy can encourage social capital formation, and 
social capital itself enhances the effectiveness of government action (Putnam, 
1993, p7). 
Synergy is about the relationship between community and the state. A conscious 
community is needed to monitor the state‟s actions and give feedback to increase the 
effectiveness of policies. As Bowles and Gintis (2002) rightly argue, communities 
make an important contribution to governance where central government policies fail 
because the necessary information to enforce beneficial exchanges cannot effectively 





be used by outsiders and central government officials. The state‟s role is even more 
important. Along with the power to enforce the rule of law and act as the provider of 
public goods, the state can play an important role in facilitating the connection 
between community and the government as well as among communities themselves. 
Through this process, the problem of social exclusion and isolation can be addressed. 
For societal well being or the collective good, a transition has to occur from 
exclusive loyalty to primary social groups to networks of secondary 
associations whose most important characteristics is that they bring together 
people who in some ways are different from the self (Narayan, 1999, p12). 
Narayan and Woolcock (2000) put a high currency on the role of state in reducing 
social vulnerability. Synergy, in the sense that Woolcock and Narayan use it, is the 
vertical relationship between community groups of society and the state. Narayan 
and Woolcock (2000) believe synergy is what different societies need to achieve 
well-being and development and it is the task of the state to create this bridging. As 
Narayan states, “the state creates the political and social space for the emergence of 
civil society and citizen action that provide checks and balances on the power of the 
state, so subjecting itself to public accountability” (Narayan, 1999, p12). 
Community-state relationships have also been expanded in poverty alleviation, social 
welfare, and development literature as the "New Policy Agenda" which puts a great 
emphasis on civil society, both NGOs and GROs in redistributing institutional 
arrangements in favour of a more just distribution of power (Edwards and Hulme 
1996, Pelling 1998). 
This 'new agenda' acknowledges the central role played by social capital in 
shaping mechanisms of resource distribution and means of access. It 
promotes participatory methodologies and polycentric institutional 
arrangements through which decision-making authority and responsibility are 
re-distributed to overcome inefficiencies inherent in the previous models of 





resource distribution. In so-doing it creates the opportunity for greater direct 
involvement in decision-making for grassroots actors, with all the changes in 
power and institutional configuration that such a move implies (Pelling, 
1998, p470). 
3.6 Civil Society and Non-governmental Organisations 
A discussion of how to understand NGOs and GROs is connected to the notion of 
civil society (Bebbington 2002, Edwards 2000).  
If civil society were an iceberg, then NGOs would be among the more 
noticeable of the peaks above the waterline (Edwards, 2000, p8). 
However, there is no unanimously agreed definition of civil society. The concept has 
been shifting and contested since the Enlightenment era in the eighteenth century. 
Almost all the scholars of this time regarded civil society as an entity outside the 
state. Marx and Engels distinguished between civil society as the ensemble of socio-
economic relations and the forces of production compared to the state as the super 
structural manifestation of class relations inside civil society. To Hegel, civil society 
was a social formation intermediate between the family and the state; Gramsci sees 
civil society as a space between coercive relations of the state and the economic 
sphere of production (Bebbington 2002).  
Recent definitions of civil society get further than merely defining it through its 
relation to the state. Edwards (2000) believes civil society is:  
... the arena in which people come together to advance the interests they hold 
in common, not for profit or political power, but because they care enough 
about something to take collective action (p 7).   





Mohan (2008) believes recent interpretations of civil society are influenced by the 
two major socio-political points of view: The neoliberal school and the post-Marxist 
school. He believes neoliberals see civil society as more a space of private property 
rights creating market-friendly political institutions and less concerned about the 
autonomous actions of associations. For the followers of post-Marxist school, on the 
other hand, civil society is some form of social movement to confront class and 
position of the dominant.  
Van Rooy (1998) classifies the use of civil society in contemporary literature as 
follows:  
 Civil society as values and norms (the kind of well-behaved society that we 
want to live in, the goal for our political and social efforts); 
 Civil society as a collective noun (i.e. NGOs and all actors explicitly 
involved in change work for social benefit); 
 Civil society as a space for action (alongside and interacting with state and 
market); 
 Civil society as a historical moment  (a historical moment where a shared 
public sphere is created in which agreed rules and norms are sustained); 
 Civil society as anti-hegemony (a movement towards alternate visions of 
society that may not necessary join in formal political action); and 
 Civil society as an antidote to the state (as an opposition to a centralised or 
autocratic state). 
For this research and due to the increasing growth in the size and number of NGOs, 
this research studies the NGO form of civil society. As McIlwaine (1998) puts it: 
“there has...been a tendency to view NGOs as primary „vehicles‟ or „agents‟ in civil 
society”(p416). As such, NGOs are the “'missing middle‟ between citizens and the 
state” (World Bank, 1997, p114). In the 1990s the number of NGOs increased due to 
the international and Northern organisations' support for the subject: 





The prominence awarded to NGOs and GROs as implementers of the two 
dimensions of the New Policy Agenda has led official agencies to channel 
increasing amounts of money to and through them…this has resulted in the 
explosive growth of NGOs in many southern countries. In Nepal the number 
of NGOs registered with the government increased from 220 in 1990 t 1210 
in 1993 during a donor "spending spree". In Tunisia there were 5186 
registered NGOs in 1991 as opposed to 1886 only three years earlier. 
(Edwards and Hulme, 1996, p962) 
Such rapid explosion in the number of NGOs backed by the donors of Northern 
countries places questions about their agendas and position in the development 
discourse. Mohan (2002) believes that donors have three main expectations from 
these NGOs: First, NGOs are significant parts of civil society. Second, they regard 
NGOs (as representatives of civil society) distinct and often-in conflict with the 
state. Third, NGOs are facilitators of the democratisation process. They are regarded 
as a means of channelling opinion into policymaking and increasing peoples' 
confidence and institutional capacity in involving themselves in public affairs. 
In this regard, the current concept of social capital is visualised in practice through 
NGOs. This research aims to open two debates that help redesign the role of social 
capital in achieving a more active and less vulnerable community, and distance the 
concept of NGOs from formal bureaucratic donor-dependant organisations and 
closer to problem solving efficient entities: positioning state and civil society in 
governance discourse and what Uphoff (1999) calls, the cognitive form of social 
capital. 
3.6.1 Habermas' State 
To find the answer to the relationship between state and civil society, this research 
benefits from the writing of one prominent scholar in this regard: Habermas. For 
Habermas, the state is the implementer of the constitution created through the active 





performance of civil society. In his view, the state and civil society have mutual 
contributions to make to each other. In Habermas‟ view, the state has a powerful 
position. A strong state is necessary as a sanctioning organisation for enforcing 
rights that are primarily fostered in public spheres.  His cornerstone of government is 
the constitution which is created and recreated through communicative actions and 
mediated, enforced and implemented through an organised judiciary. The crux of his 
debate is that this constitution is not merely normative, mythic or moral, but created 
(and recreated) through a rationalised procedure of lawmaking which involves all 
citizens in a discursive process of opinion and will-formation which as a 
consequence beget legitimacy (Habermas, 1998).  
3.6.1.1 Habermas State and Power 
One may think that government by law in the form of discourse theory transforms 
the state‟s position from a domination seeking entity in a vertical system to one of 
cooperative organization in a horizontal system of governance. The following 
statements of Habermas may contribute to such perceptions:  
“It is not the legal form as such that legitimates the exercise of governmental 
power but only the bond with legitimately enacted law” (Habermas, 1998, 
p135)  
Or when he says 
 “…in the democratic rule of law, political power is differentiated into 
communicative power and administrative power” (Habermas, 1998, p136). 
However, on the contrary, Habermas‟ idea reinforces the state‟s domination since he 
presents it as a “subjectless” legislative structure that once created (due to the 
legitimacy it gained through “reasonably structured deliberations”) would be hard to 
be conquered by the agencies it dominates:  





[government by law in the form of discourse theory approach] pulls back into 
the “subjectless” forms of communication circulating through forums and 
legislative bodies. Only in this anonymous form can its communicatively 
fluid powers bind the administrative power of the state apparatus to the will 
of the citizens (Habermas, 1998, p136).  
In Habermas‟ model, the administrative power gives even more authority to the state. 
Presenting law as a de facto social power brings about stabilisation of behavioural 
expectations and norms. Courts become key elements of organising behavioural 
conflicts and harmonising power centres. They decide what is legal or illegal. As a 
consequence, power serves to establish the judiciary as a branch of the state 
(Habermas, 1998). Governments‟ authority extends since law “generates” 
government institutions, procedures and official powers. 
3.6.1.2 Habermas, Legitimacy and Power 
Habermas believes legitimacy of political power has two sources: Normative 
authority of a judge-king enjoying a superior reputation, and social power authorised 
by sacred law. For the second type of legitimacy, political power and law bind 
together through the institutionalisation of offices that provide the exercise of 
political authority with an administrative staff; a model he calls state-organised 
authority. Thereby, law and political power intensify each other: “Not only does law 
now legitimate political power; power can make use of law as a means of organizing 
political rule” (Habermas, 1998, p142).  
Habermas in Between Facts and Norms (1998) argues that any society must benefit 
from mechanisms of action cooperation and mutual understanding to resolve 
conflicts. According to him, these mechanisms can be of two forms: Either 
regulation of a conflict caused by the clash of individual action orientation, or with 
cooperative realisation of collective goals.  





In Habermas‟ debate two contradictory forms of power can be realised: The power 
that is impossible for anyone to possess called communicative power, and a power 
that facilitates state‟s domination called administrative power. In developing 
communicative power theory, he is influenced by Arendt. He quotes from her; 
“power springs up between men when they act together and it vanishes the moment 
they disperse…power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in 
concert” (Arendt as cited by Habermas, 1998, p147-148).  
Arendt‟s idea about power is the founding of institutions through collective decisions 
and the creation of legitimate law. In Habermas‟ view, Arendt‟s communicative 
power theory lacks the political exercise of administrative and executive function: 
“the agreement between words and deeds may be the yardstick for a regime‟s 
legitimacy” (Habermas, 1998, p150). The role of law, as Habermas indicates here 
becomes helpful in translating communicative power into administrative power. 
Habermas continues to prevent abuse of dominating powers over administrative 
systems. Communicative power must be the only source that permits administrative 
power to regenerate and administrative power should not reproduce itself on its own 
terms; any illegitimate intervention of social power must be prohibited.  
In Habermas‟ model, moral values and citizen‟s institutionalised will (laws) are 
separated. “Whereas moral rules…express a universal will pure and simple, laws 
also give expression to the particular legal community” (Habermas, 1998, p152). The 
legitimacy of state comes from communicative power of citizens. A state‟s authority 
derives from laws citizens give themselves in a discursively structured opinion and 
will formation. Instead of taken for granted moral and ethical values, in Habermas‟ 
model rational discourses, design norms and these norms through institutionalisation 
of interlinked forms of communication becomes laws. Legitimacy comes from valid 
legal norms and not valid moral norms; in other words, valid moral norms can be 
“right” but not “legitimate” as far as they are not legal. 





Such a democratic model, since it is impossible for all citizens to share their beliefs, 
can come into practice through parliamentary procedure. For such practice, the 
fundamental condition of its legitimacy is representativeness. Hence, guaranteed 
autonomy of public sphere, competition between different political parties, and 
parliamentary principles are essential elements of a democratic society. 
3.6.1.3 Habermas and Foucault (Rationality and Power) 
Foucault disagrees with Habermas‟ view on power. Foucault‟s analysis of power, as 
Flyvbjerg (1998) points out:  
can be constituted only if it frees itself completely from this representation of 
power that I would term...”juridico-discursive”…a certain image of power-
law, of power-sovereignty (Foucault 1980 p90 as cited by Flyvbjerg 1998 
p214).  
Flyvberj argues that while Foucault‟s idea is „cut off the head of the king‟, in 
Habermas‟ model the head of the king “is still very much on, in the sense that 
sovereignty is a prerequisite for the regulation of power by law” (Flyvbjerg, 1998, 
p214). 
Habermas and Foucault are both concerned about domination. They try to find ways 
to minimise domination and create a balanced power structure but they present 
different approaches for achieving this goal. While Habermas applies an objective 
stance and sees the constitution as a rational way of moving toward democracy, 
Foucault sees the process of democratisation as a completely subjective and context-
dependence struggle of power. Habermas finds the solution in consensus and 
collective will formation, Foucault realises resistance and struggle as the basis for 
the practice of freedom (Flyvbjerg, 1998). 





Habermas believes civil society is needed to absorb the unequal distribution of social 
positions and power differentials resulting from them. Civil society to him is a 
political network of voluntary associations that is detached from class structure and 
facilitates the exercise of civic autonomy (Habermas, 1998).  
Habermas‟ view of civil society is neither neoliberal nor Marxist. In the view of 
Habermas, through discursive communication, citizens first reach self-
understanding. Civil society is conceived as a democratic self-organisation and 
legally institutionalised. This is in contrast with the Marxist view that demands 
revolutionary transformation through class conflict fighting domination (DeLanty, 
1997). It is not liberal because the state has great power through administration. 
Despite the respect that Habermas has for the potential social power of civil society 
and the freedom that can be generated through civil society, he believes that in the 
administrative framework, civil society is still restricted.  
Even a political process emerging from civil society must gain the measure of 
autonomy necessary to keep the administrative system …from sinking to the 
level of one party among others (Habermas, 1998, p176).  
He indicates that civil society can transform its social power either indirectly through 
manipulating public opinion or directly through administration.  
In contrast to Habermas‟ civil society, in Foucault‟s view, civil society has conflict 
and power at its centre and is alien with the consensus and conflict-free bargaining. 
States and authorities inevitably violate civil society activities and can use 
constitution as a means to legitimate their violation. 
3.6.1.4 Critiques 
Habermas is criticised for generalising its occidental rational behaviour and being 
insensitive to cultural contexts (Delanty 1997, Benhabib 1992, Flyvbjerg 1998). 





Habermas, presupposes that human social life is based upon rational processes for 
establishing reciprocal understanding ; constitutions is all it takes for uniting citizens 
in a pluralist society (Flyvbjerg, 1998).  In 1998, Habermas clarified his position by 
stating that his model refers to societies free from religious or metaphysical thinking: 
A fundamentalist self-understanding often privileges value choices that 
subordinate individual rights to collective goals and thus favour non-
egalitarian regulations. Only under the conditions of post metaphysical 
thinking do ethical-political discourses lead to regulations that lie per se in 
the equal interest of all members (Habermas, 1998, p167).  
DeLanty (1997) critiques Habermas for his moral universalism. He observes that 
Habermas‟ social theory universalises morality in the sense that it tries to provide a 
normative basis for “civilized humanity”: “Universal morality cannot be reduced to 
self-interest any more than it can be reduced to culture and identity” (DeLanty, 1997, 
p33). He argues that this occidental rationality is fostered through a comparison of 
modernity and the pre-modern tradition of Europe and is based on European 
enlightenment; hence cannot simply be applied elsewhere. 
Habermas‟ model is also critiqued for its over emphasis on law as the cornerstone of 
democracy. Paley (2002) argues that law can be double sided: “While people use it 
to resist and contest power, they are also subjugated by it” (p487).  
Another critique of Habermas‟ rational communicative model is its absence of a 
practical aspect and its limited engagement with the dynamics of power. He is 
critiqued for being unrealistic in his modelling:  
He describes to us the utopia of communicative rationality but not how to get 
there…it is easy to point to constitution writing and institutional development 
as a solution; it is something else to implement specific constitutional and 
institutional changes (Flyvbjerg, 1998, p215 & 228).  





His focus on communicative power dismisses the fact that communication can be 
penetrated by power. Moreover, as DeLanty (1997) indicates, it is less possible for 
minorities to conceive a majority by the means of better argument. As Flyvbjerg 
(1998) rightly points out, communication can be power sensitive through non-
rational rhetoric and be used to maintain dominant interests:  
Something infinitely more complex than these phenomena are at work in real 
life situations, perhaps humans are infinitely more complex than Habermas‟ 
homo democraticus. People know how to be, at the same time, tribal and 
democratic, dissidents and patriots, experts and judging how far a democratic 
constitution can be bent and used in non-democratic ways for personal and 
group advantages (Flyvbjerg, 1998, p217) 
Another critique is that in Habermas‟ view participants are rational and decent. 
According to Delanty (1997), “social life does not take the form of a community of 
scholars rationally debating a problem which can be objectively described in a 
theoretical manner” (p34). Flyvbjerg (1998) argues that Habermas, unlike some 
other scholars like Machiavelli, assumes away this idea that all men are wicked and 
bases his model on rational and civilised citizens. 
Moreover, DeLanty (1997) disagrees with the form of social learning Habermas 
believes will occur in discursive communication. He believes this process of social 
learning will only take place under the culture of occidental modernity which is 
particular to modern European-American culture: “The historical process of social 
learning through which universalistic principles emerge can occur in all societies and 
does not need to follow the particular logic of Western modernity” (1997, p42); 
societies learn in different ways.  
 
 





3.6.2 Alternatives to State-centred Governance 
Add to the critiques, the evidence that states often hinder civil society; especially 
when this involves criticism of a state's policies or practice.   
The ideal situation is when different organisations and agencies (in a community that 
is concerned with creating the conditions for collective action and public order) act 
in such harmony that their composition results in giving „power‟ to citizens. These 
citizens are playing active roles in transforming their environment into a better place 
for living. Power, according to Held, is:  
... the capacity of agents, agencies or institutions to maintain or transform 
their environment, social or physical, and it concerns the resources which 
underpin this capacity and the forces that shape and influence its exercise 
(Held, 1995, p170, as cited by Goverde et al, 2000, p103).  
However, unequal distribution of power and information asymmetries resides within 
community as well as between the community and other political actors (Pelling, 
2003). 
In the neoliberal view, which is supported by the World Bank, in contrast to 
Habermas' view, the role of the state shifts from one of control to one of 
coordination. In the late 1990s, the World Bank supported a series of programmes in 
Eastern European countries and Commonwealth independent states which were 
subjected as programmes with „good governance‟. The aim of these programmes was 
to shrink the state and make it more efficient, and to shift the balance of power in 
society from governments and the public sector to private individuals and groups. It 
was argued that „good governance‟ opens new windows for self-reliance and 
participation, which creates opportunity for civil societies to activate and reform 
unresponsive and unaccountable governments (de Alcantra, 1998, p108). Good 
governance arose as the means to promote order and justice especially in 





development studies. The role of NGOs and institutions was highlighted in this 
regard.  
As High and Nemes argue (2005), while governments deal with making and 
enforcing decisions through centralised control and hierarchical structures, 
governance is concerned with networks and institutional arrangements that reflect 
more horizontal structures and less central power. In this regard, the co-ordination 
and collaboration between different actors are crucial in promoting development. 
The literature on governance is greatly concerned with the degree of centralisation of 
government. Followers of participatory development approaches see states as 
inefficient and ineffective in delivering development projects. Chambers (1988) 
argues that large, centralised and hierarchical organisations, such as governments, 
tend to simplify, centralise and standardise policy and practice. Moreover, 
centralised structures, as is argued by Tisdell and Roy (1998), reduce the effective 
managing of lower level government while decentralised structures reduce the need 
for coordination.  
3.6.3 Examples of State-centred Programmes 
In a relevant issue to this research of post-disaster or post-war reconstruction efforts, 
especially in developing countries, the state centralised approach too often results in 
the reproduction of vulnerability. Following the Marmara earthquake (1999) which 
killed over 17,000 people and destroyed about 10,000 houses, NGOs and the media 
criticised the initially ineffective response of the state and the underlying corruption 
(Jalali, 2002). This response received a strong reaction from the Turkish state  
whereby some NGOs were asked to leave the region through systematic control and 
threats. A Turkish TV channel was closed down for a week by the government for its 
critical reports. Only designated state authorities and a few state-friendly NGOs were 
allowed to deliver aid to earthquake victims (ibid).   





As the study of Christoplos (2001) shows, in post-Mitch Nicaragua, the role of 
NGOs was questionable until they started to increase their links with each other and 
the local government. The role of NGOs was one of dissatisfaction. NGOs were 
viewed with great suspicion by government and citizens, and their actions often did 
not follow the ideals they claimed to represent. Their capacities were low and 
consequently they were reluctant to get involved in disaster management. Their co-
ordination with other NGOs was limited because of traditional opposition and 
competition for the funding needed to work. In terms of their relationship to the 
government, the situation was not good, as Christoplos (2001) argues, their status 
was one of confrontation with the government rather than joint action in the field.  
According to NGOs, the government did not make any effort to communicate and 
collaborate with them. On the other hand, state institutions were suspicious of NGOs 
because many of their officials were linked to the opposition administration of the 
1980s. Citizens do not openly recognise that NGOs are not part of civil society, but 
presume they are dominated by the intellectual elite of middle-class citizens. In the 
post-Mitch period, signs of collaboration between NGOs and local government 
appeared. NGOs found that local governments were often less political than central 
government. Leadership became essential: “Many mayors acted decisively, more as 
an expression of their natural leadership than as the result of any formally 
established arrangements” (Christoplos, 2001, p 248). 
The inclusion of local citizens in reconstruction is a very sensitive issue and is not an 
easy goal to be achieved; especially in centralised politics with limited civil society 
capacity. Geipel (1991) has studied in detail the long-term consequences of 
reconstruction after ten years since the 1977 Friuli earthquake in Italy. As he 
documented, during the immediate aftermath of the earthquake in the relief phase, 
the significant participation of local agencies and national and international 
organisations conveyed a sense of optimism for the future among victims to be able 
to overcome the shock. After the dynamism of this period, victims enthusiastic for 
accomplishing the reconstruction and building houses were suddenly cut short. This 





was until the necessary laws were implemented, modalities of compensation 
payment settled, and the necessity controls established and plans made.  
This forced inactivity of victims, capable and willing to act on their own, led to 
accusations against the administration (which deteriorated trust in the government) 
of illegal activities like illicit buildings (which damage community ties) and apathy. 
Moreover, the reconstruction plan that was designed to restore the status quo ante 
(needless to say that such approach is loss-based rather than needs based) resulted in 
the out-migration of young and active members of the city after a few years because 
the city was built for 1976 not 1996. The supply of buildings was more than needed 
and remained vacant. The consumption of alcohol and television entertainment 
increased, indicating a retreat from community life into the private sphere. Thus, 
both physical and social fabrics have not been successfully reconstructed. 
Reconstruction of Kobe, Japan, is a great example of how government plans can 
slow down the reconstruction process and put people‟s lives on hold. The studies of 
Comerio (1998) on Hanshin earthquake (Kobe), Japan, in 1995, show that within a 
month after the earthquake, the Japanese government made great efforts to organise 
reconstruction committees, passing the necessary legislation, and planning and 
financing the reconstruction. However, one year after the event, some buildings were 
still facing reconstruction problems due to multiple ownership claims, the death of 
the owners, or through lack of funds. Those who were able or willing to rebuild their 
houses using their savings found that they had to wait months to find a private 
contractor. Consequently, speculators have been buying up heavily damaged sites. 
Funding the repairs was another problem. Some homeowners had to live in damaged 
structures for years because they had to rely on themselves through lack of support. 
People whose buildings were situated in government redevelopment project areas 
had to wait until government plans were completed (which took five to ten years) in 
order to make realistic decisions about their own property. Over this time span, 
elderly and poor citizens were residing in temporary housing until they could find 
alternative housing on their own. 





The United States has experienced numerous examples of the loss-base 
reconstruction programmes that exacerbate social inequalities. Federal disaster 
assistance is designed for homeowners. Following Hurricane Hugo in 1989, as the 
studies of Comerio (1998) show, middle class owners of Charleston, South Carolina, 
in coastal communities, collected some insurance and used government grants and 
loans to repair their roofs, replace their carpets, and build swimming pools before 
tougher coastal regulations were enforced. In contrast, apartment dwellers and 
renters had difficulties finding alternative housing at the same rent. The rural poor 
had little access to any form of public assistance and depended on help from private 
charities to repair and replace their damaged housing. 
Another example of owner-driven reconstruction policy is the policy applied 
following Hurricane Andrew 1992 in Dade County, Florida. The reconstruction 
policy was again a pro-middle-class approach supported by insurance and federal 
aid. Despite this, low-priced homes were constructed, but they were built by 
developers and sold to newcomers to the area. The limited numbers of affordable 
rental units available for disaster victims drove the poorest population out of Dade 
County (Comerio, 1998). 
The studies of Kamel and Loukaitou-Sidens (2004) on reconstruction after the 
Northridge earthquake 1994 show that federal assistance based on absolute losses 
rather than emergency need led to the further marginalisation of the already 
marginalised and favoured owner occupied and secure households. 
Similarly, after Loma Prieta earthquake in California, USA in 1989, temporary 
housing and reconstruction funding were allocated by the centralised reconstruction 
plan to middle and upper class homeowners much easier than to renters or subsidised 
housing residents (Comerio, 1997). The earthquake hit hardest in low-income 
housing in downtown San Francisco, Oakland, Santa Cruz and Watsonville and the 
market failed to provide affordable rents for those affected. Less than half of the 
low-income housing units destroyed by the earthquake were rebuilt (ibid). Such loss-





base policies exacerbate the vulnerability of the communities to disaster rather than 
helping to minimise the vulnerability.   
3.6.4 Why Centralised Programmes are Ineffective 
The above examples show that where plans are centrally designed and the voice of 
the local people and especially the most vulnerable find no way to be expressed, the 
efforts for development, which are often costly, not only fail to create better access 
to resources for the residents and the affected, but increase the vulnerability of the 
most vulnerable groups in society.  
In order to reduce the vulnerability of affected communities, reconstruction plans 
should prioritise assistance according to need rather to the loss and in response to the 
cultural and traditional values of residents. To do so, there must be participation 
from the local residents. Centralised plans and programmes too easily fail to address 
these needs. This can be explained as a result of two key reasons: The blue-print 
approach, and professional/urban bias.  
3.6.4.1 The Blue-print Approach 
The blue-print approach draws from the work of Korten in 1980. He argued that 
many development projects follow implementation through a conventional 
bureaucratic structure where programmes and targets are formulated centrally with 
little regard to the willingness or capability of people to respond. The projects are 
expected to be efficient, clearly ordered and defined, specialised and with visible 
outcomes to be cost predictable and defensible in budget presentations. 
In practice, rural development projects turn out to be ill-defined in terms of the 
objectives, unclear task requirements, unpredictable costs, and outcomes unbounded 
by time. According to Korten, development projects instead shall be flexible and 
open to learning through enhancing their capacity for responsive and anticipatory 





adaptation. For that, they need to embrace error, plan with the people, and link 
knowledge to action. 
 
One of numerous weaknesses of centrally designed programs is that planners 
proceed as if they were writing on a clean slate and possessing all the 
knowledge relevant to improving the villagers' life. In reality they are making 
interventions into well-established socio-technical systems within which the 
poor have, over many years, worked out appropriate methods to meet their 
basic survival needs otherwise they would not still be around (Korten, 1980, 
p498). 
Indigenous technologies are usually within the control of the community. 
Building on, rather than replacing those technologies reduces the likelihood 
that the program intervention will "de-skill" the villagers and, thus, increase 
their dependence on external experts and suppliers over whom they have no 
social control (Korten, 1980, p499). 
3.6.4.2 Professional/Urban-Bias 
The second reason is the distance that decision-makers keep with the local people to 
make ‟professional‟ plans. These plans benefit from highly skilled professionals who 
are often from upper class urban areas. The problem is labelled „urban-bias‟ in this 
research. The expectations of affected people should be considered seriously. 
According to Schwab et al (1998) planners should remember that citizens of the area 
have a post-disaster plan in mind even before the planners begin their work. 
Contradictions between the prepared official plans and the people‟s plan, hinders the 
success of reconstruction. As Quarantelli rightly argues “realistic disaster planning 
requires that plans be adjusted to people and not that people be forced to adjust to 
plans” (Quarantelli, 1982, p2). 
 





Michael Lipton is the pioneer of developing urban bias theory through his studies in 
Africa in the 1960s. He believed that governments of many countries of the South 
tend to favour allocating resources to towns and cities as opposed to villages. His 
idea was that urban areas get a considerably higher proportion of public spending, 
especially in health and education, and this results in a rural skills drain as educated 
younger rural dwellers leave to work in urban areas.  
There are different critiques about Lipton's theory, for example, that Lipton neglects 
the power of the rural elite. Further, that in places he accounts for members of the 
rural elite as members of the urban class and members of the urban poor as part of 
the rural classes (Byres 1979, Griffin 1077).  Moreover, Jones et al (2008) challenge 
Lipton's idea through the fact that urban poverty in many places is higher than rural 
poverty and the definitions of urban and rural are not stable. 
Nevertheless, Lipton's theory is valuable in bringing to the table the notion of urban 
bias, albeit from an economic point of view. However, as Jones et al (2008) rightly 
argue, non-economic forms of urban bias are under-researched: 
Many rural people are stereotyped as backward or ignorant, and are treated 
by government officials on that basis. They might experience urban bias in 
terms other than those set out in Lipton's urban bias theory (UBT), but which 
are nonetheless consistent with his view that key development actors are 
disposed to equate the urban with the modern or developed...It is thus prudent 
to retain the provocation set out by Lipton's model…while avoiding reference 
to urban bias either as a social fact or as a pathology that always needs 
correction (Jones et al. 2008, p246). 
Studies of Chambers on rural development in his seminal book "Putting the last first" 
(1986), enriches the urban bias theory. As he asserts, education and professional 
training builds bias of perception and a mutual attraction to and reinforcement of 
power, prestige, resources, professionals, professional trainings and the capacity to 





generate and disseminate knowledge at the urban core. According to him, 
professional training inculcates an arrogance in which superior knowledge and status 
are assumed. In this respect, the rural poor are seen as ignorant and backward while 
dwellers of the urban core are seen as more prestigious and professional.  
Chambers continues that despite all its advantages, professionalism and 
specialisation make it hard for observers to understand the linkages of deprivation 
for the urban poor. The nature of professionalism makes professionals narrowly 
single-minded because it programmes them to examine what is going on in the 
framework of their specifications but makes them blind to see what lies outside it: 
"They do their own thing and only their own thing. They look for and find what fits 
their ideas" (p23).  
Hence when it comes to development projects to probe rural poverty, the 
practitioners of development become outsiders who, because of the urban biased 
nature of their trainings and life-style, become disabled in observing and addressing 
the vulnerability of rural poor. 
Outsiders are people concerned with rural development who are themselves 
neither rural nor poor. Many are headquarters and field staff of government 
organizations in the Third World…Outsiders under perceive rural poverty.  
They are attracted to and trapped in urban 'cores' which generate and 
communicate their own sort of knowledge while rural 'peripheries' are 
isolated and neglected. The direct rural experience of most urban-based 
outsiders is limited to the brief and hurried visits from urban centres…as a 
result the poorer rural people are little seen and even less is the nature of their 
poverty understood (Chambers, 1983, p2). 
According to Twigg (2004), the relationship between the outside disaster specialists 
and local people involves differences in outlook, power and resources. Outsiders 
have different educational, social and cultural backgrounds. They are often hired by 





organisations with access to a considerable budget (like governmental organisations) 
and this gives them the confidence to believe that their efforts are appropriate and 
hence they may be tempted to intervene without waiting to find out if they are really 
needed or wanted by a community.  
He believes that because of the impossibility of ever being able to put oneself fully 
into somebody else's position and see things through their eyes, outsiders find it 
difficult to understand the community's environment, needs and points of view, 
especially when funds are made available too widely or too easily. In Twigg's (2004) 
view, as long as outsiders remain facilitators and their work is guided by people's 
needs and aspirations they can be genuine partners in transformation. He continues 
that, in order to obtain such transformation, local community should actively 
participate in making decisions about the implementation of the processes, 
programmes and projects which affect them.  
Participation should empower individuals and communities by involving 
them in: defining problems and needs, deciding solutions to them, 
implementing agreed activities to achieve those solutions, and evaluating the 
results - they must also share the benefits of the initiatives. Participation 
should enable those who are usually the most vulnerable and marginalized 
within their community to be heard and have their due influence on decision-
making. (Twigg, 2004, p118)  
Twigg (2004) realises two categories for participatory approaches: Guided 
participation (also known as instrumental participation) and people-centred 
participation (also known as transformative participation)
1
. Guided participation 
seeks to include people in improvement projects, mostly in implementation and 
sometimes planning, but the projects are still initiated, funded and ultimately 
                                                 
1 This classification of participation is often expressed in different forms; "participation as a 
means" and "participation as an end" (Nelson and Wright, 1995) - "passive" and "active" 
participation (Midgeley 1986, Narayan and Pritchett 2000).  
 





controlled by professional planners from outside the community. The planners 
determine the level of popular participation. People-centred participation, on the 
other hand, addresses issues of power and control. Its view is much wider that the 
technical and managerial aspects of programmes and projects. It is concerned with 
the nature of the society in which these programmes and projects are developed. It 
aims at the empowerment of communities.  
People-centered participation is founded on the belief that ordinary people 
are capable of critical reflection and analysis, and that their knowledge is 
relevant and necessary. (Twigg, 2004, p117) 
As Mohan (2001) rightly puts; "the first move is to acknowledge that those we view 
as powerless are not" (p164). He believes this notion helps us to move beyond the 
patronising attitudes that "they" need to be empowered according to our agenda. 
Rahnema (1992) argues that: 
theirs is a different power which is not always perceived as such, and cannot 
be actualized in the same manner, yet it is very real in many ways [it] is 
constituted by the thousands of centers and informal networks of resistance 
which ordinary people put up (Rahnema 1992, p 123). 
3.6.5 Transformative Participation 
For a participatory approach to be transformative there is a need to redefine the role 
of agencies in the community. According to Pelling: 
There has been a tendency to ascribe roles to the community (a source of 
local knowledge, a source of cheap or free labour, a source to shape for 
infrastructural maintenance) rather than first asking how a community is 
structured and which groups are most likely to experience the costs and 
benefits of participation (Pelling, 2003, p83). 





The notion of empowerment is linked with the issue of citizenship and rights. The 
growing acceptance of the rights-based approach is closely linked to the entitlement 
argument of Amartya Sen. Sen‟s (1981) work on entitlements and capabilities 
stresses that, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, what counts is not what poor 
people possess, but what it enables them to do. The entitlement concept, as discussed 
earlier, draws attention away from the mere possession of goods, towards rights, the 
command people have over goods, using various economic, political and social 
opportunities within the legal system. Rights in this approach are understood not 
simply as formal laws and regulations but as a “political tool for use in the dynamic 
process of claiming resources and ensuring justice” (VeneKlasen 2004, p10). Thus, 
participation is understood as a process by which individuals are empowered to take 
part in decision-making processes and claim their rights while ensuring that 
authorities are held responsible to realise their rights and answer their claims. The 
role of the state is very important in this regard. 
3.6.6 How can NGOs contribute to Transformative 
Participation? 
NGOs have gained currency in recent debates on participation. NGOs are regarded 
by neoliberals as agencies that contribute to economic efficiency and political 
pluralism. Followers of radical perspectives see NGOs as facilitators for social 
transformation.  
However as Hulme and Edwards (1996) argue, the role of NGOs in the process of 
democratisation remains questioned by some scholars since they have failed to 
develop effective strategies and mutually beneficial links between the state and 
citizens to promote democratisation. Further, Hulme and Edwards state that NGOs 
and GROs have failed to address how to engage in the political process to achieve 
fundamental change in the distribution of power and resources, without becoming 
involved in partisan politics and the distortions which accompany the pursuit of state 
power. The question remains: 





What role can opportunistic NGOs with no mission other than the winning of 
donor or government contracts play in democratization? This is of particular 
concern where new NGOs are being formed very rapidly on the back of 
readily available official funding with weak social roots and no independent 
supporter base (Edwards and Hulme, 1996, p966). 
Approaching this challenge it is helpful to examine two expressions of social capital: 
Structural forms (like NGOs) and cognitive forms, i.e. trusts. 
3.6.7 Cognitive Social Capital 
Uphoff (1999) distinguishes between two forms of social capital: Cognitive and 
structural. The structural category refers to various forms of organisation or the 
structure of social relations like rules, networks, and formal organisations. The 
cognitive dimension derives from mental processes and ideas created by culture and 
ideology including norms and values. To him, it is upon norms and values that 
rationalise cooperative behaviour and make it respectable. He continues that these 
two domains are connected because though networks can have observable lives of 
their own, ultimately they all come from cognitive processes and are linked in 
practice by expectations. He believes the social part of social capital means "some 
degree of mutuality, some degree of common identity, some degree of cooperation 
for mutual not just personal, benefit" (Uphoff, p222, 1999). 
According to Uphoff (1999), creating social capital requires more than just 
introducing roles. Roles are defined by mutual expectations about what any person in 
a certain role should and will do under various conditions. They pattern people's 
behaviour in predictable and productive ways. In this regard, NGOs should be 
studied more deeply in terms of their mission and role in society.  





As Newton (1997) rightly argues, the disadvantage of Putnam's definition of social 
capital is that it runs different conceptual things (trust, norms, and networks) together 
that should be separated; the better to study their empirical relationships:  
If we separate the three aspects of social capital, then a series of questions 
arise about its nature, causes, and consequences. Is there an empirical 
relationship between individual involvement in social networks and 
voluntary associations, on the one hand, and relatively high levels of trust 
and reciprocity on the other?...what sorts of organizations are best at 
generating what forms of social capital and why? (Newton, 1997, p583-4). 
Uphoff (1999) believes the mission of structural forms of social capital including 
NGOs is to create a culture of friendship and trust. He believes the contribution of 
social capital in development discourse is to create values, attitudes, social structures 
and relationships that reinforce psychological investment of trust in each other.  
Social and political as well as economic relations are all more productive 
when people relate to each other not as strangers, and certainly not as 
enemies, but to some extent as friends. This reflects and reinforces trust, 
which in all accounts of social capital is recognized as the essential "glue" for 
society. (Uphoff, 1999, p227). 
In a similar argument, Newton (1997) states that social capital focuses on those 
cultural values and attitudes that allow citizens to cooperate, trust, understand, and 
empathise with each other - to treat each other as fellow citizens, rather than as 
strangers, competitors, or potential enemies. 
Newton (1997) discusses two forms of trust: „Thick‟ trust and „thin‟ trust. In small 
face-to-face communities, thick trust is the essential ingredient of mechanical 
solidarity which is generated by intensive, daily contact between people, often of the 
same tribe, class, or ethnic background. Communities of this kind are generally 





socially homogeneous, isolated, and exclusive, and able to exercise the strict social 
sanctions necessary to reinforce thick trust. On the other hand, thin trust associates 
with the organic solidarity of looser, more amorphous, secondary relations which are 
the cornerstone of modern society. This trust is the product of weak ties, which 
according to Granovetter (1973) constitute a powerful and enduring basis for social 
integration in modern, large-scale society (Newton, 1997).  
Newton (1997) believes the task of NGOs is to create a social space for citizens to 
communicate, cooperate and empathise with each other rather than merely ask for 
membership and symbolic attachment because they want to be allied with „the 
cause‟.  
…checkbook organizations may contribute to pluralist democracy (their 
external effects) but have little if any, impact on social capital (internal 
effects). They tend to be the opposite of face-to-face, informal groups such as 
conscious-raising groups or groups that meet once a month to discuss a book, 
which are more likely to have stronger internal than external effects (Newton, 
1997, p582). 
There is then the implication that it is possible to distinguish a „right‟ and „wrong‟ 
type of NGO. As Bebbington (2006) states, the definition of NGOs is contested. This 
research refers to NGOs as: 
Autonomous, non-profit-making, self governing and campaigning 
organisations with a focus on the well-being of others (Bebbington, 2006, 
p324).  
There is also another realisation of NGOs that has a more political than behavioural 
aim which is to challenge the state for alternative policies and perspectives. Mercer 
(2002) believes this kind of NGO is essential for the process of democratisation: 





More civic actors means more opportunities for a wider range of interest 
groups to have a „voice‟, more autonomous organizations to act in a 
„watchdog‟ role vis-à-vis the state, and more opportunities for networking 
and creating alliances of civic actors to place pressure on the state (Mercer, 
2002, p8).  
The United Nations (2003) also presents NGOs as organisations that check the state: 
Any non-profit, voluntary citizens‟ group which is organized on a local, 
national or international level. Task-orientated and driven by people with a 
common interest, NGOs perform a variety of services and humanitarian 
functions, bring citizens‟ concerns to Governments, monitor policies and 
encourage political participation at the community level (Teegan et al 2004, 
p466 as cited by Bebbington 2006). 
3.6.8 Connecting NGOs to People and States 
Now that the role and character of NGOs has been discussed, two notions should be 
addressed: First, why would people initially want to participate in such self 
governing organisations for the well-being of others? And second, how and why 
centralised and autocratic states would/should allow or support such activities that 
might lead to the transfer of power?  
According to Cleaver (2001), in participatory discourse it is usually assumed that 
people will participate because they find it in their best interests or because they 
perceive this as socially responsible and in the best interests of community 
development. Cleaver believes such perceptions allow little place for personal 
psychological motivation, or for the benefit of individual need, respect or purpose, 
which may be independent of material gain. 





Here the works of Arnstein and Korten helps us to understand these confusions 
through the definitions of NGOs. Arnstein (1969) believes participatory approaches 
guide people through an evolutionary path that will transform them from passive 
residents to active power-holder citizens. Arnstein (1969) recognises eight levels of 
participation to increase citizen‟s power in decision-making: Manipulation, therapy, 
informing, consultation, placation, partnership, delegated power, and citizen control. 
The first two levels are recognised as non-participation levels because they are not 
designed to enable people to participate in planning but to enable power-holders to 
educate or cure the participants. In the next three levels (informing, consultation and 
placation) despite efforts that would be made by power-holders to let the voice of 
have-nots be heard, there are no means to ensure that these opinions would be 
implemented and would end up in changing the status quo. They are the levels of 
partnership, delegated power and citizen control which consider citizens as powerful 
actors who have the ability to negotiate and engage in trade-offs with traditional 
power holders and at best, have-nots to obtain the majority of decision-making seats 
or full managerial power (Arnstein, 1969). 
In a similar progressive ontology, Korten (1987) realises three generations of NGOs 
categorised by their orientations in strategy programming: (a) Relief and welfare (b) 
local self-reliance (c) sustainable systems development. Based on his discussion, 
NGOs that work in development use one or a combination of these strategies in 
accomplishing their mission. Relief and welfare strategy models aim to deliver 
welfare services to the poor by focusing on immediate need through direct action; 
such as the distribution of food, the fielding of health teams and the provision of 
shelter - all funded by private contributions on an individual family scale. Self-
reliant local development models, shaped as an answer to the limitations of the 
previous strategy, undertakes community development style projects in a small scale 
local group or neighbourhood scale with importance placed on local self-reliance 
,anticipating that benefit would be sustained beyond the period of the NGO 
assistance.  





The third generation of NGOs fostered from the experiences of these first two 
generations, aims to cover dysfunctional aspects of the previous strategies. It focuses 
on facilitating sustainable change in policy and institutional settings on a regional or 
national basis through less direct involvement of NGOs and more involvement with 
a variety of public and private organisations that control resources and policies that 
bear on local development - such as local governments and private enterprises. 
According to Korten, the success of this strategy depends on “skilfully positioning 
the NGOs resources in relation to the target system… in such a way as to facilitate 
accelerated learning by the organisations which comprise that system” (1987, p149). 
To start to build the participatory process and trigger residents to feel responsible 
and find the power to change their environment an 'entrance point' (as Twigg calls it) 
is needed. The choice of entrance point, according to Twigg (2004), depends on the 
nature of the community concerned. It might be through traditional local authorities 
such as village elders or religious leaders, or through traditional forms of association 
such as forums for regulating power or occupational groups. In many cases it might 
be directly through the poorest and most vulnerable like women-headed households 
(Twigg, 2004). Disasters – both through risk reduction and reconstruction - are good 
opportunities for encouraging residents to participate and create great entrance 
points.  
Disasters have the potential to create a moment of dislocation in the powers 
of status quo. Social disruption can take many forms, from looting and 
lawlessness to more emancipatory activities where previously repressive state 
authorities are temporarily unable to exert control over local areas, and 
alternative forms of organization can spring up during periods of emergency 
response, relief and rehabilitation (Pelling, 2003, p45). 
 





3.7 Addressing Participatory Institutions in Post-disaster 
Reconstruction 
Disaster literature classifies disaster into phases according to actions and conditions 
that take place before, during or after a disaster. This division arose in 1977 from the 
work of Kates, Bowden and Haas. They divided disaster recovery into four phases: 
First, the emergency period which covers the initial hours after the disaster and is 
characterised by those coping actions that the community was forced to do due to the 
loss of property, lives, and injuries. Second, the restoration period, characterised by 
mending and renovations of utility, housing, commercial and industrial structures 
capable of being restored until major services and transportation return and rubble 
removed. Third, during the replacement reconstruction period, where social and 
economic activities return to the pre-disaster period and the population is replaced. 
Fourth is the commemorative, betterment and developmental reconstruction period 
which is portrayed as memorialising the disaster to mark the city‟s post-disaster 
improvement, and to serve its future growth and development (Kates et al, 1977, p 2-
3). 
Despite the fact that this process seems logical in theory, the experiences of disasters 
prove that this model does not reflect reality and that reality is much more 
complicated. Rubin (1985) argues that many of these periods overlap to a greater 
extent and the theory suggests that different groups within a community could be in 
different stages of recovery and reconstruction at the same time. As Kamel (2004) 
rightly points out, disaster process classifications vary depending on the object of 
analysis and methodology used. The threat of this theory is, as Rubin (1985) 
discusses, that any assumption of uniformity in the recovery process could contribute 
to exacerbate these inequalities by ignoring their existence. 
 





For the purposes of this research, two main post-disaster stages are identified: Relief 
and reconstruction. The definition of relief in this paper is ISDR‟s definition as, “the 
provision of assistance or intervention during or immediately after a disaster to meet 
the preservation and basic subsistence needs of those people affected” (ISDR 
terminology). The use of term “reconstruction” in this study is synonymous to the 
definition of ISDR on recovery: “Decisions and actions taken after a disaster with a 
view to restoring or improving the pre-disaster living conditions of the stricken 
community, while encouraging and facilitating necessary adjustments to reduce 
disaster risk” (ISDR terminology). It should be noted that when each phase ends or 
starts is not easily distinguishable and these stages usually overlap: The factors of 
development can be re-established in the relief phase. Depending on the situation of 
households, the relief phase may last longer for some more vulnerable households 
(Schwab et al 1992, Rubin 1985, Kamel et al 2004). Moreover, there is no uniform 
guideline for reconstruction. The reconstruction phase is often considered too huge a 
task - one which is outside of the private sector‟s capacity to handle. In non-federal 
nations and where the extent of disaster is huge the main stake-holder of 
reconstruction becomes the central state.  Depending on the intended outcomes, 
different strategies are defined. 
3.7.1 Strategies of Reconstruction 
According to Geipel (1991), the variety of strategies comes from whether strategies 
should be designed according to: Individual loss, principle of need, or the principle 
of equality. The first solution fixes the social status quo ante, the second leads to 
redistribution in favour of the poor, and the third guarantees supply for all while 
reducing differences (Geipel, 1991, p151). Geipel (1991) distinguishes three 
alternatives for reconstruction:  
 





First, there is no defined aim for the time after disaster. In this scenario, subsidies are 
most likely to be given in accordance to the financial or political power structure; 
free areas or buildings are seized by squatters; gaps between the rich and poor widen; 
no economic development occurs; trust between people and the government 
vanishes; and apathy, depression, and escapism to drugs and alcohol prevails. 
Natural disaster becomes social disaster. 
Second, restoration of the status quo is sought. Reconstruction is the responsibility 
of the owner and the planning process is decentralised at the community level. At the 
beginning, there is high solidarity in the community. The further reconstruction 
proceeds, the more luxurious and wasteful buildings arise. The former power 
relations within the community are re-established; connections and inside informants 
become more important. As a consequence, solidarity decreases. 
Third, reconstruction is seen as a chance to realise improvements: Identical aid is 
given to all affected and central planning rules at a higher administrative level. 
Reconstruction is co-operative between people and state. Co-operative and public 
building is easier and cheaper to control and survey and consequently private 
building reduces. This leads to dissatisfaction on the part of the victims who have to 
wait and cannot do things by themselves. 
It seems that Geipel has seen improvement as equity. In his third scenario, 
reconstruction is seen as an opportunity to make a more uniform society through 
identical aid to all affected regardless of their pre-disaster situations. In his 
classification of strategies, and especially in his last scenario, the role of private 
ownership is not clear. 
According to Oliver-Smith (1996): 
Disaster reconstruction is fraught with ambivalence. On the one hand, people 
whose lives have been disrupted need to re-establish some form of stability 





and continuity with the past to re-continue their lives. For some individuals 
and groups the status quo ante was extremely favorable, and they count on its 
reconstruction. On the other hand, the disaster may have revealed areas 
where change is much needed. Consequently, reconstruction entails 
significant contention over means and goals involving persistence or change 
(Oliver-Smith, 1996, p313). 
Whatever the scenario, the policy and perspective of the state substantially affects 
the character and process of reconstruction. Thus, reconstruction becomes a political 
issue since the state as the dominant power that has the monopoly in regulating 
goods distribution is responsible for shaping the new social arrangements. According 
to Pelling (2003), in developing countries, the dominant power pre-disaster often 
applies some degree of using clientelistic linkages to control grassroots where 
resources are open to being redistributed to support the dominant social groups 
instead of addressing need. The main tool that is usually used by states in 
reconstruction is the way that housing is addressed in reconstruction. 
3.7.2 Reconstruction as Housing 
Housing is essential to the well-being of households. The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights supports the right for a basic standard of living including housing in 
times of lack of livelihood in unforeseen circumstances: 
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and 
well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing and 
medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the 
event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other 
lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. (Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, Article 25).  
 





Housing is considered as an asset linked to livelihoods, health, education, security 
and family stability and is also considered as a source of pride and cultural identity 
(Barakat, 2003). According to Aysan (1992), “A „home‟ is always more than a 
structure; it is a place of security, symbol of status, reflection of social values and 
expression of aspirations” (1992, p3). Consequently, as mentioned earlier, the 
destruction of home and neighbourhood and displacement due to natural disaster 
have great psychological effects on people and damage their „sense of belonging‟. 
One of the most important areas where government can manifest its power is in 
housing and public building. As Freeman (2004) rightly argues, “governments 
benefit politically by allocating money to housing development and reconstruction 
because housing is a highly visible government investment with enormous political 
appeal” (2004, p432). 
According to Aysan (1992), in reconstruction terminology, the use of the term 
„sheltering‟ as a verb should be preferred to the use of the word „shelter‟. Sheltering 
means a process to support and empower the affected community as opposed to 
products to be delivered as houses. 
The expanded perception of sheltering and housing as processes involving 
many people and agencies inevitably leads to the need for a broad 
consideration of the elements that contribute to risk reduction and recovery. 
These will include the social, cultural, economic, political, ecological and 
developmental dynamics that constrain the processes of sheltering or housing 
families (Aysan, 1992, p12). 
Twigg (2004) believes the focus of states and international agencies on rebuilding 
homes so that they are safe or disaster-resistant has little impact on making 
vulnerable people more secure in the long-term for the following reasons: An 
emphasis on technically 'safe' housing, without certainty that such housing is 
affordable or culturally acceptable; and large scale programmes are particularly 





likely to be technology-driven and introduce new and expensive construction 
technologies. He continues that although reconstruction programmes can provide 
jobs for local builders, in many cases the builders and their traditional skills are 
displaced by imported technologies and labour. Consequently communities do not 
attain the skills needed to extend, modify and repair the new houses. Where 
reconstruction does create local jobs; it is not clear how sustainable these new 
livelihood opportunities are once the programmes have ended.  
Another problem in such approaches as Twigg (2004) argues is the focus on houses 
(physical structures) rather than housing (the arena of social and economic life). 
Homes are not seen as places of work, learning, communication and relationship 
building. Houses are built without regard for how - or if - this will improve social 
and economic status or reduce vulnerability in its widest sense. According to Kelman 
et al (2008), addressing settlement and community issues is as important as 
providing physical structures. 
Twigg (2004) further complains of a tendency for a lack of community participation. 
Most reconstruction projects claim that they are participatory, but there is usually an 
element of agency propaganda in this and the extent and nature of such participation 
is often hotly disputed. Pelling (1998) highlights this disadvantage in many so-called 
participatory projects. He argues that communities are often involved in participatory 
projects as labour (self-help) and in maintenance (management) of resources rather 
in a utilitarian way to improve the efficiency of the projects and reduce transactions 
costs for the planning agency. This is instead of identifying the problem and project 
management roles. Such projects lack the empowering nature to view community 
members as equal partners with professional agency staff. They are instead seen as 
beneficiaries of external support.  
 





3.7.3 Northern NGOs and International Aid Organisations 
as Outsiders 
Not only are the central decision-makers rarely familiar with the needs and capacities 
of the local people of the area where the project is implemented, but so too are the 
international organisations. Not many of them have the capacity to make the effort to 
gain a comprehensive knowledge about local advantages and disadvantages. 
According to Wisner (2006), in Tsunami recovery: 
Implementing aid agencies, particularly those that are new to an area, or are 
having to rapidly scale up their interventions, have a tendency to create their 
own systems for delivery, service and accountability rather than looking to 
use and enhance existing local systems. In effect, they build a parallel 
economy. They create a large pool of relatively well paid but temporary jobs. 
They use their own vehicles and build their own warehouses (Wisner, 2006, 
p58). 
There is a need for different active organisations in reconstruction to work with 
grassroots to realise the real needs and characteristics of an affected community: 
[Community based organization] were deeply rooted in the society and 
culture of each area, they enabled people to express their real needs and 
priorities, allowing problems to be correctly defined and responsive 
mitigation measures to be designed. Following disaster people were able 
through community based organizations to articulate strategies for recovery 
and reconstruction which responded to their real needs (Maskrey, 1989, p84). 
For this reason, to address the needs of the community, many northern NGOs have 
moved away from the direct implementation of projects to a 'partnership approach' 





with southern NGOs. However, the precise nature and terms of such partnerships 
often remain unclear (Desai 2008). 
Here, the core purposes of NGOs as advocates to conquer marginalisation and unjust 
distribution of power becomes the matter of notice. The experience of Bam shows 
that international NGOs sometimes intensify the manifestation of social class 
structure in their missions. Fowler (2000) believes that such approaches in foreign 
NGDOs (non-governmental, development organisations) are inevitable: 
As implicit or explicit (e.g. Christian, right wing, left wing, liberal or 
whatever) carriers of Western codes, northern NGDO usually play a cultural-
transfer role whether they like it or not. They are who they are with a moral 
wellspring and value set derived from their domestic context and individual 
origins. It would be naïve to assume value free NGDO behavior anywhere 
(2000, p597). 
Here the work of Bourdieu on social structure and class can be of assistance. To him, 
what is often missed in social analysis is the structure of the life-style characteristic 
of an agent or class of agents, that is, "the unity hidden under the diversity and 
multiplicity of the set of practices performed in fields governed by different logics 
and therefore including different forms of realization", and the structure of the 
symbolic space marked out by the whole set of these structured practices. He 
believes for a deep analysis of social structure and life-style one must consider the 
practice-generating principle, i.e. class habitus the internalised form of class 
condition and of the conditionings it entails.  
The different forms of capital, the possession of which defines class 
membership and the distribution of which determines position in the power 
relations constituting the field of power and also determines the strategies 
available for use in these struggles – 'birth', 'fortune', and 'talent' in a past age, 
now economic capital and educational capital- are simultaneously 





instruments of power and stakes in the struggle for power, they are unequally 
powerful in real terms and unequally recognized as legitimate principles of 
authority or signs of distinction, at different moments and of course, by the 
different fractions (Pierre Bourdieu, 1986, p316).  
 According to Fowler (2000), the role of NGDOs should be to foster co-operation 
and collaborative spirit as the basis of human relations in an increasingly 
interdependent world: 
The essential idea is to draw on but move beyond a too simple three-sector 
view of society, to a more complex understanding of an NGDO's grounding, 
principles of operation, roles and embedding in society. This combination is 
captured in looking at NGDOs in this new era as occupying a Fourth 
Position. In other words while bonded to civil society they use their value-
base as a 'springboard' to interact with state, market and civil society itself- 
which is far from homogeneous and is not inherently 'civil' or conflict free. 
They would have the competence to speak different 'sector languages'; 
engage across divers institutional boundaries and foster inter-organizational 
linkages…they are an ethics which recognize that personal power relations 
create and are able to reform inhumane conditions in the world order 
(Fowler, 2000, p598-9). 
3.7.4 Local Power Structures 
There are also disadvantages in local communities to address social vulnerabilities. 
The local power structure will be reflected in local community-based organisations 
and community governance. According to Pelling (2003), after the Gujarat 
earthquake the aid and goods provided by international relief agencies, were 
distributed by local organisations. However, some high-caste-dominated groups took 
advantage of the situation and captured the resources that had been intended for 
lower caste victims. According to Mercer (2002):  





NGOs must be seen as a constituent part of the culture in which they work, 
and that hierarchical and authoritarian social structures that encourage 
dependence and deference will often be replicated in NGOs. In particular the 
tendency for NGOs to be headed by one charismatic leader can stifle 
individual staff autonomy and discourage wider staff participation in 
decision-making processes (which, ironically, is usually what staff are trying 
to achieve with the NGOs‟ „beneficiaries‟) (Mercer 2002, p13). 
3.7.5 Creating Social Capital 
The creation and most importantly permanence of social capital cannot be taken for 
granted merely through the involvement of NGOs. The creation of norms of 
reciprocity, trust and networks, as the basis for development, has been proved to be 
one of the hardest tasks. While Putnam argues that social capital is the 'path 
dependant', created by society over lengthy historical periods, others (for example 
Tendler 1997) argue that state or civil society action can create social capital, 
sometimes over relatively short periods (as cited by Hulme and Goods hand, 2000). 
The task of NGOs then would be to involve people in face-to-face programmes to 
increase their sense of co-operation and trust in each other. As a result, this fosters 
the norms of reciprocity in communities while at the same time creating intra-
organisational networks with formal organisations; enabling access for people to 
influence policy which then addresses their concerns.  
Bonding, solidarity or social cohesion provides the basis for reciprocity and 
exchanges within these groups. But when the power and resources of these 
social groups is limited, bridging or linking social capital with other groups 
becomes important to access different resources, information and power 
(Narayan et al, 2004, p1184).  
Having strong ties with people who suffer from the same lack of resources as 
oneself may not be very helpful, and can even hinder individual inclusion. 





Some excluded actors are characterized by only having access to primary and 
non-cross-cutting social networks which limit their sphere of action (e.g. 
poor, low caste or women in some contexts)…socially included actors can 
usually access both cross-cutting social networks, and through them have the 
ability to access institutional capital as well- that is develop links with formal 
organizations such as local government which are providers of essential 
services and conduits for exercising political voice. Networks of secondary 
associations with more heterogeneous membership (within which ties may 
cut across ethnic, caste, class, wealth, religion, location or other 
characteristics) are thus key to accessing resources and opportunities as well 
as being capable of complementing the role of the government and even 
providing a substitute in areas in which government policy is ineffective 
(Marina Della Giusta, 2008, p138-9). 
In a similar argument, Satterthwaite (2002) realises two forms of social capital 
helpful in urban governance which can be applied to our post-disaster reconstruction 
agenda: One is built on informal social networks, and the other comes from 
participating in formal market arrangements, the wider political system and civil 
society organisation. He believes the most important aspect of social capital for the 
vulnerable is their capacity to form organisations which can link these two kinds of 
social capital and make use of community resources and their potential to negotiate 
resources and support from external agencies; especially the agencies that have 
control over access to land, infrastructure and services. According to Satterthwaite:  
there are also obvious links between the two since the extent to which 
relations with external agencies prove useful in acquiring land and obtaining 
infrastructure and services influences the extent to which people organize to 
negotiate for these (2002, p259). 
Pelling (1998) argues for community and external decision-making to link and 
collaborate, the need for leaders as representatives of the community rises. 





Leadership has to be accountable and representative and moreover it should have 
effective linkages with external organisations. The selection of leadership, if it does 
not take place with great concern and sensitivity, may result in the formation of a 
dominant and homogeneous leader group or „class‟ and undermine participation 
from an empowerment perspective (Pelling, 1998). The role of leadership in 
transferring local knowledge to external organisations is substantial. This is through 
leadership that communities realise what to do to recover, or the external donors 
become aware of weaknesses and family or material losses as well as personal 
injuries (Davis, 2006). 
Moreover, as Edwards and Hulme (1996) argue, NGOs who wish to remain effective 
and accountable and to promote their sustainability in the long-term should diversify 
their funding sources and pursue strategies to raise funds locally. Dependence of the 
NGOs on donor funding, being northern NGOs or the state, affects their 
accountability and their relationship with local civil societies and grassroots 
(Edwards and Hulme, 1996).  
According to Clarke (1998), the impact of states on civil society and NGOs is central 
in defining the role that NGOs can play in national development because it is 
government which give NGOs the space and the autonomy to organise, network and 
campaign. The role of local government as the legitimate local organisational forms 
of governance is substantial in affecting reconstruction policies and mediating the 
community-state power relations. However, as Pelling (2003, p81) cites from 
Solway (1994), “the capacity for local or municipal government to contribute to 
building resiliency is greatly determined by its organizational structure and 
relationship to national government”. Local governments can institutionalise local 
participation by bargaining for more municipal and town council authorities. 
According to Narayan (2004): 
Formal government systems are embedded in the local social organizational 
context. Hence understanding how and when local governments become 





inclusive and function effectively is basic service provision and poverty 
reduction requires understanding the interplay between history, politics and 
changes in social organization over time (Narayan, 2004, p1179) 
Institutionalising local participation in society would leave its effects on the local 
organisational context and would affect the formal governance structure.  
The community with social capital is proactive in collective decision-making 
and contributes to a speedy recovery. The community is also found to be 
satisfied with the reconstruction policy, since there has been effective 
negotiation between community and local governments (Shaw and Goda, 
2004, p32). 
3.8 Conclusion 
Development studies are increasingly involving disaster and risk reduction 
discourses into their debates. Development should be regarded as a process through 
which people's physical, social and attitudinal vulnerabilities are reduced. Along 
with rapid urbanisation process that many countries, especially developing countries, 
are experiencing, the importance of paying attention to risk reduction factors to 
decrease the vulnerabilities that rapid urbanisation brings about is becoming 
prominent.  
In doing so, the most important and basic step is understanding vulnerability. 
Vulnerability is studied through different approaches in development studies.  This 
chapter discussed the following approaches that vulnerability is addressed through: 
The entitlement or livelihood approach, relating vulnerability to the poverty 
approach, Pressure and Release model relating vulnerability to resilience, the 
institutional approach, participatory approach, and relating vulnerability to a sense of 
belonging.  





People with lower access to resources, civil rights, supporting networks and health 
conditions suffer more from natural disasters due to their higher level of 
vulnerability. Hence, it is crucial in studying development projects to identify who is 
the community, how a community is defined by itself and by others and who is 
marginalised from a community. Community gives our lives moral meaning and a 
sense of security. In times of disaster, loss of a family‟s home linked with the loss of 
a group‟s cultural space results in alienation of the families subjected to forced 
displacement and a lasting experience of placelessness. This in turn fragments 
patterns of social fabric including reciprocal help and voluntary associations. 
However, there is a discourse that disasters can also institute a new form of 
governance through informal responses that operate outside of established social 
frameworks which can address pre-disaster vulnerabilities. To prevent the feeling of 
alienation and placelessness and to increase the resilience of the affected community, 
investing in social capital is helpful. 
Part of this chapter debated and explored the concept of social capital: The origin of 
social capital discourses, Putnam's social capital, the dark side of social capital, and 
the contribution of social capital to development studies. It was also discussed how 
the development of civil society and NGOs can assist in the creation of desired forms 
of social capital in a community. In doing so, Habermas' dilemma on the roles and 
relations of the state and civil society was studied along with existing discourses 
about the alternatives to state-centred governance. Due to the fact that state centred 
approaches usually apply a blue-print approach, and are professional and urban, bias 
results in unsatisfactory outcomes.  
On the other hand, it was asserted that for NGOs to create useful social capital they 
have to invest in their communicative skills to create effective links with grass-root 
communities regarding the creation of cognitive social capital and diversify their 
financial resources to gain accountability and independence. 





Post-disaster recovery and reconstruction phases, which could be worthy 
opportunities for the creation of new social links and institutions in favour of 
encouragement of bottom-up and inclusive urban governance, often fail to achieve 
this goal. The focus of the main and central reconstruction stake-holders are usually 
directed to housing. Housing reconstruction projects, however, are often limited to 
the physical reconstruction of houses, but not to the individual and families needs 
and expectations of housing. Homes are often built without regard to their effect on 
the lives and livelihoods of the people who will live in them. Local participation in 
these approaches is limited to applying the blue-prints that are designed for them by 
outside engineers and builders.   
To make post-disaster recovery period to an opportunity for self-governing practices 
for the affected community, NGOs can be useful only if they gain success in creating 
trust among the community and local and national states and have access to efficient 
financial resources. General use of the term „NGO‟ might shadow the fact that local 
and non-local NGOs have weaknesses in creating trustful links with the grass-root 
community of the local or national states. Foreign NGOs are often alien with the 
cultural values of the affected community which can be an obstacle to creating trust. 
Local NGOs are a part of the culture in which they work, and the hierarchical and 
authoritarian social structures that encourage dependence and deference will often be 
replicated in NGOs. In the creation of social capital in development projects and 
especially post-disaster reconstruction periods, NGOs, along with getting embedded 
and accepted in the community, have the task of creating vertical links among formal 
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This chapter provides a background for the study of reconstruction policy and 
implementation in Iran. It presents the broad context necessary for understanding the 
policies for reconstruction and their results.  
To understand the reconstruction process, an understanding of the governing system 
is needed. In this regard this chapter provides an introduction to the structure of the 
state and the key policy makers and implementers in national, provincial and local 
levels. The situation of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as a part of the 
Third Sector will be presented.  





Another subject of this chapter is the government policies on urbanisation, housing 
and land after the revolution of 1979. Land and housing are crucial factors in 
reconstruction. This chapter will discuss how these policies affected the urbanisation 
process in post-revolutionary Iran. The policies are a key tool for analysing the post-
earthquake reconstruction process. 
Following these backgrounds, the disaster management system in Iran will be 
discussed followed by the experiences of reconstruction in the country. To make the 
subject clearer, Iran‟s reconstruction context is divided into two sections: 
reconstruction of war-affected areas and reconstruction of natural disaster affected 
areas in Iran.  
4.2 Earthquake-Prone Iran 
Iran is a country with an area of 1,648,000 square kilometres located in south-west 
Asia. It has more than seventy million people who are mostly young: the population 
of Iran in 2007 was 71,830,091 (Iran National Statistics centre) about twice the 
number of the population of 1979 (about 36 million, ibid). The population is mainly 
urban with 68.46 percent living in towns and cities in 2006 and 31.54 percent 
residing in rural areas (National Statistics Center).  
Being part of the Alp-Himalaya belt, Iran is the most earthquake-prone countries in 
the world. According to Iran's report for Hyogo Framework for Action (2005), more 
than 180,000 people were killed by earthquakes during the last 90 years. This can be 
explained by rapid urbanisation which increases the vulnerability to earthquake and 
put more people at risk.  In 1956 there were 199 cities in Iran which increased to 373 
cities in 1976 (twenty years later), 612 cities in 1996, and 1016 in 2006 (sixty six 
percent growth in the number of the cities since 1996) (National Statistics Centre of 
Iran). Amani (2001) identifies four factors responsible for this rapid increase in the 
number of urban population in Iran: increase in the number of births and decrease in 
the number of deaths in cities, migration from towns and villages to cities, expansion 





of cities and the merge of neighbouring settlement areas into the cities, and 
classifying large towns as cities due to the increase in the number of their 
inhabitants.  
In terms of reconstruction, in addition to post-earthquake reconstruction experiences, 
Iran has needed extensive reconstruction after war. War between Iran and Iraq broke 
out on 22 September 1980 when the Iraqi army invaded a large area of the west and 
south-west Iran. The war lasted eight years before the ceasefire in 1988. According 
to official information issued by the Iranian government, the total direct economic 
loss on the Iranian side during the eight-year war was US$ 117 billion. The total 
number of residential units destroyed in 4, 873 villages in the five provinces affected 
by the war totalled 202,356 (Chamran, 1986).  
4.3 The Structure of State in Iran after the Revolution of 
1979  
The Islamic structure of the government was a consequence of people‟s vote for an 
Islamic Republic system on 3rd April 1979. Article three of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran states: “The Islamic Republic of Iran has duty of directing all its resources to the 
goals of ruling the nation according to the Islamic Law.” According to the 
constitution, faqih as the Supreme Leader of the country has the supreme power to 
control the system:  
“In keeping with the principles of governance and the permanent necessity of 
leadership, the Constitution provides for the establishment of leadership by 
faqih (ruler) possessing the necessary qualifications and recognized as leader 
by the people. This is in accordance with the saying 'the conduct of affairs is 
to be in the hands of those who are learned concerning God and are 
trustworthy guardians of that which He has permitted and that which He has 
forbidden'. Such leadership will prevent any deviation by the various organs 





of government from their essential Islamic duties.” (Constitution: 
Introduction, 1979, p20-21).  
Along with highlighting the role of faqih in governing the system, the Constitution 
emphasises the crucial role of people as main administrators of the Islamic Republic:  
“In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the affairs of the county must be 
administrated on the basis of public opinion expressed by means of elections, 
including the election of the President of the Republic, the representatives of 
the National Consultative Assembly (the Parliament), and the members of 
Councils, or by means of referenda in matters specified in other articles of 
this Constitution.” (Article 6).  
Faqih and the people govern the country together through three political institutions: 
the Legislature (consisting of elected parliamentarians), the Executive (a directly 
elected president and 21 executive ministries), and the Judiciary (its head is 
appointed directly by faqih).  
Despite the focus of the new Constitution following the revolution of 1979 on the 
role of people in the governance, post-revolutionary Iran experienced a highly 
centralised governing system. Tajbakhsh (2003) identifies three factors influential in 
this regard: first the damage to the economy due to the flight of key investors and 
personnel, which led the new government to nationalise many industries and sectors 
of the economy. Second, the eight-year war with Iraq left no option for the 
government but to centralise military and administrative functions to safeguard the 
new state. Third, the Islamic system required ideological support which should be 
created in all spheres of society and needed government‟s input into all social and 
economic aspects of the country.  
 





4.4 Urban Governance in Iran 
The country is governed in three levels: national, regional and local. At the regional 
level Iran is divided into thirty one provinces governed by a provincial governor 
appointed by the Minister of Interior. Each province is divided into sub-provinces 
which are governed by the governor also appointed by the Ministry of Interior. In 
2003 the country had about 900 cities.  
Iran's population distribution is rapidly urbanising. A study by Azkia et al (2005) 
shows that about 68 percent of the population of Iran live in about nine hundred 
Iranian cities. Azkia et al (2005) believes the rapid growth of urbanisation in Iran is 
due to the large governmental investment in cities and especially in Tehran which 
attracts many people from rural areas to cities looking for job opportunities and 
better public services like better education for their children. Madanipour (1998) 
states this rapid urbanisation is outpacing the capacity of the infrastructure of the 
cities resulting in: pollution, shortage of water, shortage of green space, inefficient 
housing and inadequate city services are some problems. The main organisations 
responsible for solving these problems are city councils and municipalities. 
Until the end of the twentieth century urban management in Iran was highly 
centralised: urban governance was the duty of the municipality and the mayor was 
chosen by the representative of the central government of the province. In 1999 it 
changed from a top-down system towards a more democratic approach. Since 1999 
city councils were shaped by the municipality, whose members were elected by local 
residents and the mayor would be chosen by the elected city council. Studies by 
Azkia et al (2005) show that despite the creation of city councils and a democratic 
approach to urban governance, public participation in urban governance has 
decreased: in the first elections for city council in 1999, sixty five per cent of people, 
who were eligible to vote, voted; but in 2002 (one year before the Bam earthquake) 
this number decreased to fifty per cent.  





Besides electing the mayor (whom should be approved by the Ministry of Interior), 
city councils have the responsibility to monitor and co-operate with the mayor‟s 
activities; approve laws presented by the mayor‟s office, which should be in 
accordance with the framework of the Ministry of Interior; and approve the mayor‟s 
annual budget (Islamic city council of Tehran official website).  They are also 
responsible for adequately administering and providing municipal services. 
Urban municipal services in Iran can be classified into four main categories 
(Tajbakhsh, 2003):  
1. Public health, including street cleaning, collecting, transporting and disposing of 
solid waste (garbage), slaughterhouses  
2. Recreational, including parks  
3. Public safety, including fire stations  
4. Local transportation, including buses and taxis  
It should be noted that municipalities (mayors and councils) should not be 
considered as local governments, but in practice they are. Legally, they are non-
governmental public organisations: financially, according to the Municipal Fiscal 
Self-Sufficiency Act passed in 1988, municipalities are self-sufficient. However, all 
of their decisions and elections should be approved by the Ministry of Interior and 
their activities are limited to minor urban management. Neither the councils nor the 
mayors have legal authority to initiate or engage in urban development planning. 
Their area of action is restricted to implementing the urban master plans designed by 
the central Ministry of Housing and Urban Development (Islamic city council of 
Tehran official website).  
4.4.1. Local Government Powers: 
Despite their formal distinction, city councils have limited power in influencing the 
governance of cities. According to Article 7 of the Iranian Constitution, these local 





councils together with Parliament are decision-making and administrative organs of 
the state. However, as Azkia et al (2005) argue, city councils in practice have only a 
minor role in urban governance. Azkia et al believe one of the reasons is their budget 
deficit. City councils rely on local taxes for their expenses, but in Iran, due to the 
focus and access of the central government to oil income rather than on taxes, 
taxpaying is not applied orderly and correctly (Azkia et al, 2005). This limits city 
councils‟ ability to access sufficient income to run their projects. Hence their 
legitimacy for urban governance would be put at risk. Other reasons that Azkia et al 
(2005) mention are the absence of a culture of co-operation and participation and a 
lack of active civil organisations. Consequently, members of the councils spend 
significant time argueing with each other and disputing who is right, without 
applying themselves to actual governance.  
Amirahmadi (1996) has also mentioned this problem in his studies on recovery in 
post-war cities of Iran. According to him, inaugurations of city councils were 
encouraged in order to institutionalise local participation. However, due to the lack 
of autonomous non-governmental organisations to empower grass-root input, the 
national government's efforts to institutionalise participation through city councils 
became a top-down management strategy wherein the central authority makes the 
important decisions.    
Municipal revenues, according to Tajbakhsh (2003) have nine sources (Table 4.1). 
As the table shows, the main source of municipalities‟ income is through levies on 
buildings and land followed by sale of services, user charges and building permits. 
Governmental financial support through the Ministry of Interior is very small (one 
percent of the budget). This means the most beneficial income resource for 
municipalities to finance their staff and small city projects was through private 
construction sector and building permits. The municipalities increased their income 
through selling more building permits than the city‟s land-use plan allows. Coupled 
with the high rate of urbanisation, cities and their urban populations became 
increasingly vulnerability to earthquakes. 





Table 4.1: Municipal revenue/ Average of all cities in Iran (Source: Ministry of 
Interior as cited by Tajbakhsh, 2003) 
 
Revenue 
All cities average of total 
revenue 1992-2000 (%) 
1. Levies on building and land 45% 
2. Income from sale of services and user charges 17% 
3. Levies on building permits 14% 
4. Income from municipal establishments from 
fines and penalties 
11% 
5. Grants, gifts, loans, balance from previous 
years 
5% 
6. Levies on communication and transportation 4% 
7. Levies and taxes collected locally 2% 
8. Income from rent or sale of municipal 
properties 
1% 
9. Allocations from the Ministry of Interior 1% 
 
Since the presidential election of Khatami in 1997, some steps were made to increase 
people‟s participation in Iran‟s municipal governing system including: activating 
local councils and NGOs. The formation of NGOs is the subject of the following 
section.  





4.5 NGOs in Iran   
Iranian NGOs can be classified into two groups: Modern NGOs and traditional 
community-based organisations (Tahmasbi, 2002). In 1999 there were four thousand 
registered NGOs and many more that were not registered (Islamic Republic of Iran 
Population Council Information Bank, as cited by Rostami-Povey, 2004, p257).  
Many modern NGOs were established by government members (Rostami-Povey, 
2004). Among NGOs founded by government members some were established to 
activate civil society participation in line with President Khatami‟s democratic 
policies in late 1990s (Rostami-Povey, 2004). In fact, these NGOs, with the support 
they had from government acted as a catalyst in opening up the third sector and 
advocating social issues (Tahmasbi, 2002). Modern NGOs‟ can be categorised 
broadly as:  
• Women‟s NGOs  
• Children and youth NGOs  
• Environmental NGOs  
• Health NGOs  
• Cultural NGOs  
• Science and Technology NGOs  
• A limited number of Human Right NGOs  
The core of President Khatami‟s policy was encouraging civil society. He supported 
freedom of speech through publications. According to the studies of Kamrava 
(2001), in 2001, nearly one thousand newspapers, magazines and journals were 
being published. In line with his liberal policies, some modern NGOs were 
supported by the government policies more than others, namely women, youth and 
environmental NGOs (Tahmasbi, 2002).  





The studies of Malek Mohamadi and Mirbod (2005) reveal three obstacles that 
restrict NGOs in Iran: registration, funding, and management. Various government 
entities are involved in the NGO registration process, which often leads to problems. 
According to Tahmasbi (2002) the exact number of NGOs in Iran is not available but 
by 2002 they were estimated to number around 10,000-12,000 (about 5,000 of them 
are CBOs) – many of which were not registered.  In terms of funding, modern NGOs 
in Iran are financed by their members, their founders, their boards, public aid and at 
the time of Khatami‟s presidency limited but increasing contributions from the 
government (Tahmasbi, 2002). However, their financial requirements are usually not 
covered sufficiently and tax laws lack clear guidelines pertaining to NGO tax (Malek 
Mohamadi and Moniri, 2005). Regarding NGO management, many modern NGOs 
who lack experience, are unfamiliar with administrative issues which result in lack 
of transparency and accountability (Tahmasbi, 2002). Most NGOs prefer to rely just 
on a few key members for decision making and funding (Malek Mohamadi and 
Moniri, 2005). 
A 2002 study conducted by the Center of Empowering Civil Society Organizations 
in Iran on 405 NGOs, revealed that the average age of an NGO was seven years with 
thirty two percent registered between 1990-1997 and 68 percent established after 
1997. Approximately one third of the NGOs formed after 1997 had not been 
registered by that time (ibid).  
In terms of Traditional CBOs, civil society-friendly policies helped them move away 
from a traditional approach of giving money to deprived and social vulnerable 
groups which is criticised for creating dependency toward a more modern system of 
management and for conducting research and analysis to enable implementation of 
their own philanthropic services (Tahmasbi, 2002). Their activities vary from 
providing education, housing and health service for deprived households to 
consultation and assistance to female-headed households (Tahmasbi, 2002). Due to 
their long term experience and religious and cultural roots, these traditional CBOs 
were more successful in communicating with the public than modern NGOs. 





A study by Tajbakhsh et al (2003) about the history of these different types of NGOs 
in Iran, determined that new forms of Traditional NGOs were initially shaped in the 
1910s with the creation of primary links with the modern West. In 1911 the Iranian 
Government (which was The Qajar at that time) sent the first group of Iranian 
students to Europe for further education. Gradually with the return of these students, 
new views entered the social structure of Iran and brought with itself new 
institutions. One of these institutions was new forms of charity organisations. One 
such organisation was the Sardar Mokaram School which was started with funds 
from a few wealthy individuals for deprived children but later changed to a new form 
of finance and management through the creation of an organisation in which 
different persons could take part and contribute. After the Constitutional Revolution 
of Iran, which occurred between 1905 and 1907, women started to take part in non-
governmental organisations and gradually their participation expanded. In 1945 the 
"Institution for Child Fostering" became one of the first modern non-governmental 
organisations to be started by a group of women. Contemporary Iranian NGOs and 
especially those that active in Bam are mostly the offspring of this kind of NGO.   
4.6 Disaster Management system in Iran  
After the disastrous earthquake of Manjil in 1990, disaster management in Iran took 
a new form. A new law was passed in 1991 which mandated the Ministry of Interior 
as the main responsible organisation for disaster management through two new 
established sectors: The Bureau for Research and Co-ordination of Safety and 
Reconstruction Affairs (BRCSR) and Natural Disaster Headquarter (NDH). BRCSR 
research into safety measures; formulation of preparedness and mitigation plans; 
disaster information collection, analysis and dissemination; provision of coordination 
services for relief, reconstruction and rehabilitation activities; monitoring activities 
including coordination of budget forecasting; and disbursement and provision of 
logistical and procurement support service for provinces (Iran's report for Hyogo 
Framework for Action, 2005). NDH in turn, is a coordinator between different 
organisations. In normal times it coordinates research activities of different 





institutions and in times of disaster it has the responsibility of coordinating the relief 
and reconstruction operations of all respected agencies. The organs that NDH 
supervise after a disaster are: Red Crescent of Iran and Armed forces in the rescue 
and relief phase and Housing Foundation of Iran and Ministry of Housing and Urban 
Development in the reconstruction phase (Ghafoury-Ashtiani, 1999). 
Seven ministries and the following governmental organisations are directly  
concerned with disaster research and management: Army of Islamic Republic of 
Iran, Planning and Budget Organization
1
 (the supreme approving body for all public 
sector major development plans, programmes and projects), National Welfare 
Organization, Meteorological Organization, Islamic Republic Broadcasting 
Organization, Geography Institute of University of Tehran, Disciplinary Forces and 
Building and Housing Research Center. Nevertheless, other institutions that are 
represented as nongovernmental are not quite independent from the state. Beside 
Earthquake Committee of National research Council, Natural Disaster Prevention 
Center and International Institute for Seismology Earthquake, which are 






                                                 
1
 This organisation was eliminated in 2007, two sections were created in the president's Office to do 
the former Planning and Budget Organization's responsibilities 





Table 4.2: all governments/para-government organisations involved in disaster management 

























































































Army of IRI              
Housing Foundation              
Fire department              
National Welfare Organisation              
Meteorological Organisation              
Municipalities              
IR Broadcasting Org.              
Emam Khomeini Relief 
Foundation 
             
Earthquake Com. Of National 
research Council 
             
Building and housing research 
centre 
             
Natural disaster Prevention 
centre 
             
International Institute for 
seismology earthquake 
             
Geography institute, Uni. of 
Tehran 
             
Disciplinary Forces              
Mobilisation Forces               
Ministry of Interior              
The Red Crescent Society of 
Iran 
             
Ministry of Health              
Ministry of Foreign Affairs              
Ministry of Housing and Urban 
Development 
             
Ministry of Energy              
Ministry of Agriculture              
Ministry of Roads and 
Transportation 
             





Housing Foundation, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, was established to provide 
housing for under-privileged and families of martyrs in the early years after the 
revolution. Together with the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, Housing 
Foundation is responsible for approval and implementation of spatial plans, housing 
projects and building codes including earthquake mandatory codes (Iran's report for 
Hyogo Framework for Action, 2005). Reconstruction of housing is carried out by the 
Housing Foundation in collaboration and with participation of the owners, people‟s 
assistance, support of banks and free technical and engineering services from the 
government (Housing Foundation Guidance Book).  
Emam Khomeini Relief Foundation is a charity organisation inaugurated by Imam 
Khomeini‟s call for supporting deprived households in years following the 
revolution. The Red Crescent Society of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the first of its 
kind in the region, is by far the most important nongovernmental partner in disaster 
management in Iran (Iran's report for Hyogo Framework for Action, 2005).  
In terms of municipalities, as stated earlier, despite the fact that legally they are 
nongovernmental organisations, in practice they are an implementing arm of the 
Ministry of Interior.  
4.7 Reconstruction  
Iran has experience in both post-war and post-earthquake reconstructions.  
4.7.1 Post-war reconstruction  
Immediately after the end of Islamic Revolution in 1979, the war between Iran and 
Iraq started in 1980 which lasted for eight years. After two years of war and after the 
government overcame the shock of Iraqi attacks and found enough power to manage 
the war, the reconstruction of war affected cities started (Motawef, 1996).  





Since it was still early years of the new regime, the ideas of revolution and the main 
tools for policy making were still fresh. The new regime slogans were: support the 
poor, independence from foreign aid, and people‟s participation (Motawef, 1996).  
“Take the reconstruction in the same way as the war and strive to solve its 
problems with the assistance of the people” (Imam Khomeini, 1982).  
Reconstruction in those days had broader meaning for the revolutionary people. The 
idea of reconstruction of the country was the main subject of after the revolution 
even before the war started. Reconstruction was referred to as “the restoration of an 
Islamic polity which had been largely and deliberately destroyed by the previous 
„westernising‟ regime of the Shah” (Motawef, 1996, p 120).  
In the reconstruction of war damaged areas three approaches were of main concern: 
first, keeping the status quo approach – to rebuild the damaged area the way they 
were before; second, the pro-poor approach which was the cornerstone of the 
government‟s policies;, and third, the development approach in which the 
reconstruction was considered as an opportunity to restore Islamic identity in 
damaged cities (Zargar 1989, Motawef 1996).  
“The major debates were around defining the objective of reconstruction. 
Some of those involved defined reconstruction as regeneration. By this 
definition, in each village efforts should be made to help the victims to 
resettle and therefore no change in the settlement or life style were 
considered. This view was criticised by others as it appears in many post-
disaster situations. The other groups claimed that if we look to the previous 
situation of these villages, in fact we cannot see anything worthwhile to 
reconstruct” (Zargar, 1988, p29).  
In practice, however, no coherent programme was applied. Operations occurred 
rapidly and without clear planning. As the studies of Motawef (1996) reveal,  





“…the main policy was in effect simply to get the reconstruction operation 
started in the confidence that, although problems would undoubtedly occur, 
solutions would certainly be found” (Motawef, 1996, p128-129).  
The reconstruction was carried out by the central government with the assistance of 
numerous volunteers in response to the government‟s call for manpower and pubic 
donations. In terms of people‟s participation, Zargar (as cited by El Masri 1992) 
classifies reconstruction policies into three categories:  
• Participatory policy: people are involved in the decision making, design and 
construction,  
• Non-participatory policy: the reconstruction project was designed by outsiders. At 
the time of rebuilding, local people have been either living in other areas because of 
displacement or were able to make only a minor contribution to construction,  
• Semi-participatory policy: people have little opportunity to influence the decision 
making and the deign process and their role is limited to construction of individual 
dwellings,  
Some national NGOs were also helpful in reconstruction. For the reconstruction of 
rural areas two revolutionary NGOs mobilised: Housing Foundation (which cannot 
be considered entirely as a "non"-governmental organisation) and the Construction 
Jihad which was another organisation inaugurated by volunteers immediately after 
the revolution to develop rural and deprived areas through reviving the rural 
production system other related activities (Motawef, 1996).  
In urban areas, some NGOs were shaped in mosques and religious centres for the 
purpose of reconstruction. These NGOs were known as Assistant Organisations and 
each took responsibility for a particular town or city (Motawef, 1996). Nevertheless, 
these Assistant Organisations lacked coordination and experience in reconstruction 





and consequently they could not play an influential role in reconstruction. Hence 
they left the affected areas in 1984 while the reconstruction was still under process.  
In 1985 two factors forced the government to halt the reconstruction. First, the 
government decided to focus on finishing the protracted war to avoid wasting money 
on reconstruction that may only be temporary and in areas where residents had left 
and would not return to their houses until after the war. Second, a collapse in oil 
prices in the mid 1980s, which at that time covered ninety to ninety five percent of 
the government‟s annual budget, resulted in an economic crisis for the Iran 
government (Amirahmadi, 1990). The government cut reconstruction funds to 
decrease expenditures.  
After the end of the war in 1988, a new era started in Iran which influenced 
reconstruction. One year after the end of the war Imam Khomeini passed away and 
the structure of power changed. Hashemi Rafsanjani became president in 1989. 
During his presidency, economic liberalisation attracted foreign investment and 
increased private sector activity. The first National Five-year Development Plan 
since the revolution was published by the government with a focus on reconstruction 
of the war damaged cities. The plan required international loans totalling US$ 30-40 
billion to finance the reconstruction and development. The funds were mainly 
invested in industrial projects (Amirahmadi, 1990). NGOs have not yet become 
professional and experienced enough to make a strong appearance in the governance 
of reconstruction (Motawef, 1996).  
4.7.1.1 Some the Examples of Post-war Reconstruction:  
In the reconstruction of Khuzastan the use that villages would get from schools, 
mosques and other public infrastructure were overestimated. Zargar (1989) relates 
this to the lack of participation of local community based organisations. The 
investment in unnecessary infrastructure was a waste of money and over time has 





resulted in the buildings falling in to disrepair since local communities are unable to 
afford the cost of maintenance.  
Another example is the reconstruction of Farsia. As Pour (1988) has documented, the 
reconstruction of Farsia was conducted by planners unfamiliar with the area and 
without consultation of the local people. This led to a loss of sense of place and an 
unfamiliarity of the new space with its residents. Nevertheless, over time residents 
started to change the village in their favour. Minor changes included building 
required facilities like ovens and sheds, and a major change was the reforming of the 
functioning of the structure of the city: the narrow pedestrian ways and the square 
left unused and the cattle rout becoming a vivid centre for the cluster of houses 
around them because the daily and economic life of Farsia revolved around animals 
and livestock. This example shows where plans are not designed based on the needs 
and culture of the area, people change their surroundings in their favour and the 
reconstruction project results in waste of the budget and time. 
The case of Howeizeh is noteworthy. Before the war, Howeizeh had a population of 
about 6,000 and functioned as an urban centre for the surrounding rural population. 
During the war, the town was completely levelled by Iraqi troops before its liberation 
in May 1982. Howeizeh was rebuilt as a monument of war in a different location 
from the previous city and ten times larger than its original size. The new city had 
wide streets and many extravagant public buildings. No consultation took place 
either with local residents or local authorities (Motawef, 1996). Landownership was 
totally ignored and cultural and social structure of the area was not considered (ibid). 
Fourteen years after the town‟s liberation, landownership problems had not been 
solved and people were still taking cases to court. New houses were bigger in 
number but smaller in size than the pre-war ones and the large open spaces did not 
suit the hot weather of the region. All households now live in similar small houses 
without consideration of their pre-war houses‟ prices (ibid).  





Khoramshahr was another “show case” that can be considered as a failure in 
reconstruction. Khoramshahr was an important city in the south west of Iran that was 
soon occupied by Iraqi troops at the start of the war and the port was destroyed 
leading to decimation of the city‟s economic life. Its liberalisation has become one of 
the greatest events in the history of the Iran-Iraq war. Subsequently its reconstruction 
gained nationwide interest. Reconstruction was regarded simply as building houses 
and no attention was paid either to the community‟s basic needs or the facilities or 
infrastructure network of the site (Motawef, 1996). The result was that only deprived 
people who had no alternative place to go and were unable to access resources 
agreed to move to this site (ibid). The city lost its core residents, identity and life. 
Due to the absence of grass-root inputs, the hope that residents of war afflicted areas 
would be involved in the rebuilding process was far from reality, except in the case 
of private housing reconstruction (Amirahmadi, 1996). A representative of the 
Housing Foundation was appointed to supervise the rebuilding of houses, which 
were designed for the people but not by them. The government provided the 
architectural design, construction materials and technical supervision for 
reconstruction of houses. Community members only became involved in the process 
through providing the human resources necessary for economic efficiency 
(Amirahmadi, 1996).  
El Mesri (1992) summarised the shortcomings of the housing reconstruction in the 
war affected cities as follows:  
1. Emphasis on speed and quantification sometimes led to rebuilding settlements 
alien to the people. In some cases reconstruction started even before identifying 
practical and effective means to encourage the displaced people to return to their 
original settlement.  
2. Standardised building materials were produced and delivered to sites by the 
government through different organisations. While this facilitated quick and efficient 





construction, it neglected the resources and skills available at the regional and local 
levels which ought to have been developed. In addition, this standardisation 
contributed to a lack of local characteristics in the cities.  
3. In most situations the community was not consulted in major decision makings.  
4.7.2 Post-earthquake Reconstruction  
4.7.2.1 Buyinzahra 1962  
On September 1962, at about 19:20, an earthquake occurred in Buyin-Zahra, a rural 
area in northern Iran which killed 12,225, injured 2,776 people and damaged 21,310 
houses beyond repair. It caused damage to 324 villages with a total population of 
199,500. 91 villages were totally destroyed. The main reasons for such a catastrophe 
were poor quality of building material, heavy roofs and unstable buildings 
(Ambraseys, 1963).  
The city of Buyin Zahra, as Zareh describes (2001), was reconstructed by the Shah‟s 
(pre-revolution) government of Iran one year after the earthquake through a highly 
centralised approach. Despite the catastrophic experience of 1962, new mitigation 
factors were not applied in the reconstruction. Forty years after the Buyin-Zahra 
earthquake of 1962, another big earthquake measuring 6.3 on the Richter scale, 
occurred on 22 June 2002 that killed 500 people and made more than 50,000 people 
homeless (Zareh, 2003). This implies that in the reconstruction following the 
earthquake of 1962 houses were not built resistant to the earthquake, this could be 
due to the lack of inserting resistant building factors in the reconstruction plan or 
lack of proper monitoring in applying the resistant factors.  





4.7.2.2 Tabas 1978  
The catastrophic earthquake of Tabas occurred on 16th September 1978: killing 
20,000 people and severely damaging 90 villages and the town of Tabas. According 
to Baker et al (2003), the earthquake killed eighty five percent of the population of 
the town Tabas and the high number of deaths was mostly due to the poor structure 
of buildings.  
The reconstruction process of Tabas demonstrated both some positive outcomes and 
negative impacts. The reconstruction benefited from the experiences of past 
earthquakes in Iran plus the fact that the earthquake happened during the revolution, 
when people were optimistic to create a new and more effective form of governance. 
Many volunteer groups entered the area to build houses for the affected people and 
especially the poor. Houses were largely built on adjacent plots next to the ruins of 
the destroyed houses using earthquake resistant standards (Ghafoury-Ashtiany, 
1999).  
However, some unexpected consequences emerged after the reconstruction. For 
example the new houses were not suitable for the taste and culture of the rural life 
style of villages (Ghafoury-Ashtiany, 1999). As a consequence, people used them as 
storage or animal sheds and then repaired their damaged houses themselves to use as 
their living spaces. However, such examples were not widespread.  
Nevertheless, according to Ghafoury-Ashtiany (1999), the reconstruction of Tabas, 
which lasted four and a half years, was not a disappointing experience. The rebuilt 
houses were safer and people kept the ruins as a memory for prevention.  
4.7.2.3 Manjil 1990  
The experiences of post-war reconstruction helped planners and authorities apply the 
lessons learnt to post-earthquake reconstruction. The most notable example and one 





which is widely considered as the turning point of reconstruction and natural disaster 
management in Iran, is the reconstruction of Manjil after the earthquake of 1990.  
On 21st June 1990, an earthquake measuring 7.5 on the Richter scale struck 
northwest Iran, killing more than 40,000 people and leaving nearly 500,000 
homeless. Most of those severely affected were rural residents; over eighty percent 
were living in more than 700 villages.   
The main organisation implementing the reconstruction was the Housing Foundation 
(HF). Based on its experiences of reconstruction in war damaged areas, HF 
conducted the reconstruction of Manjil with extensive participation of local people 
(Motawef, 1996). Local people and communities were involved in all stages of 
reconstruction including decision-making; and the state acted as the sponsor of the 
needs as decided by the people themselves. During reconstruction many of these 
villages were merged together. 
Ten years after the earthquake a study of the host community and the in-migrated 
(guest) community in one of the villages, which had been formed through the 
merging of two other villages, was conducted by Asgary (2006). The study revealed 
that the economic situation and quality of life of the relocated community had 
deteriorated significantly when compared with the host community. The main 
economic activities of the region before the earthquake were farming, horticulture 
(olive trees), livestock and honey production. Due to relocation, the guest 
communities had lost their land rights. Though the resettlement policy provided 
them with land for housing, there was no agricultural land provided in the new area. 
Due to the distance of their agricultural lands from their new village, ninety six 
percent of the land owned by the guest community was left unattended. In 
accordance with the livelihood regeneration policy of the government after, olive 
production was supported financially by the government. But as the study shows, 
while average ownership of olive trees among the host community increased, their 
guest counterparts faced significant decrease in ownership of olive trees (from an 





average of 57 trees to 17). The same trend was found with livestock ownership as 
new houses were built without adequate consideration of animal husbandry 
requirements. Nevertheless honey production, which does not require land or labour, 
increased – especially among guest communities. 
The change the guest community‟s lifestyle was not merely due to their lack of 
agriculture land. Despite government investments in creating livelihoods for disaster 
affected communities, the displaced communities did not benefit from these policies 
as much as host communities. The first generation of the displaced population did 
not have enough skills to gain employment (since most of these investments 
occurred in the service sector) and the second generation did not have an opportunity 
to acquire new jobs due to the socio-political dominance of the host community (lack 
of social capital). Due to the deterioration of the financial situation of households, 
more family members had to seek employment including women in both guest and 
host communities. However, while the women of host communities secured jobs in 
governmental and office posts, the women of guest communities largely engaged in 
daily paid jobs, which were mostly agricultural based on nearby large farms.  
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter studied how Iran has managed reconstruction. It was discussed that the 
highly centralised governing system, has led to many negative consequences in terms 
of urbanisation and reconstruction.  
The eight-year war with Iraq exacerbated the situation. The war not only postponed 
the development process of the country, but legitimised and prolonged a highly 
centralised government. After the war liberalisation policies emerged across the 
country: first through economic liberalisation in Hashemi Rafsanjani presidential 
period and then through political liberalisation in President Khatami‟s eight year 
presidential era.  





Due to these relatively recent changes, real practice of people‟s participation is still 
in its early stages. City councils were activated in 1999 and NGOs in their modern 
form came to practice no earlier than 1997. At the time of Bam's earthquake in 2003, 
these institutions were young and lacked sufficient knowledge and experience in 
their functions.  
The above examples of reconstruction reveal this process of evolution of the 
governing system. The early practices of reconstruction of war affected areas were 
highly centralised and lacked adequate planning and management; leading to 
negative outcomes. Over time as lessons were learned during post-war 
reconstruction, reconstruction policies became more participatory with more positive 
outcomes. The turning point in this regard was the reconstruction of post-earthquake 
Manjil in 1990. The first large-scale reconstruction that occurred after the formal 
establishment of participatory institutions of city councils and NGOs is the 









This chapter aims to create an image of Bam and its reconstruction process. It first 
describes the evolution of Bam through history and then creates an image of the 
current city of Bam. Then the chapter makes a twist towards the post-earthquake 
Bam and bends more towards the designed policies and schemes of reconstruction. It 
continues with introducing the stakeholders of reconstruction namely: NGOs, 
international organisations, local government, the Emam Khomeini Relief 
foundation and the State Welfare Organisation. 
 





5.2 Bam through History 
Bam is a city of historical importance. It was situated on the path of the Silk Road. 
The city had trade importance since it was the main producer of fine silk and dates. 
On the other hand, Bam being the neighbour of Sistan, made it the gateway to India. 
This strategic position filled Bam‟s history with numerous wars between different 
power-seekers. Once in a while, a new ruler from a new background (such as 
Afghan, Baluch, Mongol or Arab) and often non-local, claimed authority, possessed 
the lands, and imposed high taxes and cruelty upon the residents (Bastani Parizi, 
1984).  
The Historic Arge Bam (Citadel of Bam) is a remnant of these ancient days of Bam. 
The city was constituted of a Citadel (political centre), four great mosques (since the 
Islamic Era), bazaars (economic centre) and residential districts all surrounded by 
walls and four gates.  From the 19
th
 century onwards, the Silk Road lost its 
importance and in the 20
th
 century the trade importance of Bam gave way to the 
Persian Gulf ports (Bastani Parizi, 1984). During this time, the city continued to 
expand even though the economic function declined. The city expanded over the 
walls and new districts and bazaars inaugurated outside the border walls (Bastani 
Parizi, 1984).  
5.3 Resource dependency and structure of power 
Being in command of water as the core capital for production in an arid area like 
Bam could be regarded as a major tool to impose power over residents by rulers. The 
need for irrigation meant that the authority of power holders in Bam was immense; 
water scarcity in the region was a main factor in intensifying the social tension in 
Bam. Bam is situated in a highly arid area: among desert. The mean rainfall in the 
high season in Bam in forty seven years (1957-2004), according to the National 
Statistics Centre of Iran, was eleven millimetres. The prosperity of the agriculture 
sector (as the main sector of Bam) was (and still is) due to the qanāt system (a type 





of underground irrigation canal between an aquifer on the piedmont to an arid plain). 
However, maintenance of qanāts was a costly process. This resulted in a social-class 
system: Khān-Rayat in which Khān was regarded as the lord of the area who owned 
the lands and Rayat were landless inhabitants working on Khān‟s land for their 
livelihood. Costly irrigation systems were a great obstacle for simple residents and 
resulted in them not being able to benefit from private landownership for farming
1
.  
The landownership system in Iran was another means of despotism and a way of 
imposing a patronage system (Shaugannik, 1985). Iqta was the main form of land 
privilege until the nineteenth century (ibid). According to that system, land would be 
granted conditionally to civil and military servants as long as the will of the ruler 
remained. Since the possession of land was temporary and did not provide a 
permanent profit, the iqta holders tried to squeeze all that they could from the 
peasants in the shortest time possible. Small landowners asked for protection from 
the stronger ones in order to secure land by paying a special due to the „patron‟ 
(ibid). Another form of landownership since the Islamic Era of Iran was waqf in 
which the land could be an endowment for religious or charitable purposes. Though 
the purpose behind it was public benefit, it was often used to corrupt the 
administrative organs (Shaugannik, 1985).  
In Bam, the landownership system was the same; private ownership shaped through 
social structures where the highest levels were rulers and clergy. Local rulers 
appointed by the Shah titled thousands acres of land as their own private possession 
(Vaziri, 1997). Along with it was the landownership of Prophet Muhammad‟s 
descendants (Sādāt) who have resided in Bam for more than four hundred years and 
were provided with acres of land to run their livelihood (ibid).  
                                                 
1
The irrigation system was that costly that even after land reform policies in 1960s (which was 
designed to reduce poverty and give land to small farmers through forcing the Khans to sell or rent 
their lands to small farmers) did not work and small farmers, not being able to pay irrigation costs, 
sold the lands and returned to Khan‟s lands in order to work for them on daily wage bases (Zande-
Razavi, 2005). 





The modern political structure (since the inauguration of parliament in 1905) was to 
a great extent shaped by Khan-Rayat pattern. According to Bāstani-Pārizi (1984), 
between 1941 and 1961, fifty seven percent of national parliamentary representatives 
were among the Khāns.  By the inauguration of the Islamic Republic in 1979, 
Parliament had run twenty four terms of which in sixteen terms, the representatives 
of Bam were among the previous Khāns (Bāstani-Rād, 2007, p55). Since the Khans 
had better access to material resources they could benefit from a good education that 
increased their capability for political responsibilities. Many of these representatives 
were not even residents of Bam (some of them had never been to Bam) but simply 
owned lands there (Bāstani-Rād, 2007). Worth noting is that the Khāns competed 
with each other to gain the chair in Parliament; the class tension was not only 
between the Khāns and the Rayat, but also among the Khāns themselves. The 
geographical distance between the Khans from Bam, and the virtual distance from 
normal residents and the Rayats, along with their temptation to keep the political 
chair rather than empower local people, resulted in local people being unconnected 
and Bamis unaware of their rights. 
5.4 Landownership and entitlement 
The undergoing political reforms since the inauguration of parliament (1905) did not 
cover this social gap. Most of the Bamis remained vulnerable in terms of land and 
property ownership. As the studies of Ekhlaspour (2008) in 1956 reveal, fifty percent 
of the population of Bam were living in houses not belonging to them (these are not 
the same as renters) and twenty percent of the inhabitants were renters. Eighty 
percent of residents lived in mud-built houses (kheshti), ten percent in mud-brick 
houses and only about one percent in total brick-made houses. One of the common 
types of houses in this period was shared houses Khāns built to shelter temporary 
farmers (Ekhlaspour, 2008). This shows the vulnerability of residents in terms of 
their lack of entitlement or bargaining power. 





Despite the changes that the Pahlavi regime made in the 1960s as “social reforms” 
(such as to the national dress code, the national language, land reforms and modern 
schools) and regional plans like the Marshal Plan and the Truman Plan to change the 
social structure of the country, the historical Khan-Rayat class-structure remained in 
the new social structure of Bam. Due to the mechanisation of agriculture which freed 
a great number of people, residents of villages and towns migrated towards the 
bigger cities. The people were drawn to the opportunity of work, new infrastructures, 
a growing service and industry sector, and health and leisure institutions.  
The allocation of land to these newcomers was influenced by the unequal 
distribution of access to resources. As the studies of Ekhlaspour (2008) reveal, while 
one group of Khans had the authority over the local government and City Council, 
the other group of Khans controlled the land market, bazaar, and industrial factories. 
To accommodate newcomers, construction business became prosperous and new 
houses were built. In 1966, about one third of houses in Bam were less than ten years 
old (Ekhlaspour, 2008). 
Due to the fact that industry, land and property markets were in the hands of the 
Khans, the social gap in Bam was intensified. Rich families became richer and many 
rural immigrants became even more vulnerable than before. Despite the prosperous 
construction business, in 1966, thirty eight percent of inhabitants owned no land or 
property and were living in properties belonging to someone else (either as a renter 
or worker) (Ekhlaspour, 2008). The Khans moved their families to bigger cities like 
Kerman or Tehran or to other capital cities. Poor rural immigrants, not being able to 
afford property in Bam, started to build up their own mud-built houses in the city. 









5.5 Revolution: The New regime, new institutions 
The new regime following the revolution of 1979 brought about new opportunities 
and new social institutions. Being in opposition to the previous regime, the new 
regime aimed to deconstruct the current structure and reshape the socio-economic 
form of the whole country. Many Khans being in favour of the previous regime had 
no place in the new regime (since the new Islamic regime did not legitimise the 
superiority of previous bourgeois and feudal classes and confiscated all of their 
belongings) left the country and their land which they could not take with them. As a 
consequence many pieces of land were abandoned without legitimate title or deed 
under the new regime; landless residents benefited from this situation and occupied 
these lands, and often were successful in legitimising it as their own through buying 
them from para-governmental organizations or other ways. 
The new regime which presented itself as a supporter of the deprived, tried to 
provide more opportunities through new institutions. Jahade-Sazandegi (volunteers 
for development) was one of the public institutions created in the early days after the 
revolution. Its members were citizens passionate about developing the country 
through new opportunities that the regime brought about. They were financially 
supported by the government. Their main job was to provide basic infrastructure for 
the most deprived towns and villages
2
. Due to their efforts, many villages which 
were damaged and depreciated through the 1960s and 1970s out-migration of their 
residents, revived and in some cases, the migrated residents returned. This was also 
the case in towns and villages around Bam.  
Another reform was the organisation of the farming system. The Mosha farming 
system was presented whereby groups of five to ten farmers could work on the land 
provided to them by the government with farming infrastructure and tools. Wells 
were dug to facilitate the irrigation system. Whoever could improve the qanat 
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 Jahade-Sazandegi later merged into the Ministry of Agriculture and consequently (or as a 
consequence of) the volunteerism spirit was lost. 





system or revitalise an unproductive piece of land was able to claim the land as one‟s 
own. Through these supporting policies, more than 1200 households gained land 
ownership in Bam (Ehlaspour, 2008). Bam is the most agricultural area of the 
province with more than thirty eight percent of its population being farmers 
(National Census 1996). In other sectors, (service and industry) however, the city is 
not prosperous. 
The inability of the service and industry sectors to create adequate job opportunities 
to cover the employment demand resulted in the creation of a number of vulnerable 
groups and an increase in drug dealing. Traditionally, the residents of Bam‟s 
surrounding towns and villages moved seasonally towards the city to work on 
agricultural land. This was because the wages were higher in the city and it was 
easier to find a market for their crops. In harvest seasons, the job seekers resided on 
the outskirts of the city in tents or other kinds of temporary shelters. With the 
expansion of the city came a number of problems: The rise in unemployment; the 
dependency of the economy on agriculture; and a marginal society made up of a 
group of Afghan Refugees - all living on the borders of the city. Major landholders 
took advantage of this opportunity and divided their lands into smaller sizes and sold 
them to the new immigrants of the city
3
 (Ekhlaspour, 2008).  
This agriculturally dependent society brought about another vulnerability factor to 
the families: large household sizes. Traditional beliefs that valued high fertility were 
still respected in Bam. As the studies of Behzadfar (2006) reveal, in 1966, the 
average household size in Bam was 5.26; thirty years later in 1996 (seven years 
before the earthquake) the average household member in Bam remained 5.2 
(Behzadfar, 2006). 
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 Eishabad and Fakhrabad were among the most damaged places in the earthquake. Eishabad is 
studied in this research. 





5.6 Citizenship and entitlement 
The expansion of the city and transition of the residents from the city to the 
surrounding towns created a blurring of the boundaries demarking the city. 
Moreover, it led to uncertainty among residents regarding their identity – who was a 
Bami? In Bam, the line between rural and urban was never clear. The imperial move 
from inside the walls of the historic city (now a tourist site of the ancient Citadel of 
Bam) in 1824 (Baastani-Rad, 2007) to the surrounding lands was due to the 
investments by the Khans on the qanats system and transferring from a bazaar based 
economy to an agriculturally-based one. This attracted many residents from inside-
the-wall-city to the fields outside the wall. Gradually, while the city expanded, the 
Khans accommodated the temporary farmers who came from the surrounding towns, 
in cheap accommodation within the city. In the 1960s, due to western style 
development projects and land reforms, another group of immigrants arrived in the 
city. After the revolution of 1979, the efforts of Jahade-Sazandegi created another 
population movement and lessened the inward migration to the city; but as discussed 
earlier, the livelihood vulnerability of residents from the surrounding towns pushed 
the rural residents into the city.  
So who were the Bami? Were they the wealthy landowners who moved to Tehran or 
Kerman and ran their life through their possessions? Or were they the farmers who 
resided in the margins of the city and lived through daily communes in Bam and who 
worked on the lands of the absent landlord? What about the landless petty workers 
who have resided on un-claimed lands for decades without any formal deeds? What 
then counts for being a resident of Bam: birthplace, landholding, having Bami 
ancestors, speaking with a Bami accent, or residing in Bam for a specific amount of 
time? 
This obscurity was reflected in the formal statistics. In a report, the consultancy 
responsible for planning the reconstruction of Bam (Armanshahr) states that: “The 
population of the city of Bam before the earthquake in 1382 [solar Persian calendar 





equal to 2003 AD] according to the national census was reported as 89145, however 
the consultancy through investigations realised that in the census of 1382, some of 
the blocks outside the city limits were included in the census; excluding those blocks 
the population would be 86930” (Armanshahr, Behzadfar, 2006). In an interview 
with Papuli and Garaxian (2008), two archaeologists studied post-earthquake Bam 
and it was revealed that “despite the fact that the government presented the number 
of deaths in Bam as 26770, we counted 30730 tombs in the cemetery whose death 
was due to the earthquake. The formal death toll was according to the void identity 
cards reported, however there were residents like Afghan refugees who resided in 
Bam for years without any identity card”. Later in reconstruction period people 
without formal identity card became marginalized in benefiting the reconstruction 
services.  
5.7  “City” of Bam Today 
Bam is located in south east of Iran in a dry and desert like area. Palm groves are the 
main characteristic of Bam which gets irrigated through qanats – which creates a 
sense of nostalgia for the people of Bam. Dates are one of the main products of the 
area; Bam‟s dates are among the most famous in the world. It is one of the most 
difficult types of fruits to cultivate. To fertilise the female flowers (pistils) which do 
not occur naturally, each date palm (which can be thirty metres tall) must be 
accessed by a climbing frame by the farmer who then leaves a small spike of the 
stamen in the pistil of the date. The difficulty of date cultivation has connected Bami 
people to the palms emotionally and this is seen in both the architecture and urban 
feature: Bam consists of blocks of palm groves and residential houses which are 
situated among the palm groves. For this reason, Bam is called the “garden city”.  
In 2003, the region of Bam had a population of around 223,000. The region of Bam 
must be distinguished from the city of Bam. The city is the main focus of this 
research and is the most populated within the Bam region; the population was 88,000 
in 2003. The ratio of urban to rural population of Bam was 51.4 percent in 2003, less 





than the overall province (62.4 %) and country (66 %). Therefore, it can be 
concluded that in the Bam region, agriculture and traditional values, like large 
families and strong family bonds, play an important role in shaping the social 
structure of the area.  
The following figures support this conclusion. The average population of villages in 
the region of Bam based on the 1996 census was two hundred; more than the 
province‟s average rural population of 153 in the same year. The average family size 
in 1996 in the Bam region was 5.5 (the city of Bam having an average family size of 
5.2 and an average family size in rural areas of 5.6). This is compared to the Kerman 
province which was 5.08 in the same year and the country‟s average family size of 
4.8 in 1996 (with an average rural family size of 5.1 and an urban family size of 4.1). 
This shows that the Bam region has relatively large families.  
Moreover, based on a recent study of the President‟s deputy strategic planning and 
control department, while most of the provinces of the country had a negative 
population growth rate in their rural areas between the years 1996 to 2006, Kerman 
province was among the five provinces which had a positive growth rate in their 
rural population during the same period. This could be due to the high birth rate of 
the region. Additionally, another figure shows that the annual population growth rate 
in Bam city between the years 1966 to 1996 was 3.87% (according to the Iran 
national census organisation); the least among other cities of the province. This may 
show that the city of Bam did not have much to attract people from the surrounding 
rural areas; maybe due to the semi-agricultural way of life in the city which did not 
make much of a distinction between the rural and urban areas of the region.  
Ahmadzadeh et al in a study about Bam in 2007 defined the structure of Bam before 
the earthquake as follows: 
Residential units in Bam are scattered all through the city through a two-
hundred-year process. Only in a small central area we can see dense urban 





form which accommodates petty traders and retailers...other than that other 
wards shaped initially as palm-groves and orchards with residential units 
spread among them and gradually with development of connecting roads and 
streets they got linked and shaped a textured form. Moreover, there is a 
marginal area in borders of the city formed by rural migrants (p79-80). 
5.8 Demography of Bam 
According to Table 5.1, in 1996 while 60% of the country‟s population was less than 
twenty five years old, the figure in the region of Bam was 65.7 % and in the city of 
Bam 61.25%, a bit higher than in the country overall. This means that at the time of 
the earthquake in 2003, the majority of the population was thirty two years old or 
less. Therefore, the target population for reconstruction had to be the young 
generation. Considering that 34.66% of the total population within the region in 
1996 were among the eleven to twenty four year olds, in 2003, about one third of the 
population were aged eighteen to thirty two years. These young people were about to 
start a family and were in need of affordable housing. Taking into account that the 
earthquake may have killed more elderly people due to their vulnerability, the 
proportion of young couples in need of new homes may have increased after the 
earthquake. 
In terms of literacy, according to Table 5.2, based on the 1996 census, the literacy 
rate of the region was a bit lower than the country as a whole. Despite the higher 
literacy figures of urban areas in Bam which were more than the national average, 
the low rate of rural literacy made the region‟s average literacy rate lower than the 
national average. It has to be noted that the difference in the female literacy rate in 
the Bam region (and urban and rural areas of Bam) from the female national literacy 
rate is 2.1% (74.2(%)- 72.1(%)=2.1(%)); lower than the difference of the male 
literacy rate which is 5.1% (84.7(%)-79.6(%)=5.1 (%)) from the male national 
literacy rate (Table 5.2). This shows that compared to national scales Bami women 
have a relatively better situation than their male counterparts in terms of literacy.  






Table 5.1: Distribution of the population according to age (%): 1996 
























Iran 100% 1.69% 11.21% 14.60% 11.99% 20.54% 35.58% 4.32% 
Kerman 
province 
100% 1.81% 12.17% 15.53% 12.73% 20.87% 32.60% 4.28% 
Bam 
region 
100% 1.66% 12.80% 16.58 % 13.68% 20.98% 30.32% 3.95% 
Urban 100% 1.46% 10.66% 15.33% 13.22% 20.86% 34.72% 3.75% 
Bam city 100% 1.48% 10.47% 15.30% 13.19% 20.81% 35.09% 3.66% 
Rural 100% 1.81% 14.38% 17.48% 14.04% 21.06% 27.12% 4.11% 









Table 5.2: Literacy rate according to sexuality: 1996 
 Male and female Male Female 
Iran 79.5% 84.7% 74.2% 
Kerman Province 78.2% 81.6% 74.8% 
Bam region 75.8% 79.6% 72.1% 
Urban 85.4% 87.6% 83% 
Bam city 86% 88.1% 83.9% 
Rural 68.7% 73.3% 64.2% 
Source: Statistical Centre of Iran 
 
5.9 Earthquake-hit Bam 
On the morning of 26 December 2003 at 05:28 (local time), a major earthquake 
measuring 6.5 on the Richter scale struck Bam. It took the lives of nearly thirty 
thousand people, left over twenty five thousand injured and about seventy five 
thousand homeless. Approximately eighty five percent of the houses, commercial 
units, health and educational facilities and administrative buildings in the city and 
surrounding villages were either severely damaged or completely destroyed (UN, 
2004). The 2,500 year-old historic Citadel of Bam (Arg-e-Bam), an internationally 
famous heritage site, was almost completely destroyed. 





After the earthquake, due to the severity of the disaster, many national and 
international organisations and volunteers offered financial and non-financial aid to 
the area. Almost all the Iranian people did whatever they could to help their fellow 
citizens to decrease their suffering in the cold winter of Bam.  
According to Jenty Wood Oxfam‟s Humanitarian Programme Manager for Iran, in 
the first two weeks after the earthquake over 120 tonnes of relief supplies and 1,900 
international personnel arrived in Bam, complementing the 4,500 tonnes of supplies 
and 8,600 personnel already deployed by the Iranian government and the Red 
Crescent. Many professionals in the relief sector considered the initial response 
exemplary, and it is true that the performance in accordance to key indicators was 
impressive. There were no significant disease outbreaks; according to the Iranian 
Red Crescent the first food and water distributions began within 12 hours, and over 
20,000 tents were distributed within the first three days. 
5.9.1 Appointment of Organisational Structures for the 
Reconstruction of Bam 
Decision-makers started to formulate administrative organising systems and long-
term plans for reconstructing Bam. The result divided the reconstruction process into 
three phases of emergency (temporary tent shelters in urban areas that were located 
either on the sites of original dwellings or in campgrounds in the outskirts of the 
city), transitional shelter (structures built out of prefabricated components that could 
be erected in a short time and were either built on original plots or in the 
campgrounds on the outskirts of the city), and permanent shelter (permanent houses 
in the urban areas as laid out in the Master Plan
4
, which was adopted in September 
2004). 
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 The Master Plan was initially designed before the earthquake in 2002 by a profound Tehrani 
Consultant company. After the earthquake and with the start of reconstruction the Master Plan was 





 Another outcome was the conception of the Strategic Reconstruction Bureau 
(Setade-Rahbordi-e-Bazsazi): a governmental organisation consisting of Ministers of 
Housing, Interior, Justice, Finance and Economy, Culture and Chairmen of Housing 
Foundation, the Iranian Red Crescent, Management and Planning Organisation, 
Cultural Heritage Organisation, and Kerman Province Governor. The initial function 
of the Bureau was to invite five of the greatest architects of Iran to design the 
reconstruction plan of Bam and later shape the Council of Architecture and Urban 
Development. The result was to put some of the best construction consultancy 
companies (which were mainly located in Tehran) in charge of designing a new 
Master Plan for the city of Bam, and to propose legislation for the physical 
reconstruction of the city.  
The implementation of the projects to reconstruct the residential and commercial 
units was given to a Housing Foundation representative in Bam called Setad. Bam 
was later divided into ten districts and each district was managed by sub-Setads 
coming in from different provinces of Iran; for example one district was given to a 
representative from Tehran‟s Housing Foundation in Bam and another district was 
monitored by a representative from Khorasan‟s Housing Foundation. Their job was 
to monitor the process of reconstruction and deal with any issues from the residents 
regarding the reconstruction from a physical point of view.  
5.9.2 Transitional shelter phase 
The transitional shelter phase referred to is the period of transferring affected 
residents from temporary shelter like tents, prefabricated units and camps, to built 
houses. This was expected to be a two year period. Tents were mostly used during 
the emergency phase and accommodated people in groups in public spaces like 
streets and parks. About thirty thousand tents were provided immediately after the 
earthquake. With the start of the transitional shelter phase people moved to their pre-
                                                                                                                                          
changed a bit and was handed to the municipality and the Housing Foundation to be applied during 
the reconstruction phase 





earthquake locations and settled into prefabricated units provided by the government 
through national and international resources. The intermediate shelters built from 
prefabricated components typically consisted of a single room measuring 16–20 
square metres (generally 3 m*6 m or 4 m*4 m in plan), which cost about 2,500-3000 
USD to build. 
Six months after the earthquake, in June 2004, the flattened city was dotted 
with tents. Now all but a few remain. In their place, are thousands of white 
box-like prefabricated buildings. Families of up to eight squeezed into a 
room measuring six by four meters now live in these temporary shelters until 
the city is rebuilt (Report by the United Nations Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs in January 2005).  
There were some concerns about prefabricated shelters and camp layouts. They were 
alleged to have been constructed without adequate consideration of cultural 
requirements. For example, many people were dissatisfied with the latrines being 
located inside the shelter units as people were used to having their dwelling area 
separate from sanitary facilities. Concerns were also raised regarding the assembled 
toilet/shower facilities, primarily because the women were reluctant to use them due 
to modesty concerns. In some cases, modifications to the existing designs were made 
to fit with the traditional way of life. Extensions to the shelter units in the camps 
which were adjacent to each other could be seen by people drawing curtains to 
separate their units from their neighbours to provide privacy. Improvements were 
also made to the prefabricated units built on private property to be consistent with 
typical dwellings in Bam, where traditionally, several families would live under one 
roof. In some cases, where families took the initiative to contribute to their own 
funds, it was possible to create a more suitable living space by combining two 
intermediate shelters. 
Due to the earthquake, the middle class and those who could afford the minimum 
cost of living in other cities, moved to neighbouring cities (according to an article by 





Papuli this migration was short term and simply a transitional shelter phase where 
many people ended up returning to Bam). Meanwhile, many people from other 
towns came to Bam hoping to create a new life and benefit from the aid. This created 
concern about the long-term effects of these camps,  since there were many renters 
and migrants from the villages, and there was a risk that these units would continue 
to be occupied by these dwellers and create marginal residents or slum dwellings. 
To benefit reconstruction loans households should prove their ownership of the land. 
The victims of the earthquake lost documents and deeds (if they had any) for their 
properties. Generally, local neighbours provided evidence for each other in order to 
prove ownership of the land. There were of course occasions where agencies 
provided false evidence in an opportunistic way and won the land.  In many cases, 
where an entire family had died, other relatives often from other cities would come 
to inherit the land. Pre-earthquake renters, landless residents and newcomers would 
face difficulties in their legitimacy to benefit from reconstruction policies. Loan-
based reconstruction policy only benefited those who could prove their land 
ownership.  
Despite the reconstruction plan being central, post-earthquake Bam was being 
shaped by unplanned and unexpected outcomes.  One of the main issues was the 
huge inflow of newcomers. After the earthquake, the demographic of the city 
changed. Many people entered the city from neighbouring areas. According to one of 
Setad’s managers, the population of Bam before the earthquake was about one 
hundred thousand people. Formal resources specified that the earthquake had killed 
more than thirty thousand people (informal resources revealed an amount more than 
sixty thousand); one year after the earthquake the population was about 120,000 
people. This shows a huge amount of new residents; more than fifty percent of 
Bam‟s pre-earthquake population. It can be presumed that many people came to the 
city hoping to use the grants and opportunity to claim land and loans. This fact made 
the participation of the “local people” more difficult and problematic.  





Participation was supposed to be one of the main elements of Bam‟s 
reconstruction. Ayatollah Khamenei has called this year [2005] the year of 
people‟s participation. But in practice, the participation was more 
problematic than it was expected. After the earthquake, a huge amount of 
people from other cities flew to the city. The city‟s population was redefined 
several times, but it is still more than its pre-earthquake population. People 
are living in prefabs that the government gave them. Each of these prefabs 
cost the government two million Toman
5
s [2,200 USD]. Many people, 
including the new comers do not care for more i.e. permanent houses; they 
are either non-local opportunists or landless residents who are happy with 
prefabs since they cannot prove the ownership of the land. The government is 
giving people ten million Tomans [11,000 USD] to gradually rebuild their 
houses but they have to first prove ownership of the land and then apply for 
to the contractor. After that they can apply for loans from the banks. 
Moreover, because of the fear of the earthquake some other people are afraid 
of sleeping under a built roof and hence do not apply for (or use) loans for the 
construction of permanent houses (As a member of Setad revealed in an 
interview in 2005).  
This inflow of newcomers created a culture of distrust among the local and non-local 
residents. Newcomers were labelled as Narmashiri. Narmashir is a town near Bam 
where citizens of Bam felt superior to its residents the same feeling of superiority 
which urban dwellers now felt about rural dwellers. Narmashiri was used to refer to 
all newcomers from the surrounding areas to Bam.  
Another feature of post-earthquake Bam that was not planned, and partly was the 
side-effect of the loan-based reconstruction plan, was the fostering of a new 
business: taxi driving. The central reconstruction process along with the inflow of 
numerous Tehrani and international NGO staff created a need for non-local 
professionals to provide taxi services to transfer people into this unfamiliar city. The 
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inflow of professionals and NGO workers was to such an extent that flights from 
Tehran to Bam increased to two per day and remained at this rate for years after the 
earthquake. Moreover, as will be discussed in the NGO chapter later, most of these 
non-local professionals resided in Arge-jadid, a modern development which is 
located 10-kilometres from the eastern part of Bam city. For their commute into 
Bam, they needed local drivers familiar with the area.   
Many Bami residents, in the absence of a comprehensive livelihood reconstruction 
plan, found this an opportunity hard to ignore. Many people lost their shops in the 
earthquake and considering the complicated process to apply for commercial loans 
and the decrease in demand for retailers since the earthquake, taxi-driving was a less 
complicated and more fruitful business option. Some people had worked for the 
historical Citadel of the Bam tourist centre which was totally destroyed in 
earthquake. To afford cars they used an initial loan instalment. They continued living 
in the prefabs; hoping that by taxi-driving they would eventually save enough money 
to be able to rebuild their homes.   
One of the side effects of this was the increase in number of female drivers (not 
necessarily as taxi-drivers) in the city, which would have been rare before the 
disaster. Many of these women had lost their husbands and had to commute to the 
cemetery from surrounding areas. They found themselves driving because it was a 
safer and easier way to travel. In later years, the first female taxi-driving agency in 
Bam was inaugurated. 
5.9.3 NGOs in Bam 
In this research, the term „NGO‟ refers to local, national and international 
organisations that have been involved in the reconstruction process and who have 
played key roles through the provision of social, cultural, and economic development 
programmes. Such programmes include assessing people‟s needs, fundraising, 
providing social and community services, vocational training and public education, 





and environmental protection. More than thirty five international NGOs helped the 
State Welfare Organisation deliver social services (Kerman SWO chairman, Qods 
newspaper, September 2006).  
Over two hundred international organisations arrived in Bam in the first two weeks 
after the earthquake. To assist in the coordination effort, the Iranian government and 
the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) set up a 
camp for international organisations on a former sports field. OCHA also established 
sectoral coordination meetings and strengthened links with the Iranian Red Crescent; 
the lead agency for the response. In the early phases of reconstruction, NGOs had 
good communication with each other and were effective in the field:  
 
Organisations helped each other, and personal relations were good. Oxfam 
borrowed tents from Save the Children, and Médecins Sans Frontières who 
provided supplies to other organisations. There was a strong sense that 
everyone simply wanted to get things done to help the people of Bam. There 
were also more formal coordination mechanisms. A group of five agencies 
banded together to initiate a joint latrine procurement tender using agreed 
standards and specifications. The tender failed in the end, but it was proof 
that organisations were willing to cooperate and to agree standards and 
approaches in a coordinated matter. A system initiated by the Iranian Red 
Crescent, dividing the city into 12 zones each to be assisted by a different 
provincial branch, was rapidly picked up by international NGOs, who agreed 
to accept assigned zones and to focus their assessment and intervention work 
in these areas. (Oxfam Report in Bam, July 2004).  
 
5.10 The International Organisations 
International organisations such as the United Nations and its related agencies are 
among the key stakeholders in the Bam reconstruction process. The United Nations 





Development Program (UNDP) worked closely with the government of Iran, local 
and provincial authorities, as well as affected communities. The UNDP‟s priorities 
are mainly capacity building, empowerment, vulnerability reduction, and 
coordination of international efforts through various training programmes. UNESCO 
is also involved in the reconstruction process by providing scientific and technical 
advice, training and education, mobilising financial assistance, and also by creating a 
task force to coordinate UNESCO‟s actions in response to the damage to a world 
heritage site (Asgary, 2004). 
UNICEF was involved in six projects: Psycho Social Intervention, Early Child Care 
Centres (ECCC) and Recreational Centres, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WSH), 
Education, Child friendly cities, and Family Reunification. 
The World Health Organisation (WHO) was another agency that was active in Bam. 
It had close connections with the Ministry of Sanitation and Health in terms of 
monitoring sanitation and health issues since the earthquake. They created 10 urban 
health centres in Bam. Their efforts resulted positively by ensuring that there was no 
widespread epidemic in the city after the earthquake. 
5.11 The Local Government 
The Bam Municipality and the Bam City Council are the two most important local 
government bodies in the city. Issuing building permits, dealing with subdivision and 
setback applications, and recovering building titles and official documents were 
among the major activities of the City Council. The City Council, as mentioned in 
chapter four, is almost independent from central government financially and is 
therefore self-reliant; the Ministry of Interior covers a small proportion of the 
expenses of the municipality of Bam. After the earthquake, the government allocated 
income for the construction of commercial and residential unit licenses to Bam‟s 
Municipality. 





To increase the Municipality income, we made a contract with a private 
company to implement a construction development on the previous land of 
the Municipality (in reconstruction the Municipality was relocated). The 
Municipality could benefit from forty percent of the development and another 
sixty percent would be given to the private company. Shops of the 
development that belonged to the Municipality are now rented and bring in 
income. We suggested selling the land instead of taking part in the project, 
but the City Council rejected this.  We thought that by selling the land there 
was a possibility for corruption as the money may get into the pockets of 
those in power (Head member of Bam City Council, 2008). 
The City Council is quite a new concept in urban governance in Bam (see chapter 
four). Before 1999, urban governance was very central: there was the mayor and the 
governor who were directly appointed by the Ministry of Interior. In 1999, the first 
City Council of Bam (along with other cities of Iran) was inaugurated with seven 
members - all from Bam and elected by the people. The Mayor was elected by the 
City Council.  
In practice, the City Council has the least presence in urban governance (see chapter 
four, section 4.4). In the case of Bam, the reconstruction created an opportunity for 
members of the City Council to get involved in various fields of reconstruction and 
expand their authority. To achieve this aim, local members of the City Council tried 
to fight their way through: 
In the early days after the earthquake, we sent a letter to the President‟s office 
and shared our plan about reconstruction. In that letter we asked for 
responsibility to design the reconstruction plan under the supervision of the 
local people. This did not happen in practice. Initially our voices were so 
insignificant in the decision making process but we fought for our rights. The 
City Council was not regarded as an implementing organisation. Therefore, 
we tried to carry out our own advocacy for the local people. We did not want 





to let the city be relocated elsewhere and we were also against the 
establishment of temporary camps. Moreover, all international aid for the 
reconstruction of Bam went directly to the Ministry of Interior and the local 
government was not aware of the amount and had no access to it. 
There were even times that our challenges were violated with central 
organisations. For example, on one occasion, we had a confrontation with the 
Ministry of Housing. The Ministry of Housing decided to build a library on a 
piece of land that we already had allocated to another NGO. We requested 
the representative of the Ministry of Housing to use some other place for 
their project since that land was already allocated. The Ministry neglected our 
request and unloaded the construction materials on the land as a sign of 
occupation. It should be mentioned that the land was situated in a strategic 
location to the entrance of the city and in view of the public. In protest, we 
emptied the land of construction materials and regained the possession of it.  
We also raised the government‟s grants for reconstruction of houses. At first 
the government‟s financial support was 2.5 million Toman (two and a half 
thousand USD) as a grant and 6.5 million Toman (six and half thousand 
USD) as a loan. That could hardly cover the cost of reconstruction. We tried 
to use available means - liaising and media - to increase the amount. This 
issue even made coverage on the BBC. Finally, the government‟s support 
increased to 16.5 million Toman (sixteen and half thousand USD).  
The earthquake had destroyed more than eighty percent of the historical 
Citadel of Bam. Initially, ten days after the earthquake, the World Bank and 
UNESCO rejected our request for financial support for the reconstruction of 
the Citadel because it was claimed that there was no “economic explanation” 
for the disaster. When the decision was communicated to the local 
government, I complained and told the representative; “Thank you for your 
concern but the Citadel will be reconstructed by Bamis themselves if not by 





any organisation. The Citadel was originally built by Bami people and not by 
external agencies so we can do the same again. The Citadel of Bam to Bamis 
is like the Louvre Museum to Parisians. Bam owes its identity to its Citadel, 
old bazaar, palm groves, and qanats.” Through revealing the Citadel‟s 
importance to us, we got the the UN and WB to provide support. Now the 
Cultural Heritage Organisation of Iran is rebuilding the Citadel with the help  
of other international organisations including UNESCO. (Head member of 
the City Council of Bam).  
In terms of accountability, Bamis can air their dissatisfaction with the City Council 
through the local newspaper, direct contact with members, and quite recently 
through the Internet.  Local newspapers are run by  Bami journalists and publish 
ongoing issues related to the city. Through this research, it became apparent that the 
newspaper is a popular forum in Bam and people trust it as a means of voicing their 
concerns. The newspaper office is a small room in an accessible part of the city. 
After spending one hour there, about ten different types of people visited the 
newspaper office requesting that their announcement be published or that their small 
talk with the publisher who ran the newspaper with his son, be heard.  
Since the earthquake, news published about the role of the City Council in their 
reconstruction efforts concentrated on arranging the bodies of the dead from the 
disaster including transferring, washing, shrouding and burying them; surfacing the 
emergency roads especially those linked to hospitals, NGOs and Red Crescent 
centres; providing free transport during the emergency period; reconstructing parks, 
fire centres, vegetable bazaars and cemeteries; collecting waste and garbage; helping 
the Housing Foundation branches; and running seminars for earthquake and 
reconstruction. In terms of transparency, it also revealed a conflict that was going on 
in the municipality regarding the appointment of the new Mayor in May 2003; seven 
months before the disaster. The new Mayor was very young and non-local. As the 
report revealed, during the time of the appointment some of citizens were gathered in 
front of the municipality to show their opposition to the new Mayor. The governor 
was also against this appointment but the City Council backed the young Mayor. 





While the City Council called for the previous Mayor to resign, the governor resisted 
signing the inauguration of the new Mayor. For a while, the Municipality was 
running with two Mayors. 
As the City Council‟s responsibility domain was minor, expectations and claims 
from it were not considerable. Letters people sent to the municipality were mostly 
requests from the City Council to intervene between the local people and other 
organisations; especially during the early months of reconstruction. Most complaints 
were about temporary shelter and the camp‟s situation or the difficulty in obtaining 
loans from Setad. Moreover, as discovered through the survey, people sent their 
claims in the form of letters to the President‟s office or the supreme leader. People 
found no powerful or legitimate alternative on a local scale with whom to raise their 
complaints.   
In terms of Internet complaints, this is a very new concept. With a visit to the city 
council of Bam's website, it becomes clear that use of the Internet is a new idea. 
There are only two emails sent to the website - the first one is a congratulation note 
to the new governor in May 2009, and the other is posted in May 2009 asking the 
mayor about the lack of security in Bam and plans to increase security in the region. 
The answer was sent two months later in July 2009 from the Mayor claiming that the 
security in Bam is at an acceptable level especially in comparison with neighbouring 
cities and it is unfortunate that the city is located on the drug route. It would appear 
therefore that the use of the Internet is not popular in Bam.  
To highlight their role in reconstruction, and in order not to be left marginalised by 
central government authorities, members of the City Council created a link between 
appointed characters within the reconstruction process. Mr. Saidikia, the Head of the 
Reconstruction Body (Setad), and the governor were two influential people in the 
reconstruction with whom the City Council created mutual links: 





It has to be mentioned that in most cases Mr. Saiedikia played a great role in 
advocating for us. At that time he was the highest position in Housing 
Foundation of Bam. He was our strongest link to central government and he 
tried to ease the liaising process and license taking processes for us.  
The governor at first intended to step in to reconstruction on his own 
initiative and without asking from any help from us, but I told him that this 
will damage the whole process of reconstruction; a family in which all the 
pressure is on the father of the family is not fair; we all have to cooperate. 
Generally, there is a lack of connection among organisations which has an 
adverse consequence on reconstruction. This absence of proper co-operation 
was disconcerting even before the earthquake. Urban services were always 
poorly delivered. In the case of a water mains issue in the city, due to 
cooperation between responsible sectors and organisations, the process 
becomes very time-consuming and inefficient and the provision of water may 
only last for a few days. Rubble and wasted reconstruction materials are all 
over the city which has brought the disease Aleppo boil; an epidemic which 
spreads through flies living in dust (Head member of the City Council in 
Bam).  
After three years since the earthquake, a new era for urban governance in Bam can 
be distinguished. Macro projects of central government along with a housing 
reconstruction phase approached its end and hence the role of central government in 
reconstruction became small. Simultaneously, the role of the City Council in urban 
governance intensified. National government changed and Saidikia, the most 
important person in the reconstruction effort of Bam was promoted to the Minister of 
Housing.  The City Council started its third round with new members. This created 
links between the previous members of the City Council and Saidikia was no longer 
of use.  The third course was left again with minor capacity to act in micro projects 





of urban furnishing. This was apparent from the words of the new Head member of 
the City Council: 
The main mission of the City Council is to help the municipality put the city 
in order and make it a pleasant place.  But the municipality‟s mission comes 
last in the process of urban reconstruction since we have to wait for other 
service providing organisations like water and electricity to finish their 
projects and then we step in to furnish the city. Our activities have sped up 
especially in the last eight months - including signing the roads and streets, 
asphalt and pavement.  We are also in charge of creating green space for the 
city. We are waiting for the funding from central government to run our 
projects.  
Along with the change of the members, the links changed as well and not only in 
terms of connecting to new organisations but also in the nature of communication. 
The City Council‟s role was not proactive anymore and merely became a link to 
deliver local people‟s complaints to central authorities: 
In terms of cooperation with other organisations, I can mention the Cultural 
Heritage of Iran Organisation as the organ that we had the most contact with 
especially in regard to the reconstruction of the Citadel and the Bazaar. The 
Housing Foundation was the other organisation that we had cooperation with. 
In relation to the dissatisfaction of households with the Housing Foundation 
or with its fourteen branches in wards we tried to lubricate communication 
between these organs and citizens through liaising, asking for financial 
support, and consultation. We also reflected people‟s dissatisfaction with 
other service provider organisations - like the electricity and water providing 
organisations. We also cooperated with finance and land offices regarding 
building licenses and valuing land. Moreover, we have weekly sessions with 
citizens so that anyone who wants to share something with the City Council 





can call them on Saturdays when all of the members are present and ready to 
help. 
Despite the opportunity reconstruction brought to highlight the role of the City 
Council in urban governance, unfortunately this aim did not come into practice in the 
long term. As reconstruction approached its end, along with the change of active 
agencies in reconstruction, the City Council lost its influence. Its role returned as a 
local guard for the city - furnishing limited financial support and dependency on 
central government. 
5.12 Relief Foundation and the State Welfare Organisation 
In Iran‟s social welfare system, the Emam Khomeini Relief Foundation and State 
Welfare Organisation of Iran are the two most important organisations for supporting 
vulnerable groups. The Emam Khomeini Relief Foundation was established in 1979 
in the early days after the revolution. It was established as a non-profit organisation 
to support and empower vulnerable and deprived people. It functions under the 
supervision of the Supreme Leader. The official website of the Foundation defines 
its objective as follows: 
The aim of establishing The Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation is to offer 
supportive, cultural and living services to the needy and deprived people 
living inside and outside the country in order to provide self-reliance, 
strengthen and increase faith as well as preserving the human dignity. 
The financial resources of Imam Relief consist of
6
: 
A) The support of the supreme leader. 
B) The budgets and aides of the Islamic Republic Government. 
                                                 
6
 Source: Emam Khomeini Relief Foundation official website 





C) The aid and donations of people, institutions, organisations and 
foundations inside and outside the country. 
D) Alms, vows, Zakat. 
E) Income resulting from the economic activities of Emam Relief.  
Table 5.3: Emam Relief Foundation Aid in Bam in 1999 
Source: Statistical Centre of Iran 
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 Emdad Project: supports vulnerable people like single-mother households, the disabled, aged parents 
and imprisoned-fathers, temporarily or permanently on the basis of each case of vulnerability. 
8
 Rajaie Project: supports senior residents, over sixty years old, in rural areas and nomads, and their 











































































































































































Table 5.4: Emam Relief Foundation Aids in Bam in 2003, 2005, 2008 (Source: 


















































33432 59402440 13542 28426410 






With a look at the tables above (extracted from the Statistical Centre of Iran) the 
Emam Relief Foundation has two main projects for providing support: Emdad and 
Rajaie.  While the Emdad project covers the most vulnerable groups including the 
disabled and single or absent-parent households, the Rajaie project merely supports 
senior residents. As the numbers show, people supported by the Emdad project 
decreased from 24,840 in 1999 to 24,518 in 2003 (the year of the earthquake) and 
increased to 28,874 people in 2005 (two years after the earthquake). At the end of 
2003, some people previously covered by the Emdad project were killed by the 
earthquake (since they were among the most vulnerable groups) and because the 
earthquake occurred at the end of 2003, the new earthquake-affected people are not 
reflected in the numbers. By the year 2005, about four and a half thousand people 
were added to the previous number which shows the earthquake-affected group 
covered by the Emdad project. The number of Rajaie project decreases. The reason 
for this may be as a result of the death of elderly people as a result of  the 
earthquake. In both cases, the amount of aid increased substantially in 2005 which 
could be due to the policies designed to cover earthquake loss.   
In 2008, five years after the earthquake, the number of vulnerable households 
covered by the Emdad project increased. From 2003, about nine thousand people got 
under the Emdad project support which reflects the role of the earthquake on 
increasing vulnerable households. On average, since the earthquake, annually more 









Table 5.5: Loans given by the Emam Relief Foundation in Bam in 1999, 2003, 
2005 











































































65 710 17 42 92 926 1563 1167480 









































































533 11392626 1160 3943621 
Source: Statistical Centre of Iran 





According to Tables 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9, the numbers of cases benefitting from loans 
from the Emam Relief Foundation decreased between 1999 and 2003 (especially 
empowerment project loans) and then increased in 2005. The decrease in 2003 
cannot be due to the earthquake because it happened at the end of 2003. Despite the 
harsh economic situation of Bam before the earthquake (due to the drought) it is 
questionable why Emam cut its empowerment loans in 2003. The increase in the 
number of cases from 2003 to 2005 can be explained as the increase of the number 
of people becoming vulnerable through the earthquake.  
The State Welfare Organisation is a governmental organisation funded through the 
government‟s budget to support disabled and deprived people. After the earthquake, 
the State Welfare Organisation was one of the main centres supporting affected 
people. 































































































































1 9 21 1 0 0 
Source: Statistical Centre of Iran 





Table 5.7: People benefitted from SWO services in urban Bam in 2003 and 2008 
(Source: Statistical Centre of Iran) 



















761 1985 3137 0 0 
 
Since the earthquake, the numbers of orphanage and nursery centres has increased, 
but the numbers of orphans and children benefitting from nurseries have decreased 
(Tables 5.10, 5.11, 5.12 and 5.13). The decrease in number of orphans supported by 
the SWO may be due to the increase in NGOs in Bam or due to a transfer of orphans 
to other cities. NGOs may also play a substitute role for SWO centres in relation to 
nursery services (one reason for the decrease of nursery users of SWO in Bam since 
the earthquake).  
In a case like Bam where the disaster was extreme, there is an expected increase in 
the number of vulnerable and dependant households. But surprisingly, the number of 
pensioners supported by SWO decreased substantially from 2003 to 2008 (Tables 
5.12 and 5.13). The fact is that the SWO appeared very inadequate in terms of social 
support during the reconstruction of Bam. In an interview with the SWO chairman in 
Kerman in 2006 in Qods newspaper, he declared that the SWO had a severe budget 





deficit during the reconstruction period. The financial problem was such that for 
2004 and 2005 they could afford to pay only half of their recipients‟ pensions. 
Actually, the SWO in Bam since 2005 received minimum finance from central 
government and this is despite the fact that in Bam the number of single-mother 
households increased to 2500 (from five hundreds before the earthquake), disabled 
people to 2700, and orphan or mal-parented children to four thousand (ibid).  
5.13 Conclusion 
Bam has experienced several twists and turns through its evolution. Once in a while 
in its history it was the focal point for attention. Its history, along with its 
geographical situation, gave Bam a character that has made it resistant to the 
outcomes of the modern world. The earthquake of 2003 has become a turning point 
in the evolution of Bam. Bam, as a traditional “city” that had problems adapting 
itself to modern urban factors, like citizenship or non-agricultural and bureaucratic 
urban styles, had to answer to bureaucratic and modern solutions. Schemes and plans 
sent from Tehran were applied by non-local contractors. The affected people got 
social help from international organisations which they had least familiarity... 
Through this process, opportunities have been created for different stakeholders to 
learn from each other and create links for long-term communication. Some of these 
links remained; like the links some NGOs created with local agencies or with each 
other, and some of them faded away; like those that were created by local 
government staff with different stakeholders. To be more precise, links between 
agencies survived but those between organisations that changed their staff 
evaporated. Governmental organisational social support was channelled through 
SWO which showed a very weak appearance. The Emam Relief Foundation, on the 
other hand, as a para-governmental organisation became a sounder substitute for 
SWO in reconstruction. What the reconstruction resulted in is what this research 
aims to examine in the following chapters. It will be explored how different 




An Analysis of Resilience between Six 





It was discussed in chapter three that vulnerability of a community to hazards derives 
from social and institutional structure of that community. Forms of entitlement and 
livelihood access are crucial factors in shaping the resilience of the members of a 
community. The level of importance of different institutions and concepts in a 
community defines what risk reduction factors are more easily welcomed and 
adopted. It was discussed that social capital can be an important factor in increasing 
social resilience through creating links among different stakeholders and it also 
increases the understanding and trust among them and eases the access of the most 
vulnerable to resources.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to get a better understanding about the initial form of 
social capital in the city of Bam before the disaster and studying how after the 
disaster and during the reconstruction phase those informal institutions that shaped 





the social relations and hence the level of social capital in Bam have been changed 
and what were their effects on the resilience of different households.   
In doing so, one hundred and ninety six households were interviewed. It was a 99% 
sample: the researcher tried to document the experiences of all the members of the 
six districts by knocking on every door. There was only one household that rejected 
to participate. Twenty six households were from Ferdosi, twenty seven households 
were from Eishabad, twenty three households were from Bethat-Almahdi, forty 
households were from Janbazan, thirty nine households were from Takhti, and forty 
one households were from Hafezabad. 
To study the form and amount of social capital of the sample group the following 
indexes were used: the geographical closeness of close members of the family like 
married couples and their parents and the distance of their residential location to 
their parents', the networking and trust of neighbours together, the trust of the 
interviewees to their fellow citizens, the change in their social gatherings with 
relatives, and their sense of having power in affecting their surroundings. Their 
livelihood situation was also studied to get a better understanding of their 
vulnerability and the effect of reconstruction on it. The population pyramid of each 
ward was also studied to compare the population structure of different wards to each 
other and to Bam in general. It has to be noted that through the initial studies about 
Bam it was realised that after the earthquake a great number of new-comers entered 
Bam (see chapter five); however it was difficult from the structured survey to 
distinguish between the new immigrants and the old dwellers; almost all of the 
interviewees stated that they were living in Bam before the earthquake. 
In this regard this chapter consists of six main sections. The first section studies the 
family bonding ties of a sample community and compares it with the situation pre-
disaster. The second section examines the effect of bonding ties on livelihoods in six 
selected districts in Bam. This is achieved by linking the dependency rate to the level 
of access of the households to shelter, car, social support, work and other financial 





resources. The third section explores the age and gender structure of the six wards 
and tries to establish if any outstanding relationship exists among these factors and 
the resilience of the residents.  The fourth section considers the effect of 
reconstruction on the level of trust among the sample community (i.e. the residents 
of the six districts) and aims to see whether the level of trust is related to other 
factors like affluence and age. The fifth section examines any changes to social and 
formal networking in the sample community since the earthquake. The sixth section 
discusses the effect of reconstruction on governance; and how having power 
influences the community’s surroundings. 
6.2 Family Bonding Ties 
Out of 196 households surveyed in Bam, the outcomes of household sizes are shown 
in Figure 6.1. Figure 6.2 compares the survey with Bam’s household size in the last 
formal census data before the earthquake in 1997. Comparing the two, it will be 
concluded that the household size of the sample is smaller. While the majority of 
households in the sample had two, three or four members in 1997, most of Bami 
households consisted of four to seven members. Three factors could be responsible 
for that: First, the high death toll of the earthquake which substantially affected the 
households' size in Bam and second, by choosing the most hit areas in Bam as the 
sample area.  
The third reason could be the development of new families through marriage since 
the earthquake. During the fieldwork, it was observed during several occasions that 
families had been divided into smaller families through marriage of the young. One 
important reason for this was the loan policy which favoured newly wedded 
households. The designed loan policy had a section that stated those households who 
married after the earthquake could benefit from loans to build new homes... This  
increased the number of marriages and brought more people to Bam from 
neighbouring towns and cities: 





Following the loan policy for newly wedded households, many people came 
to Bam to benefit from the loan: They married the Bami girls or became 
brides of Bami men. In many cases, parents let their young marry, albeit 
willingly, as a coping system to access more loans, because in later years 
with the increase in the price of building materials the allocated loan was not 
enough for building construction. Through this strategy, households would 
have a house built plus one or two prefabricated units as separate rooms: Two 
or three households could live together through this arrangement (one of the 
Bami residents, 2008). 
Figure 6.1: Household size of the sample community 2008 (Numbers are in 
percentage) 
 
As Rakodi rightly argues, 2002, household composition is a determinant of the 
capabilities, choices and strategies available to a household.  
Despite the legal separation and division of households through marriage, 
geographically this separation showed itself in different forms. In other words, many 
newly married households did not separate from their parental family geographically 




















Figure 6.2: Comparing national census data 1997 and sample data 2008 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Geographical distance of parents and newly wedded young families 
of the sample community in 2008 
 
Figure 6.3 tries to reveal the strength of family bonding ties through the geographical 
distance of the households to their married children. To find out how much Bami 
young people are dependent on their family, one factor is to consider how many of 
them live in their parents' houses, on their lands or on separate land but side-to-side 
















live independently without any neighbouring connection to their parents or siblings. 
Thirty two percent of households are households with close family relations (for 
example. brothers and sisters or as father and son) who share a yard and either live 
under one roof or in separate shelters. Fourteen percent of households are three 
households who share one yard with close family connections. Two percent are four 
households with family relations in one yard and ten percent are households with 
close family relations who do not share a piece of land but live in neighbouring 
proximity to each other. To summarise, fifty eight percent of households in the 
sample community have located their families as close as possible to their relations; 
parent and siblings. This situation, along with the populated households shown 
before the earthquake, highlights the strength of family bonding ties in Bam. 
These high bonding ties have advantages and disadvantages in times of disaster. As 
observations have revealed, families with stronger ties and less family loss during 
the earthquake exhibited less trauma than those with weaker links. In one case, in 
Hafezabad, an old mason accommodated his five married children in the same street 
side-by-side in one or two bedroom houses with separate land. 
Before the earthquake, the mason had a large area of land which he lived on with his 
wife, daughters and sons - together in one house. After the earthquake, he lost his 
wife, one of his sons and one of his daughters so he decided to divide the land 
among his remaining children and together they built three two-bedroom houses and 
one one-bedroom.  
Because our houses were side by side we could share the construction 
material and help each other with the construction of the buildings. God is 
great, He never lets you down; He always helps (the mason, 2008).  
Despite the fact that he had lost his wife, four of his children and grandchildren in 
the earthquake, his behaviour and and that of his remaining children was very 
composed and they were all keen to help. Being situated in the most insecure area of 





Bam, and by keeping their links only with each other - excluding themselves from 
the rest of the district, provided the family with a supporting network which 
increased their resilience and coping mechanisms.  
We do not communicate with residents of the neighbourhood, we only visit 
each other, and hence we have created a sense of security in the street for 
ourselves. Our livelihood comes from farming and has not changed much 
from before the earthquake. We had no contact with any governmental 
organisation, we rely only on God, and he will help us. We share food and 
help each other in financial difficulties... we take care of the children together 
(the mason's daughter-in-law, 2008). 
 In a troubled city where many of the interviewees mentioned the high crime rate and 
lack of security, the mason and his family responded to “how serious do you think 
the theft problem is in the city?” with “none at all”, and their answer to “how much 
impact do you think you have in making Bam a better place to live?” was “very 
much” which was a rare response in the survey. In answering the question, "don't 
you fear theft or crime in the area", the mason replied:  
No, together we keep the street safe and take care of each other… and above 
all it is God who takes care of us.  
Their spirits were better than their Bami counterparts. None of them were jobless, 
sons were active in farming, and the son-in-law who had lost his food store in the 
earthquake was employed in the reconstruction of the citadel. 
After knocking on a door a few houses along, an old man opened the door looking 
immeasurably sad. He was so depressed that he could not communicate properly; 
hence his daughter answered the questions. Two members of his household had been 
killed in the earthquake, - the mother and one of their children. The father had 
become so depressed because of the loss of his loved ones that he could not work 





anymore (he was a farmer). The house was rebuilt albeit much smaller than the one 
before the disaster. There were three sons and one daughter in the household. One of 
them was married and was living in the same house (which was a small one-
bedroom). One of the sons was employed, but another was depressed as well. The 
household was reliant on the income of the married son who had the responsibility of 
feeding his own family as well. This placed the family in difficulty regarding 
livelihood. They felt insecure about their future financial situation, about the area, 
and about the crime in the city.  
The above examples show how strong bonding ties in Bam were either beneficial to 
the community because the family provided a safety network, or, where family 
members had died, the bonding stopped because the loss created an inability to cope.  
Along with bonding ties, the resilience of households depends on different factors 
which include affluence, age, gender, dependency rate and networking. These factors 
will be addressed in the following section by a comparison among different districts 
in Bam. 
6.3 Comparing the Six Districts 
The reason for comparing the districts is to find out the characteristics of each 
according to affluency, networking, dependency rate, age and gender. Then, to 
establish whether the resilience of the households is related to the  characteristics as 









Figure 2.1: Allocating sample wards on Map of Bam (repeat) 
 
 





Can be regarded as the most affluent area in Bam. Compared to the 
other six districts, Ferdosi has the least building damage and is the 
lowest in density 
Eishabad 
One of the oldest areas in Bam, there is a mixed type of resident - 
houses were mud-built and brick-built before the earthquake.  




Can not be regarded as one of the oldest areas in Bam. Houses were 
built mostly from rough bricks. The area experienced severe damage 
as a result of the earthquake 
Janbazan 
One of the severely hit areas in Bam. It has dense urban form and 
houses are mostly in the form of brick-built 
Takhti 
One of the oldest areas in Bam, severly damaged by the earthquake. 
Houses before the earthquake were mostly in the form of mud-built 
Hafezabad 
Locality of the most marginalised people in Bam with a reputation 
for informal business and drug dealing. Houses were a mix of mud-
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 There was no formal data about the districts in the form that they were categorised in this research, 
so the research relied on local people information and the map provided in the Methodology Chapter. 





6.3.1 The Livelihood Situation of the Six Districts 
To measure the livelihood situation of the six districts, the following indicators were 
used. First, mesauring the dependency rate of the households. Second, to find the 
size of households, the age distribution of the households and the geographical 
distance of close family members like parents and married children or siblings was 
measured. Two kinds of dependency rate would be measured: The potential and the 
actual. Potential dependency rate means the number of people who are eligible to 
work according to their age. The actual dependency rate would be worked out by 
dividing the number of income bringers of each household to the number of all 
members of the household.  
Moreover, the access of households to a private car, their access to a social care 
system (i.e. Welfare Organization's (Behzisti) support), and the number of employed 
people of the household were studied. The access of the residents to shelter was also 
examined through ascertaining the rate of a person per room with the number of built 
houses and prefabricated units.  
6.3.1.1 Dependency rate 
Questions asked in this regard are
2
: 
 How many households live in here? 
 Do the households relate to each other? If the answer is "Yes", what is the 
relation? 
 How many members does each household have? Age? 
 The occupation of each household's members: 
 Source of income of each household before earthquake: 
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 See Appendix 1 






Ferdosi: The majority of households are three to five members; the number of seven 
or eight-members (and more) is low and it has the highest number of one-member 
households among the districts (Figure 6.4).   Compared to the other five districts, 
Ferdosi has the lowest number of under five year olds (post-earthquake born 
children). This could be the result of the low rate of fertility in proportion to the 
district (it has the lowest rate of fifteen to thirty five year olds among the districts).  
It also has the highest number of thirty one to sixty year olds and the sample 
community had no resident over sixty.  It has the lowest "Potential dependency rate 
(based on age)" after Bethat-Almahdi (Figure 6.7). Ferdosi is the only district that 
has no parent and married children living in one yard but it has the highest rate of 
households who live in neighbouring proxmity to their parents (on different pieces of 
land) and households whose children were not at their neighbourhood. The sample 
shows no post-earthquake wedded households in Ferdosi. 
Eishabad: Eishabad's figures reveal that the district has the highest three member 
households after Bethat-Almahdi and has the highest number of four-member 
households; in fact, three and four-member households are the norm in the district. It 
also has the highest number of seven-member households (Figure 6.4). Eishabad's 
number of post-earthquake born babies is relatively high and more of the population 
are between six and thrity years old. Figure 6.6 shows that Eishabad has the highest 
number of over sixty  year olds. It has the highest "Potential dependency rate (based 
on age)" among the six districts (Figure 6.7). The district has a elatively high number 
of people sharing one yard with their parents (Figure 6.8).  
Bethat-Almahdi: A great percentage of households in Bethat-Almahdi have three-
members. There is no household larger that six-members (Figure 6.4). It has the 
highest number of people aged between sixteen and thirty and its number of post-
earthquake births is relatively high. Bethat-Almahdi has the lowest potential 
dependency rate among the six districts (Figure 6.7). It means the number of people 





who can work according to their age is considerably higher than the number of 
people who are not expected to work based on their age (i.e. children and seniors). 
Figure 6.8 shows Bethat-Almahdi has the highest number of young households 
living in geographical proximity to their parents, and after Ferdosi, it has the lowest 
number of households who share land with their parents. It has the highest number of 
post-earthquake wedded households among the districts (Figure 6.9). 
Figure 6.4: Household size in six districts post-earthquake Bam, sample 
community
3
, 2008 (Q6, App.1) 
 
Janbazan: The majority of the households who live in Janbazan are small 
households of two, three or four members (Figure 6.4).  The majority of its residents 
are between six to thirty years old (Figure 6.5). Its "Potential dependency rate (based 
on age)" is 0.49 and does not show an extreme among the districts. However, in 
terms of geographical distance of parents and wedded children it has the highest 
number of young households who share one land with their parents and has no 
parents and wedded children living as neighbours to each other on seperate land.  
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Takhti: Most of the residents of Takhti district are households of two to five 
members (Figure 6.4). It has the highest "Potential dependency rate (based on age)" 
after Eishabad (Figure 6.7). In Takhti, residents were either not living with their 
relatives in one district or if they were, they were living on one piece of land (Figure 
6.8). 
Figure 6.5: Age distribution in the six districts of post-earthquake Bam, sample 
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Figure 6.6: Age distribution with a focus on the population from working age to 
pension age of post-earthquake Bam (in percentage %), sample community, 
2008 
 
Figure 6.7: Potential dependency rate (based on age)
4
 of post-earthquake Bam, 
sample community, 2008 
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 This is calculated by dividing the number of people between sixteen and sixty (working age to 
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Dependency rate by age





Hafezabad: Figure 6.4 shows the households of Hafezabad are larger than the other 
five districts: It has the highest number of six-member households and the only 
district that accomodates more than seven member households. It has the highest 
number of under fifteen year-olds (Figure 6.6) and it has increased its potential 
dependency rate (based on age) (Figure 6.7). In Hafezabad, the number of 
households who were living within neighbouring proximity of their parents or 
siblings on separate lands was relatively high. It also has the lowest number of 
households over thirty five years old who did not have their children close by. Based 
on Figure 6.8 in Hafezabad, households were living in neighbouring sights from 
their relatives (as parents or siblings) either on one land or on different lands; this 
shows the strong family bonding ties of its residents. Moreover, after Bethat-
Almahdi, Hafezabad has the highest number of post-earthquake-married households 
(Figure 6.9). 
Figure 6.8: Closeness of families post-earthquake Bam, sample community, in 
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6.3.1.2 Actual Dependency Rate 
Questions asked in this regard
5
: 
 How many members does each household have?  
 The occupation of each household's members: 
One of the ways to measure the poverty level of households is through measuring 
actual dependency rate; by that it means the number of members who earn money 
compared to the number of members who consume it in the household. In Figure 
6.10, 2/7 for example, means two members of the household out of seven members 
who bring money into the household, and the families who are underemployed or do 
not have permanent income -  clarified by “occasionally” working.  In Figure 6.10, 
the right side means less dependency and consequently lower levels of poverty, and 
the left side means higher levels of poverty or a higher dependency rate.  
Considering the dependency rate as an index for measuring poverty is not without 
challenge. Households with the same dependency rate may have different levels of 
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income; two households with 1/5 dependency rate may have different income 
sources: One may be the owner of a prosperous date-garden, the other a retired 
teacher earning an under-average pension. There is also the problem of classifying 
dependency rates in a way to ease the analysis: It is not clear that a ten member 
household with one member who earns money from a permanent job is better off, or 
that a five member household with one member earns money from temporary jobs. 
These problems decrease the accuracy of the findings – but this is nothing new as 
measuring poverty levels has always been challenging.  
Figure 6.10:  Actual Dependency Rate
6
 of post-earthquake Bam, sample 








As the figure shows, the dependency rate of the six wards are very close to each 
other. The graphs are most dense between 1/3 and occasionally 2/3. Among the 
wards, Janbazan has the greatest tendency towards low dependency rate. In 1/10 and 
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 Due to the high number of the dependency rate indicators, it became impossible to have districts in 










































































































































































2/9 range there is the highest concentration of occasional workers in which 
Hafezabad, Takhti and Eishabad are most prominent. This confirms the household 
vulnerability of these areas. 
Table 6.2: Dependency Rate of the sample community 
District Mode of the 





Family bonding ties (geographical 










Ferdosi Medium (three 
to five-
members) 
Average Intense (parents and children mostly live 





Eishabad Medium (three 
to four-
members) 
Highest Very intense (high number of people sharing 













Janbazan Small Medium Very intense (has the highest number of 





High Combination (residents either were not living 
with their relatives at one district or if they 






Hafezabad Populated High Very intense (households living in 
neighbouring proximity to their parents or 
siblings either on one land or on different 
lands) 
High High 





6.3.1.3 Access to Shelter, Transport, Governmental Social-financial 
support, Money Lenders and Employment 
Questions asked in this regard
7
: 
 Do you live in a prefabricated unit, built house, undestroyed house, or others? 
Number of rooms (except kitchen, bathroom, toilet) 
 Do any of the households receive help from Imam Khomeini Relief 
Committee or Welfare Organization? 
 Do you have access to personal vehicle? 
 Who owns the land?  
 To whom did it belong before the earthquake? How about the building? 
 If an emergency came up that you need money, except for first-rate family, 
how many people are there that you can ask them to for borrow money and 
they are willing to help you?  
 The occupation of each household's members before and after the 
earthquake: 
 How have your weekend leisure time changed compared to before the 
earthquake? 
Ferdosi: The rate of "built house to household" is the highest and the rates of under-
construction to household and prefabricated unit to household is quite low. These 
factors support the relatively high ability of inhabitants to afford house 
reconstruction. Moreover, it has the least number of households in government 
financial support (Behzisti and Emam Khomeini Foundation) (Figure 6.13) and its 
room per person is the highest. In terms of bouncing back (albeit in terms of house 
reconstruction), Ferdosi shows the highest resilience. The residents of Ferdosi 
mostly said that they can not borrow money from anyone (Figure 6.14) but thought 
themselves in a better financial position than their friends and relatives. This 
response may be due to the high age factor of the inhabitants (not able to work) - 
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they recognise themselves as supporters rather than under support, considering that 
after Janbazan, it has the highest “more than five” answer. The residents of Ferdosi 
were among the most dissatisfied with their post-earthquake leisure time and stated 
they had better weekends before the earhquake (Figure 6.15). 
It was good in Bam before the earthquake, the city was alive. For our leisure 
time we used to travel around the city by car, there was a cinema before, but 
now there is nothing. (A resident from Ferdosi, 2008) 
Eishabad: Shows the lowest resiliency in terms of bouncing back regarding house 
reconstruction. Its rate of built-houses to household and the rate of built-house to a 
piece of land remain the lowest. It also has the highest rate in seven-member 
households, its percentage of people still living in prefabricated unit is high (second 
after Janbazan), and the rate of young households living apart from their parents 
independently is the lowest. Eishabad has the highest rate of unemployment as well 
as the number of households being helped by government financial support 
organisations (Behzisti and Emam Khomeini Foundation
8
) (Figure 6.13). The number 
of members benefiting from the use of a personal car is the least among the districts. 
The number of persons per room is the highest among the six districts. The answer 
by the residents to how many people they have access to ask for money was mostly 
"no one". Eishabad has a zero “more than five” answer. This can be indexed to 
highlight their financial insecurity. Most of the residents did not feel change in their 
weekend leisure quality (Figure 6.15), they mostly stated they spent their weekends 
at home as they did before the earthquake. 
We used to live in one house with my father-in-law and brother-in-law and 
his wife. After the earthquake, the loan was enough to build a small house for 
my brother-in- law after the death of my father-in-law. Our application for a 
loan was denied because we were told the land is too small to accommodate 
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two buildings, so we live in prefabricated unit on the same land with my 
brother-in-law’s family. (One of the residents of Eishabad, 2008) 
Figure 6.11: Rate of Built-Houses post-earthquake Bam, sample community, 
2008 (Q1, App.1) 
 
Bethat-Almahdi: Bethat-Almahdi has the highest rate of under-construction houses 
to households and its rate of pre-fabricated units to household is the lowest. Most 
residents of Bethat-Almahdi have a car (Figure 6.12). The numbers of unemployed 
people who benefit from government financial services is also relatively high (Figure 
6.13). Comparing this data with Table 6.2, it can be concluded that Bethat-Almahdi 
has the highest rate of three-member households, the highest number of "between 
sixteen to sixty", the highest rate of households living with no relatives in their 
neighbourhood, and the highest number of post-earthquake-wedded households. Its 
rate of young households living in neighbouring proximity to relatives (mostly 
brothers and sisters) is second after Hafezabad. One possibility for these outcomes 
could be that the district which is one of the most affected districts in Bam greatly 
changed its identity after the earthquake. Former inhabitants have mostly died and 
lands were passed on to the heirs. Heirs either built new houses on the land beside 
each other or sold the land to young families. Figure 6.11 supports this result since 





















inheritance process and selling the land is a time consuming process and 
consequently postponed the reconstruction). The answer by the residents to how 
many people they have access to for money was mostly "no one" (Figure 6.24). It is 
possible that the answer may be a consequence of being new to the area and being 
distant from previous social networks - from whom they could borrow money. 
Weekend leisure quality remained mostly the same (Figure 6.15). 
Figure 6.12: Person per room post-earthquake in Bam, sample community, 
2008 (Q 2 & 6, App.1) 
 
Janbazan: Comparing the highest rate of people living in prefabricated unit in the 
area to Table 6.2, it can be concluded that the area is ranked first in terms of parents  
and married son/daughter living on the same piece of land. While one household has 
built its house, the other is living in prefabricated unit. The residents show more 
confidence in terms of access to a social network that they can ask money from since 
Janbazan has the highest rate of "more than five persons"  and  the lowest number of 
"no one" answers to the question - how many people can you ask to borrow money 
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Figure 6.13: Deprivation, sample community, post earthquake Bam, 2008 
, (Q9, App.1) 
 
Figure 6.14: People to Borrow money from, Sample Community, post 
earthquake Bam, 2008, (Q 19, App.1) 
 
Takhti: Takhti does not show any extremes in its data. The number of residents 
having access to a car is average among the districts, along with the number of 
























Less than 5 persons
More than 5 persons





number of built houses per household and per piece of land are also average among 
the districts. Its person per room rate is also average.  
Hafezabad: In Hafezabad, the rate of person per room is high, albeit not as extreme 
as Eishabad. There waere no underconstruction houses in the area: Houses were 
either built or people were still living in prefabricated units (Figure 6.11). This may 
be an indicator of informal dwellers because if the lands had formal deeds they 
would be inherited by the heirs and it would be time for the heir to construct new 
buildings in the area. However, if the land title was unknown, no one could claim for 
a loan for land reconstruction. If this was the case in Hafezabad, this might indicate 
that newcomers to the city had chosen that area for its informal setting as no one 
would claim those lands. 
Figure 6.15: Change in weekend leisure quality, sample community, post 
earthquake Bam, 2008
9
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leisure time was better 
before the earthquake 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6.3.2 Population structure of the sample community 
Based on the questionnaires, the population pyramid of the samples is provided. The 
reason for analysing the population pyramid is to study if factors such as age and 
gender have any influnece on the resilience of the districts and have any relation with 
other factors like dependency rate, access to shelter, and trust. 






Figure 6.16: Kerman's Population Pyramid (1) 2006 
 









Figure 6.17: Kerman Population Pyramid (2) 2006 
 
Figure 6.18: Sample Community Population Pyramid, post earthquake Bam, 
2008 
 













0 to 5 6 to 15 16 to 30 31 to 45 46 to 60 over 60 
% females 5.22% 9.91% 17.52% 8.72% 4.84% 2.74%
% males -5.46% -10.36%-18.39% -8.98% -4.80% -3.06%
Kerman Population Pyramid 2006







0 to 5 6 to 15 16 to 30 31 to 45 46 to 60 over 60
male -1.92% -12.45% -15.08% -10.70% -6.66% -1.22%
female 2.63% 14.21% 17.89% 8.77% 7.89% 0.52%
Total Sample Population Pyramid





The sample reads with the province pyramid in mind because the most populated 
category is between sixteen and thirty year olds. However, children under five are 
considerably low. To compare the Ferdosi with the sample and Kerman’s pyramid, 
Ferdosi’s population are almost equally distributed in different categories except that 
the number of children under five is very little.  
Eishabad’s population is mostly female and less mature than Ferdosi.  














0 to 5 6 to 15 16 to 30 31 to 45 46 to 60 over 60
male 0 -11.84% -13.10% -13.10% -7.89% -1.31%
female 1.31% 15.78% 10.52% 11.84% 11.84% 1.31%
Ferdosi Population Pyramid





Figure 6.20: Sample Community Population Pyramid, post earthquake Bam, 
2008, Eishabad 
 
Figure 6.21: Sample Community Population Pyramid, post earthquake Bam, 
2008, Bethat-Almahdi 
 







0 to 5 6 to 15 16 to 30 31 to 45 46 to 60 over 60
male -2.40% -8.43% -14.45% -8.43% -6.02% -3.61%
female 3.61% 18.07% 14.48% 9.63% 9.63% 1.20%
Eishabad Population Pyramid







0 to 5 6 to 15 16 to 30 31 to 45 46 to 60 over 60
male -1.51% -7.57% -22.72% -12.12% -6.06% 0.00%
female 4.54% 7.57% 24.24% 9.09% 4.54% 0.00%
Bethat Population Pyramid





In the population pyramid for Bethat-Almahdi, the young population between 
sixteen and thirty is considerably high. As mentioned perviously, one explanation for 
this could be that the area has become home to the young couples who are building 
new properties in the district. Gender distribution is almost equal. 
In Janbazan, the six to thirty population is considerably higher than the over thirty 
population. The district shows the most gender equallity among all of the six wards.  
In Takhti, the female population between thirty and forty five is considerably lower 
than their male counterparts.  
 In Hafezabad, the most noteworthy issue is the gender inequality between six and 
fifteen year olds; young boys attend school at a  considerably higher rate than their 
female counterparts. One reason for this could be due to the social problems of the 
area. In particualr, families with young girls preferred not to reside in the area due to 
social concerns regarding their daughters’ safety.  
The population pyramid reveals no abnormal expansion; it is almost in accordance to 
the province's population pyramid. One noticeable fact is that Bethat's pyramid 
shows a considerable expansion in the the young population between sixteen and 
thirty year olds. This supports the assumption that Bethat-Almahdi is developing 
new characteristics since the earthquake by accomodating mostly young residents. It 
should be noted that the results are merely sample results and drawing conclusions 









Figure 6.22: Sample Community Population Pyramid, post earthquake Bam, 
2008, Janbazan 
 











0 to 5 6 to 15 16 to 30 31 to 45 46 to 60 over 60
MALE -0.88% -14.15% -17.69% -7.96% -7.07% -0.88%
FEMALE 1.76% 15.04% 19.46% 7.96% 7.07% 0.00%
Janbazan Population Pyramid







0 to 5 6 to 15 16 to 30 31 to 45 46 to 60 over 60
MALE -1.96% -10.78% -12.74% -12.74% -6.86% -0.98%
FEMALE 2.94% 17.64% 18.62% 6.86% 5.88% 0.98%
Takhti Population Pyramid





Figure 6.24: Sample Community Population Pyramid, post earthquake Bam, 
2008, Hafezabad 
 
6.3.3 Trust and Communication in the six districts 
Questions asked in this regard
10
: 
 Do you know your neighbours? 
 Do you think that the neighbourhood people will help each other in difficult 
circumstances?  Has this issue changed compared to before the earthquake? 
(If you have come to this place after the earthquake, is it different compared 
to the previous neighbourhood?)  
 Do you think that most of the neighbourhood people can be trusted? Why do 
you think like that? Did you think like this before 
 How your trustfulness has changed to the following people compared to the 
time before the earthquake? 
                                                 
10
 See Appendix 1 







0 to 5 6 to 15 16 to 30 31 to 45 46 to 60 over 60
male -4.50% -20.72% -14.41% -12.61% -7.20% -0.90%
female 2.70% 12.61% 22.52% 9.90% 9.90% 0.00%
Hafezabad Population Pyramid





Through the questionnaire survey, residents were asked about their levels of trust 
towards their neighbours; to the new inhabitants of Bam. They were required to 
compare the situation with and before the earthquake. The intention was to study the 
influence of the earthquake and impact of the reconstruction on the levels of trust, 
security and belonging.  
Ferdosi: The residents of Ferdosi show the least change in their trust towards their 
neighbours. This is not surprising since the district has the highest rate of relatives 
living in close proximity to their neighbours. They also have the highest aged 
households, which means its inhabitants had more time to communicate with their 
neighbours compared to younger households in other districts.  
Bethat-Almahdi: The results of Bethat-Almahdi district regarding the neighbour 
questions, supports the idea of the area being transfomed into a new district with new 
inhabitants. Its inhabitants are mostly unfamilier with their neighbours  (more than 
fifty per cent of the inhabitants) and consequently have a low rate of  trust compared 
to the other districts.  
Hafezabad: The residents of Hafezabad also distrusted their neighbours and believed 
they did not know their neighbours and in many cases, newcomers to Hafezabad 
stated that in previous living areas people were more familiar with each other.   
Hafezabad's inhabitants felt isolated from their surrounding communities and 
neighbours. Despite the fact that the area is second in terms of the numbers of 
relatives living on neighbouring land (after Ferdosi), the households did not trust 
their neighbours. One fact worth considering is that the area has a bad reputation for 
drug dealing; therefore interviewees may prefer to show themselves unacquainted 
with other members of the district to present themselves clean from drug dealing. 





Takhti: Takhti's data shows the trust of residents towards their neighbours and that it 
has changed very slightly since before the earthquake. They mostly stated that their 
neighbours are the same ones as before and that the area has not changed much.  
Eishabad and Janbazan do not show any special characteristics in this regard. 
However, Eishabad as being the most deprived area along with Hafezabad was 
expected to show some especial characteristic and difference with other districts. 
Compared to the other districts, the neighbourhood ties of Eishabad were apparent 
by observing the residents rather than from the answers the residents gave to the 
survey questions. For example, inhabitants accompanied the researcher to contact 
neighbours - both considering it as an opportunity to say hello to the neighbour, and 
to create awareness among the neighbours of the questionaire process. At times, the 
group discussions developped  naturally - it was obvious that bonding ties were high. 
However, it also became apparent that the level of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD) was high. Most interviewees with trauma were observed in Eishabad; many 
people crying after each question and women blaming themselves for their children 
becoming unruly as a result of their depression which was prevalent among these 
communities. Not benefiting from financial capital, their most valued capital was 
their bonding ties. The loss of financial capital was therefore not that harsh to them 
since they had become accustomed to it even before the earthquake. However, loss 
of their loved ones was a greater catastrophe to these people compared with other 










Figure 6.25: Change (decrease) in trusting Neighbours, Sample Community, 
post earthquake Bam, 2008, (Q 25, 27, App.1) 
 
 
Figure 6.26: Trust to the citizens, Sample Community, post earthquake Bam, 
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In terms of change towards trust by the citizens (Figure 6.26) the outcomes are 
suprisingly contrary. Eishabad and Janbazan have the least change while Bethat-
Almahdi and Ferdosi have the highest decrease in the levels of trust. In Janbazan 
and Bethat-Almahdi, answers were mostly followed by claims that the city got filled 
with newcomers (Narmashiris) who destroyed Bam’s solidarity. Residents of 
Eishabad, on the other hand, showed more sympathy to the post-earthquake Bamis. 
In many interviews, people stated that they were unable to care for each other any 
more because they were suffering from their own difficulties. The high rate of 
distrust towards other citizens in Bam of Bathat, once again confirms the 

















Table 6.4: Change in Trust since the earthquake of the sample community 
Districts Change in Trust towards 
Neighbours 
Change in Trust towards 
Residents of Bam 
Ferdosi Little change Highly decreased 
Eishabad Average Decreased 
Bethat-Almahdi Highly decreased Highly decreased 
Janbazan Average Decreased 
Takhti Little change Decreased 
Hafezabad Decreased Decreased 
 





6.3.4 Networking and Social Gatherings 




 How many times did you have guests in the past two months? How has it 
changed compared to before the earthquake?  
 How many times have you gone to a party in the past two months? How has 
it changed compared to before the earthquake? 
 
Figure 6.27 shows the change in private social gatherings in Bam since the 
earthquake. Overall, most of the respondents declared a decrease in the numbers of 
private social gatherings since the earthquake. Households stated the reasons as: A 
decrease in the number of relatives (some of them were killed in the earthquake and 
some migrated); financial deficits after the earthquake; depression; and not being 
able to leave the house empty due to insecurity and the threat of robbery. There were 
some households who confirmed an increase in the number of gatherings, due to a 
desire to see each other more and reduce the pain of the disaster. People in this 
category belonged either to the Ferdosi area which is the most affluent or Hafezabad 
which, along with Ferdosi, had the highest rate of families living in close proximity 
to their relatives. In some cases, the interviewees mentioned that despite the decrease 
in the number of gatherings since the earthquake, the form of gatherings has changed 
more towards close relatives and siblings rather than distant ones. According to one 
of the residents of Ferdosi: 
 Before the earthquake we used to gather at each other's houses for Quran 
readings but now I have no idea about the city - everything has changed. I 
feel l will get lost if I leave the house. 
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Figure 6.27: Changes to private social gatherings since the earthquake, Sample 
Community,  post earthquake Bam, 2008, (Q 31 & 32, App.1) 
 
Through the data collected on Bethat-Almahdi, Ferdosi and Eishabad, some 
characteristics of the wards can be extracted: Bethat-Almahdi is the ward whose 
residents felt the least change in their private social gatherings. One reason could be 
that the residents are young couples who had started their social life recently, or the 
earthquake affected their social relationships the least (considering the fact that 
Bethat-Almahdi has the highest rate of newly wedded households among the 
districts). Ferdosi is the other ward that shows the least decrease in gatherings and 
even some households confirmed an increase. As mentioned before, this could be 
due to the affluence of the residents to be able to afford gatherings. Eishabad, on the 
other hand, shows a substantial decrease in gatherings. One reason for this could be 
the deprivation of the residents. Eishabad was one of the most affected areas in 
contrast to Bethat-Almahdi which still has its pre-earthquake residents and has the 
least young independent households. It is also one of the areas with the most 
dependant households who live in one yard - hence less people feel the need for 




















6.3.5 Sense of having power in affecting their surroundings: 
The social structure in Bam has changed, a huge number of Bamis died, a 
large number of new residents are from other cities. The city is full of 
construction labourers who have come from different parts of Iran. There is 
no social trust anymore.  I feel powerless in governing my city; everything is 
in the hands of central and local government. Nobody wants my opinion 
(One of the Residents of Takhti district, 2008). 
To figure out how responsible residents feel about their surroundings, three 
questions were designed
12
: 1. Have you worked with others in your neighbourhood 
to do something for the benefit of the community in the past four years (since the 
earthquake)? 2. How much impact do you think you have in making Bam a better 
place to live? 3. Have you sent any grievance letters to any organisation in last four 
years, and if so, to which organisation? 
Answers to the first question are shown in Figure 6.28. Bethat-Almahdi highlights 
the least cooperation between neighbours. This shows the lack of closeness between 
neighbours which again backs the assumption that Bethat-Almahdi accommodates 
mostly new comers. Janbazan shows the most cooperation and the most 
independent couples (actual dependency rate figure). It also has the most completed 
buildings per piece of land among the wards (Figure 6.11). Most young couples live 
in prefabricated units and share yards with their siblings. Being young and in need, 
increases their sense of cooperation – because they want to improve their situation. 
Hafezabad and Ferdosi have the highest rate of neighbours being parents and 
children, but Hafezabad reveals considerable difference in terms of cooperation than 
Ferdosi (Figure 6.28). One reason for this could be IBC’s networking project in 
Hafezabad which will be discussed in the next chapter.  Eishabad has a low 
cooperation rate; probably due to a high rate of ward deprivation which has 
increased their resilience and tolerance to harsh conditions. Despite the fact that 
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figures show low cooperation in submitting any neighbourhood projects, at the time 
of filling in the questionnaire, neighbouring bonds were so strong that entire 
households often accompanied the researcher to contact their neighbours. This 
increased the levels of trust between the researcher and the interviewees.  
Figure 6.28: Neighbourhood co-operation, Sample Community,  post 
earthquake Bam, 2008 (in percentage), (Q 28-30, App.1) 
 
Figure 6.29 is extracted from the data revealed through the question: “How much 
impact do you think you have in making Bam a better place to live?”. Most of the 
residents have negative viewpoints on their role in Bam. On many occasions, the 
answer was "it is the role of the Municipality" or often citing the word “government” 
(and not local government) as having the responsibility to take care of the city. In 
some cases, people commented that, “we can be very influential and even have some 












Activities done for the neighbourhood 
within the last 4yrs
done something for 
neighbourhood with 
neighburs last 4yrs





Figure 6.29: Sense of having impact in shaping the future of Bam, Sample 
Community,  post earthquake Bam, 2008, (Q 33, App.1) 
 
To discuss it from the perspective of the wards, a comparison needs to be made: 
Bethat-Almahdi has the least "none at all" answers and most “to some extent”. Age 
might be an influential factor in the sense of having power to change surroundings 
since the residents of Bethat-Almahdi are mostly young couples. “Very much” as a 
response in the questionnaires was very few, but in Hafezabad the highest rate of 
“very much” as an answer prevailed. However, here, the data might be influenced by 
the answers of the mason’s family (which is discussed earlier in this chapter) who, 
with their strong bonding ties and financial support, had a better feeling about their 
lives than others. Nevertheless, the mason’s family had never put in a grievance 
letter to the municipality or the city council. In Ferdosi, despite the fact that 
residents were in a better financial situation than in other wards, they felt they had 
the least power to affect change in Bam. One reason for this could be due to their 
better conditions which meant that they had less tolerance for harsh situations and 
higher expectations - hence suffering more from the conditions. This is especially so 
regarding the fact that based on Figure 6.30, residents of Ferdosi were one of the 
most active among the wards in sending grievance letters to the governor and the city 
council. Such a viewpoint was also apparent among the residents of Eishabad: they 



















Figure 6.30: Grievance, Sample Community, post earthquake Bam, 2008, (Q 34, 
App.1) 
 
At the time of the survey, the researcher came across a couple from Eishabad whose 
conditions were harsh. Their 200 square metre house was destroyed and only 
through loans were they able to rebuild an 85 square metre two-bedroom house. Five 
of their children were killed in the earthquake. The man was a taxi driver before the 
catastrophe; but in the earthquake his waist was broken and he was not able to drive 
anymore. For eight years prior to the earthquake they were supported by social 
welfare organisations and at the time of the survey they got a monthly subvention of 
50 thousand Toman (about 50 USD). To be able to cover their basic needs, they had 
decided to sell their car and invest the money into the bank. The interest (about 30-
40 USD per month) would help them stretch their budget a bit. They had a son 
whose eye was infected and could not work; nursing him had increased their 
expenses. Having no affluent friends or relatives, the only agency they thought might 
help was the government. However, the only complaint they made was to send a 
letter to the President’s office (there was no response to the letter). In other words, 
they applied a person-to-person approach towards the government. 
Figure 6.30 concerns the complaints of residents. Regarding Figure 6.30, Takhti’s 




















The initial form of questions was to ask residents about their participation in local or 
national elections and their attendance in any local seminar or public discussion 
group. All answered positively to participating in local or national elections. 
However, it became apparent that negative answers to such questions were risky for 
the respondents and could question their political participation. It is likely therefore 
that any positive answers to participation in the national presidential election or 
parliamentary election was not a genuine response. Moreover, after some 
questionnaires, it was revealed that no seminars or public discussion groups 
happened in Bam that involved the residents. However, people mentioned the letters 
they had sent to the president’s office or the supreme leader’s office regarding their 
problems. Consequently, the questions were amended to; “Have you sent any 
grievance letter to any organisation in last four years, if yes, to which organisation?”, 
but unfortunately no data was collected from the Takhti district. 
The most prominent answer was none. Most households did not send any grievance 
letter to any organisation. This is followed by most grievance letters being sent to the 
president’s office in Tehran (and not to the local governor or city council). The 
reason for this could be that residents believed national leaders had more capacity 
and power to help them than local leaders. One resident in answering the question; 
“why didn’t you ask local responsibilities to deal with Bam’s problems?” answered 
“the governor is living in a prefabricated unit; if he had any power he would improve 
his own situation first”. Or as one of the residents of Ferdosi stated:  
Municipality by far had shown no productivity. The streets, after four years, 
are the same as they were in early days after the earthquake. They start 
refurbishment of one part but leave it unfinished after a while. We don’t 
know what they do with the budget.  
 
 





A resident of Eishabad stated:  
The problem of the city is irresponsibility of local governmental 
organisations: There is no garbage collecting system; garbage remains in the 
street for days and brings bugs and animals. The street is messy and dusty; 
there is no pavement in the streets. The insecurity is high; our orchard is 
robbed daily by unknown people. The electricity was cut for seven days 
without any explanation. The mayor and governor are of no use. 
Local officials pay no attention. I am an aged woman with six orphaned 
grand children and no source of income. I visited the governor and he said 
my issue should be addressed to the Eman Foundation Charity. I called the 
Emam Foundation and they said my case is related to the Welfare 
Organisation. I visited the Welfare Organisation and they asked me to fill out 
a form. I filled out the form and later checked the Organisation for a follow-
up to my case. They said we have lost your form so I filled out another form 
but there was still no news until now. I got so exhausted. Now I sell bananas 
or snacks or cigarettes on the city corners but this money is hardly enough to 












Table 6.5: Networking and a sense of being important in shaping Bam, 
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 In most cases the letters were not replied to or had unsatisfying responses. In a few cases, people 
were happy with the responses. 






Residents of Bam have very strong family bonding relationships and this works for 
them as a coping mechanism. Through these family ties, financial resources flow and 
it provides them with psychological comfort and support. Young members shape 
new families and children which bring hope and joy for older members who then 
help them in providing shelter, income and resources. As long as this institution 
works properly, they are rarely concerned about outdoor issues.  
The earthquake has affected this cultural way of life. The household size has 
decreased due to the high death toll caused by the earthquake. Some dependant 
families saw this as an opportunity to separate their shelter from their parents and 
become more independent.  
In all districts, the number of social gatherings decreased along with the trust of 
residents in the new Bam. Residents revealed the least signs of any social 
empowerment; to be able to have an impact on their surroundings, on social 
cooperation; or to be able to air their complaints. Despite the high rate of trust among 
neighbours, social cooperation to improve neighbourhood conditions was very rare. 
Improving urban conditions was seen as “the government’s” task and people felt 
either not responsible or marginalised in this regard. The following paragraphs 
discuss the changes each district went through since the earthquake: 
Ferdosi shows high resilience in terms of rebuilding their houses and livelihood: 
High access to transport, shelter and employment after the earthquake. However, 
little change in the levels of trust in the neighbourhood. People felt marginalised in 
the formal governing system of the city and believed the city had become unsafe and 
unfamiliar after the earthquake. There were no signs of new forms of networking: 
Social gatherings decreased, neighbourhood cooperation was low, and there were not 
many people to ask for money in times of difficulty. Residents showed their 
grievances by sending letters to the President's Office. In terms of corresponding 





with the local government, despite not having satisfying correspondence, Ferdosi 
residents had the highest rate compared to other districts. 
Eishabad: shows low resilience in terms of access to shelter. In terms of livelihood, 
residents of the district were vulnerable before the earthquake and their vulnerability 
has not decreased after the earthquake: Access to transport and employment remain 
low in the district. The high potential dependency rate has increased their 
vulnerability. The neighbouring ties were strong but this has not helped them in 
reducing the problems of the ward (for example garbage collection). Social 
gatherings decreased and synergy between people and the local government was at a 
minimum level. People preferred contact with the President by sending letters 
instead of solving their problems through local organisations. 
Bethat-Almahdi: Here, there were the most signs of change since the earthquake. Its 
population is abnormally young (mostly between sixteen and thirty years old) and 
has the highest rate of post-earthquake married households. It also has the highest 
number of buildings under construction. Neighbourhood bonding ties were also 
weakest among the districts (considering the fact that in contrast to other districts, 
residents of Bethat-Almahdi were mostly located in geographical distance from their 
parents and siblings). Their trust towards neighbours and neighbourhood co-
operation was very low. The data showed no vulnerability in terms of access to 
transport or employment. The residents preferred to use organisational 
correspondence methods over personal correspondence with the President. This 
might be due to the young age of the residents and being more familiar with a 
modern bureaucratic system. 
Bethat-Almahdi and Takhti were both garden-urban areas with severe damage 
caused by the earthquake. While Bethat-Almahdi changed its demographic 
characteristic in the form of independent young people, this was not the case in 
Takhti. One reason for this could be the geographic location of the districts; Bethat-
Almahdi was situated close to the dense-urban area whereas Takhti was far from it. 





Takhti and Bethat-Almahdi were both severely damaged by the earthquake. 
Most of their inhabitants were killed in the earthquake, but while the new 
residents of Bethat-Almahdi were heirs of the deceased and came to Bam 
after the earthquake from other cities like Kerman. Heirs of the deceased or 
survivors from Takhti sold the land and bought new pieces in other parts of 
the city which were safer and less traditional (One of the Bami residents, 
2011).  
Bethat-Almahdi has become less traditional. We have more women drivers in 
Bethat-Almahdi than we had before the earthquake. Recently, a cab-hiring 
service for women was launched in the area and all of its drivers are women 
(One of the residents of Bam, 2011) 
Janbazan: The most noteworthy issue about Janbazan is the fact that it has the 
highest number of secondary or extended households sharing one yard with their 
parents in an arrangement of prefabricated units and built houses. The effect of the 
earthquake on the residents of Janbazan was to separate them in terms of their shelter 
but not in terms of land. The household arrangement of the neighbourhoods has not 
changed considerably and there are some signs of neighbourhood cooperation.  Their 
sense of being important in shaping the future of Bam was not negative and most of 
the residents felt there were people to help them financially in times of difficulty. 
This might therefore suggest that their social network has not changed substantially. 
Their synergy with the local government was none.  
Takhti: The sample data shows that Takhti has kept its pre-earthquake character to a 
large extent. Households were living either independently or in an arrangement of 
built houses and prefabricated units with their parents or siblings in one yard. The 
trust levels towards neighbours has not changed and people still feel connected to the 
new Bam since some of the residents felt they can be influential in shaping its future. 
The mixed character of Takhti, as households living independent of their parents, or 
sharing one land, could be due to the changes the ward experienced since the 





earthquake through demographic changes. Takhti had a high death toll in the 
earthquake; new residents are mostly either heirs of the previous ones or newcomers 
from other areas. This cannot be concluded definitively from the survey data, but 
adding data obtained from the interviews with local people, the situation does 
become clearer. Takhti did not experienced the changes Bethat-Almahdi 
experienced, it kept its traditional character with high bonding ties - one reason for 
this could be its geographical distance from the dense-less traditional areas of Bam.   
Hafezabad: The district had very strong family bonding ties. Households were 
mostly populated and the number of post-earthquake wedded households was high. 
However, the the newly wedded households were still living in close proximity to 
their parents on the same land or on neighbouring land. An interesting factor about 
Hafezabad was its higher networking efforts compared to other districts. There were 
signs of neighbourhood co-operation and efforts to send grievance letters to local 
organisations. This might be as a result of International Blue Crescent (IBC) 
organization's empowering project which was applied in Hafezabad. The impact of 
this project was that the people of Hafezabad felt they could be influential in shaping 
the future of Bam.  
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter studied the effect of reconstruction through the lens of the residents in 
Bam. A sample community of the six most devastated districts was chosen and a 
questionnaire survey applied. Through the results of the questionnaires, the strength 
of family bonding ties was explored and its relationship to the vulnerability of 
households studied. Age was another factor in examining the resilience of the 
residents. This was measured through access to shelter, transport, employment, 
social networks, government support, and through a sense of having the power to 
shape the future of Bam. It was realised that government reconstruction policy has 
affected the informal institutions of Bam; like marriage and the size of households. 
Many households separated their shelter from their parental family, often due to 





limited choice, and most live in a prefabricated unit nearby to their parents. The 
earthquake changed the character of some districts like Bethat-Almahdi and 
Hafezabad, by accommodating new residents. The networking of the households was 
mostly in the form of people visiting their family and relatives, and to some extent 
neighbours, but also showed the least correlation with local government 












Participatory Housing Reconstruction 





Participatory approaches to development, despite being a buzzword in development 
discourse, showed little evidence of long-term effectiveness to address problems 
facing the most vulnerable or as a strategy for social change. Participatory discourse 
was an attempt to challenge the existing power relations in society by recognising 
structures of power and empowering the disempowered. However, in practice, this 
attempt was translated into, as Cleaver put it in (2001): "a managerial exercise based 
on 'toolboxes' of procedures and techniques…[which] remain largely concerned with 
efficiency" (p53). 





As Giles Mohan (2008) rightly argues, understanding how participation is used is 
very important in realising its possible impact: "in terms of development, a key 
question is: if people participate, what are they aiming to gain by participating? 
(p46)". He addresses three rationales for participatory development: (1) Efficiency 
and effectiveness - this approach uses participation as a means for applying projects 
through involvement of beneficiaries; (2) Mutual learning - this approach uses 
participation as a means of achieving a higher goal. This higher goal is to obtain for 
people a better life by learning from each other and understanding in an 
epistemological way; and, (3) Transformative approaches that aim to create 
meaningful social change through valorising other voices. In this approach, 
participation is the end goal. Here, participation offers communities the self-
determination they need to become associated with civil society. 
The aim of this research is to probe further into participation as an approach that is 
highly applied in recent development projects. The most detailed definition is 
provided by Stiefel. Stiefel (1981, p1-2) defines participation in terms of 'organized 
efforts to increase control over resources and regulative institutions in given social 
situations on the part of the groups and movements hitherto excluded from such 
decision making processes' (as cited by Desai, 2008, p116) 
This chapter examines how centralised reconstruction programme can address the 
social vulnerabilities. The outcomes of applying blue-print approaches is studied: it 
discusses how projects end up being standardised and participation (being presented 
as the main aim of reconstruction of Bam) to be used as a means for increasing 
efficiency rather than being transformative. In this approach programmes are 
designed based on loss rather than needs and is blind to shortcomings of 
entitlement's pattern. This chapter discusses how shortcomings of legislative and 
cultural weaknesses in Bam exclude some groups of people to entitle the benefits of 
reconstruction and as a consequence it exacerbates their vulnerabilities. The chapter 
also examines how an urban and professional biased programme decreases the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the projects.  





In doing so, this chapter is divided into six sections. The first section examines the 
housing reconstruction scheme designed in Tehran by members of the central 
government. The scheme was called „participatory housing reconstruction‟ and 
explores how participatory turned out in practice and on paper. Two main problems 
were recognised and discussed by the author in terms of the participatory nature of 
the reconstruction programme: First, it was highly Tehran-biased in terms of finding 
designers and applicators for the housing projects, and second, it followed an 
inflexible blue-print approach. It will also be discussed how the policy ended up 
creating additional vulnerability due to distance and an unfamiliarity with local 
communities. After discussing these weaknesses, two sections are allocated to the 
effect of reconstruction on the Bami residents and their sense of belonging to the 
community. The first section was carried out through in-depth interviews with thirty 
seven Bamis in 2010; seven years after the earthquake and the second section 
consolidates secondary data from the early stages of reconstruction in 2004.  
This chapter analysis the data collected through the following methods: face-to-face 
and semi-structured interviews took place with the governmental and Housing 
Foundation's officials in Tehran and Bam. The themes of the questions were their 
view-point about reconstruction and vulnerability, their priorities and challenges, and 
their method to approach the affected people and hear their problems. Documents, 
secondary data, and the views of people who were randomly and accidentally 
encountered are other sources of data of this chapter. 
7.2 Participatory Housing Reconstruction Scheme of Bam 
Despite the fact that reconstruction in Bam was presented as a participatory approach 
by central officials, the reconstruction plan was designed shortly after the earthquake 
by Tehrani architects and through the Strategic Reconstruction Bureau.  The 
reconstruction Plan for Bam designed by the Council of Architecture and Urban 
Development was based on three aims:  





a) Preserving the city identity through urban design; 
b) Strengthening the new houses against the earthquake through the national building 
code; and 
c) Householders' participation in the process of rebuilding. 
In designing the housing reconstruction plan, the above aims were prioritised; 
however, there was evidence that the architectural and technical aspects of houses 
received more focus than a participatory housing approach. On page 23 of the 
guidance to reconstruction published by the HF on August 2005 it is stated that: 
"It should be noted that the reconstruction of Bam is different from other 
experiences of reconstruction in Iran regarding participation. The attempt in 
previous reconstruction projects was to help the affected people to rebuild 
their own houses, in such cases HF acted more as a facilitator; but in the case 
of Bam, due to the importance of the unique and historical architectural 
importance of the buildings and the city design and in order to build 
earthquake-resistant buildings, more guidance is applied by the professional 
architects and contractors in designing and implementing the housing 
scheme.  
In “Housing Reconstruction Programme of post-earthquake Bam” prepared by the 
Strategic Reconstruction Bureau (Setade-Rahbordi-e-Bazsazi), the objective of 
Bam‟s reconstruction effort is defined as: 
Reconstruction and regeneration of residential and commercial units of rural 
and urban areas affected by the earthquake in accordance with the regional 
development plans and based on national and local capacities and abilities in 
order to restore the liveliness and function of cities and towns of Bam‟s 
region (Author's Italic). 





Further, in the chapter about administrative policies, it was highlighted that: 
It is necessary for HF to be in coordination with involved organizations like 
the municipality to lubricate the process of reconstruction and prevent 
parallel activities and increase public information about the construction in 
order to solve pre-disaster substandard construction method through 
providing financial support and awareness. Otherwise, focusing merely on 
restoring the pre-disaster situation will consequent in misuse of the created 
opportunity to develop the construction techniques and hence would have no 
effect on the development of the life qualities and also will increase the future 
risk.(Author's Italic)  
At the initial stages of reconstruction, many decision-makers boasted about the 
participatory nature of Bam‟s reconstruction plan as a new agenda in reconstruction 
experiences for Iran: 
It is the first time in any reconstruction planning in Iran that participation is 
considered seriously. In this direction, UNDP and the government made their 
planning based on people‟s participation and choice. After several years of 
post-disaster reconstruction planning, the best attempts have been made to 
make the most appropriate reconstruction planning in Bam (One of the staff 
from the Ministry of Housing responsible for the design of Bam‟s 
Reconstruction Plan. The interview took place in the summer, 2005). 
After years of experiencing post-war and post-disaster reconstruction 
planning in Iran, it is realised that the best way to reconstruct is not through 
building new houses for people, but to facilitate the reconstruction process 
for them to build their own houses. For example, in the reconstruction of 
Boeenzahra (1961), the government built new modern apartments for rural 
people from the area which ended up in misusing the properties and 
importing rural culture into modern apartments; like bringing goats and sheep 





onto balconies. In this way [encouraging and supporting people to build their 
own houses], not only houses will be built in accordance with the culture and 
needs of local people, but also people will be active in the reconstruction 
process and it will help them to feel that a new life is forming.” (One of the 
officials in the disaster centre from the Ministry of Interior. The interview 
took place in the summer 2005).  
Furthermore, to explain the role of people in reconstruction, he continues:  
It is important to insert resistant measures into new constructions. In this 
respect, the government and the UNDP have applied a community-based, 
cost-effective and earthquake-resistant housing approach that could be 
cheaply and easily replicated in earthquake-prone areas. They have created 
an exhibition of cheap and earthquake resistant houses outside the Bam 
district. Different types of cheap and earthquake-resistant houses were built 
and exhibited to the people. An album was prepared from the pictures of 
these houses. People who apply for new houses will choose one of the houses 
from the album. Then they will ask for a contractor. The contractors play a 
great role. These contractors should all be qualified in terms of considering 
earthquake-resistant measures in construction. In this way, qualified 
contractors are given a qualification certificate. Whenever applicants choose 
their type of house and make contracts with licensed contractors, they can 
apply for government loans. The government is offering loans and grants of 
up to USD 11,000 to those who have lost their homes; to rebuild their houses. 
In this way, people can “choose” their type of house. The houses are actually 
built by the local people under their own supervision. The government is 
financially supporting people, and houses are being built earthquake-
resistant.  
During interviews, participation was regarded by officials as mutual assistance 
between the government and Bamis through the rebuilding of the destroyed houses: 





 The government is not doing the reconstruction. The government gives 
people technical and financial support and advice. The Housing Foundation 
lends government financial support to people - it is a link between the people 
and the central government. People are rebuilding the city by themselves. 
This will help people to implement their own choice of building in 
accordance with their culture. It also has positive psychological effects - 
people see and feel that their community is being reconstructed and can 
become attached once again to a home, place and life. The affected person 
should get a contractor and materials, who will supervise the building 
process, and become involved in the reconstruction field” (One of the staff 
members of HF, 2005).  
People are provided with an exhibition of earthquake resistant buildings, 
which are designed in accordance with Bami culture, weather and identity. 
Affected people will choose from these houses. Professionals have assessed 
all the engineering and architectural aspects of the building. Therefore, the 
local people will not be involved in engineering details of the buildings. They 
will choose their type of house among dozens of buildings; they will get 
contractors and materials and will supervise the building process. In this way, 
they will rebuild their homes, which are designed to be disaster resistant 
(ibid). 
According to the above comments, it becomes clear that all officials unanimously 
saw participation through supervision (rather than implementation) of houses which 
are designed and measured by non-local architects and engineers. They believed this 
would be beneficial for people in terms of the psychological aspects: people see their 
houses and city being constructed and feel hopeful. Many academics wrote articles 
about the benefits of such approaches in scientific journals considering Bam‟s 
experience as one of the successful cases: 





In the city of Bam, community active participation in the process of 
designing, planning and constructing units was strongly encouraged. This 
approach provided a great relief to peoples‟ pain and suffering and helped to 
mitigate their psychological pressures...In the case of Bam, householders 
were given the ability to choose their own plans and layouts and act as the 
supervisors of their own projects, thus paving the way to establish a line of 
cooperation between designers and contractors. This approach also ensured 
that government loans resulted in the desired houses being built for the 
people (Fallahi, 2007, p31). 
Despite promising words and views expressed by officials and academics about the 
reconstruction, neither the physical objectives of the designed plan were met nor 
were the social aspects of vulnerability addressed. In continuous visits to Bam it was 
observed that after seven years since the earthquake, a great number of people still 
stay in prefabricated units. The constructed houses are typically hostile to the initial 
desire of the planners.  Many streets in Bam are unfurnished and the presence of 
debris and dust has resulted in the expansion of skin disease called leishmaniasis (a 
disease transmitted by the bite of phlebotomine sand flies). According to a study by 
Ranjbar et al (2010), the number of people with leishmaniasis is 5.8 times more than 
before the earthquake. In a study that will be presented later in this chapter, the top 
ten most expressed anxieties of a sample group of 208 Bami men and women were 
as follows: being left homeless, low job opportunities, the remains of dust and 
rubbish, the high cost of living, feeling insecure because of newcomers, 
leishmaniasis, depression, the increase of substance abuse, missing loved ones, and 
the destruction of social values. These anxieties are contrary to the defined 
objectives of the reconstruction: to restore the liveliness and function of the cities, 
development of life qualities, development of construction techniques, and an 
increase in local capacity. 
This research outlines the main limitations of the participatory approach of Bam's 
reconstruction, primarily, as a result of being urban-biased in design, and due to 
following a 'blue-print' approach in implementation. The reconstruction approach of 





Bam was highly urban-biased. The knowledge of professional Tehrani architects was 
prioritised over the words and needs of Bamis. The unfamiliarity of the planners with 
what the Bamis' wanted resulted in the alienation of local Bamis with their new 
„reconstructed space‟. Moreover, despite the intention to make the reconstruction of 
Bam participatory, in practice the officials applied a blue-print approach that was 
inflexible, focused on physical output and standardisation, and which increased the 
bureaucratic nature of the housing reconstruction. 
7.3 Urban-bias Nature of Reconstruction 
The favouritism towards Teherani professionals and to equating an urban and 
modern life-style to a developed one seriously hindered the achievement of 
empowering and inclusive participation. The reconstruction of Bam is a good 
example of urban bias in the sense that local Bamis were marginalised in their 
physical reconstruction plans due to their limited construction knowledge. Instead of 
making use of local workers, setads from other cities were involved in the 
reconstruction, and Bami workers did not participate: 
I was a contractor in Bam before the earthquake, but despite the good market 
for construction business, I was marginalized as a contractor in the 
reconstruction process because the city was in the hands of setads
1
 and each 
setad had its own contractors who had come to Bam from other cities. And 
for achieving a contractor license for reconstruction, my experience did not 
meet their demands. Hence, after the earthquake I changed my job to taxi-
driving (A Bami driver). 
In a meeting about reconstruction in 2005, a Tehrani professional architect and a 
member of the Council of Architecture and Urban development of Bam stated that:  
                                                 
1 The HF branches throughout the city - see chapter five 





Because of the historical importance of Bam, we have to pay special attention 
to its architecture in reconstruction and cannot let Bam be built by 
unprofessional local builders. We have to use modern managing techniques 
in construction and apply mass construction approaches which are cheaper.  
Dr Zand Razavi, a social scholar in the meeting objected and mentioned:  
The people of Bam are unemployed, so construction can be a good 
opportunity for them to be busy, divert the reconstruction budget to Bamis, 
and transfer the safety construction technique to Bam. But choosing mass 
construction as our objective instead of participation will ruin this 
opportunity. 
In an interview with the Head of Naghshe-Jahane-pars (the main construction 
coordinator for companies in Bam, but situated in Tehran, who was also one of the 
main decision-makers designing the reconstruction plan), he was asked for his 
opinion on the role of Tehran-based companies in reconstruction. His idea was that: 
Our plan was to make reconstruction of buildings a means to link the 
physical reconstruction with the recovery of minds and souls. Houses 
were meant to be built with traditional Bami design but only earthquake 
resistant. There were twenty four housing consultants in Bam which were 
mostly from Tehran. Bam was an agricultural city; their experience in 
architecture and construction was rudimentary. We had no choice but to 
apply for contractor and architectures from other cities in order to have 
safer and nice buildings (Winter, 2010).   
The absence of local workers in the reconstruction process was also reflected in 
Parliament: 





Most of the construction companies are based in other cities, mostly Tehran, 
and for each technical problem the blueprints and plans have to be sent to the 
company to be studied by the professionals and the companies‟ construction 
engineers to be solved. In eighty percent of cases the problems are trivial; in 
some cases a plan travels three to eleven times before it can be approved. 





The idea of the Head of Bam's City Council was that the system of reconstruction 
had perceived Bamis as incapable "children" not qualified for the task: 
Bam should be built by local people who find the reconstruction of Bam a 
moral duty, not by Tehrani people who want to take care of us like children. 
We do not need professionals to sit in Tehran and decide for us, we are 
capable of reconstructing Bam and want to be involved. We demand that the 
State plays only as a supervisor (The Head of Bam‟s City Council, 2004). 
In a visit to the Housing Foundation branch in Bam, almost all members of the staff 
were not Bami and were mostly from Tehran; only the drivers of the HF were Bami. 
By asking the HF in Bam why they had not used Bami workers in reconstructing 
Bam the opinion was that Bamis are not efficient: "They spend too much time doing 
too little work. They are mostly substance users and this makes them idle" (2007).  
Box 7.1. Those who were formally involved in reconstruction used to make short travels to 
Bam, say once a week, by airplane from distant cities and made their stay in Bam as short 
as possible. We had the least direct connection with them. The setad that worked for our 
area were not serious in their duties. But where could we raise our objections? We were 
dictated the process and had to follow it based on the designed schedule. (A Bami man, 
2010)  
 





Another reason often cited as one of the obstacles in applying the participatory 
approach, was the time consuming nature of it; people needed shelter quickly which 
was more important. The importance of speed in the reconstruction of the houses 
was the main excuse that reconstruction planners mentioned for the unwanted 
outcomes of reconstruction: 
The plan was creating several schemes of houses and not to apply each 
scheme more than ten times. In this way, people would have different 
options and schemes to choose houses and houses would not look similar 
to each other. But what was implemented was different from what we had 
in mind. The huge demand for houses and the limited time we had to 
prepare schemes for twenty five thousand houses for people who were in 
instant need of shelter ended up in repetitious schemes. People were too 
desperate to pay attention and communicate with the schemes. Moreover, 
it was easier for contractors and setads to control and apply the projects 
in this way (the Head of Naghshe-Jahane-pars, winter 2010). 
According to the above, the reconstruction of Bam was considered by central 
officials, who hold core perception power and resources, as a highly professional 
task - by professional they meant experienced Tehrani architects. The specification 
of reconstruction to rebuilding the destructed houses and retail stores blindfolded 
decision makers to observe the deeper factors of vulnerability of the Bamis people 
and hence the designed policy of reconstruction increased the vulnerability of many 
Bami residents through further marginalisation. 
7.3.1 Structural weaknesses in the Reconstruction Policy 
and the Shaping of Vulnerability 
One of the main problems of the reconstruction policy of Bam was its focus on 
landownership which was a problematic issue in Bam even before the earthquake. 
For benefitting loans initially one has to prove landownership. This put two groups 





in a vulnerable situation: people who did not have formal ownership of the lands 
before the earthquake (like renters or informal-dwellers), and those who faced 
problems regarding land inheritance after the death of the owner following the 
earthquake (especially women who had lost their husband in the earthquake).  
In terms of renters, since they could not prove any form of landownership, they 
remained vulnerable; especially during the early stages of reconstruction. Later, they 
were included in the policy guidelines: they could benefit from construction loans if 
they could afford a piece of land. Those households who were not affluent enough to 
afford a piece of land remained vulnerable, especially new female-headed 
households. Bam had a strong traditional society before the earthquake; women were 
mostly housekeepers running often crowded households. The average household size 
in the Bam region in 1996 was 5.5 and in the city of Bam was 5.2 (national census 
1996). Forty one percent of the population in Bam was under fifteen in 1996 
(national census 1996). In 1996, 43.4 percent of the population from the Bam region 
were households, this number in the city was 39.3 (national census 1996). Men in 
households provided the main sources of income:  
We were renters before the earthquake. I lost my husband in the earthquake 
and have no skill or income resource to feed my two small children. My 
sister is kind enough to let me put my prefabricated unit in her yard, but 
being a burden to my sister‟s family I feel ashamed and anxious” one of the 
Bami interviewees during the fieldwork; to the question that whether she had 
heard about the HF‟s reconstruction policy for pre-disaster renters she did 
not. Later she received shelter from an NGO. 
I lost my husband in the earthquake and was left with three small children - 
the youngest being two years old at the time of the disaster. Being a renter 
before the earthquake we had no shelter after the disaster. Consequently after 
the emergency phase in tents we rented a prefabricated unit for seventy 
thousand Toman (70 USD) per month. Our income sources were the Welfare 





Organization; with forty thousand Toman per month (which we would put 
into our account every four to six months), and NGOs” One of the affected 
women from the earthquake. 
Another group who became vulnerable through this policy was informal dwellers. As 
the studies of Ekhlaspour (2008) reveal, with the development of the service sector 
and the tightening of the agriculture sector, farmers from surrounding towns 
migrated to the city and resided in the margins of the city - in tents or other kinds of 
temporary and informal shelters and created a marginal society.  
The designed participatory approach for reconstruction tries to be 
comprehensive but there are limitations to it. For example, pre-earthquake 
informal dwellers have no land or houses before the earthquake to claim for 
in reconstruction. Governments' funds are for those who have lost their 
formal estate; it does not cover informal dwellers (A member of the Natural 
Disaster sector of the government, 2005).  
Another fact that lowered the inclusiveness of the participatory reconstruction 
approach based on landownership was the national heritage legislation. According to 
Articles 946 and 947 of heritage law, the wife can only inherit buildings, trees, and 
moveable property
2
. Based on this law, the wife was deprived from inheriting the 
land from her husband. The land would be inherited by the children or other heirs. In 
the case of Bam where the earthquake had destroyed buildings and trees, many 
women had lost their husbands in the earthquake. They had no right to apply for 
loans even though they were now the head of their household, because they had not 
inherited the land and could not rely on the deeds to apply for loans. The land would 
primarily be inherited by the children who were mostly under eighteen years old. 
The civil guardian for these young children was their grandfather, who in many cases 
in Bam abused this right and used it as a means to control or harass the family. The 
                                                 
2
 The law was amended later in 2009 and women could also inherit the land as well, but it 
was not retrospective.  





land heritage along with custody law put many Bami women in vulnerable 
circumstances after the earthquake (Boxes 7.1 and 7.2).   
It has to be said that the extent of the outcome of this law is not catastrophic 
in Bam because people mostly are either unaware of the law or do not care to 
regard it. But there are cases of females in such a situation who want to 
rebuild their house but their father-in-law does not give permission because 
he considers himself the owner of the land. Or in some cases, there are 
children who have lost both their parents in the earthquake and their 
grandfather (from their father„s side) does not reside in Bam or is dead. These 
children are left without a guardian since there is no grandfather from their 
father‟s side and their grandfather from their mother‟s side is not a legitimate 
guardian (Ekhlaspour, Zanan magazine, 2005).  
During the fieldwork for this research, one of the households with such a problem 
was interviewed. The woman had lost her husband and three of her children in the 
earthquake and was left with a twelve-year-old son and an undergraduate daughter.  
The land belonged to her husband and now to her father-in-law. The father-in-law 
did not agree to the transfer of the title of land to the lady or his grand-children. The 
grand-father himself is in need and gets subvention from Emam committee: “Instead 
of giving us support, he often demands money from us since he knows we are 
dependent on the land and he has the last word for selling or keeping it”.  
Another group of women who were marginalised through the reconstruction effort, 
were single women who were formally married but their husbands were absent in 
their life, mostly from being left by their husband without a divorce. It became 
evident that in Bam polygamy is common, often temporary marriages, but where the 
husband lives with one wife and leaves behind the other wife or wives (usually the 
oldest one being left behind) and regularly leaves the children with their mother. The 
reconstruction loan would be given to the head of the household and each household 
could only apply once.  





This group can be called the forgotten group in reconstruction. There is no 
shelter for these women, and they are not few: for one female headed 
household there are five abandoned women. Because they have no permanent 
marriage deeds [their marriage deeds are mostly temporary] they are put in a 
vulnerable position. Many of them are not native and are mistaken as 
opportunistic newcomers. Even if these women bring one hundred native 
Bamis to provide evidence that they have lived here for years before the 
earthquake or even had a small retail store, their existence in Bam cannot be 
accepted as legitimate. These women are left vulnerable. Consequently they 
still live in camps which were considered to be temporary but are still 










Box 7.2. We were renters before the earthquake. My husband died in the earthquake and since then 
I have been struggling to take care of my children. After their father, their legal guardian would be 
their grandfather. But the grandfather gave us nothing but trouble. I only have an old mother who 
could hardly take care of herself. My father-in- law, despite being rich, did not give his 
grandchildren any money and considers me alien to their family. When I was going to move to the 
house that one of the NGOs provided for us, he stopped me claiming that he does not want his 
grandchildren being raised by a charity. No money was coming into the household; I could not 
leave my children alone, and I had no one to take care of them. Their grandfather neither gave them 
any money nor let me get any benefit from the charity. The government‟s financial support from 
WO for my children is sent to their guardian, my father-in-law, since I don‟t have custody of my 
children. He never gave the money to us.  I complained to the court to either get my Mahrieh from 
my father-in-law or to force them to give me custody of my children. He took my children for three 
days and did not let me to see them to prove that, if he wants, he can deprive me from seeing my 
children. After three days of crying I withdrew my case from the court and took the children back. I 
finally brought my children here [to the house provided by an NGO]. Thank God I now have job - I 
am employed at the University‟s kitchen as a cook (One of the young mothers, 2007). 
 















One of these women shared her experience with the researcher. Her husband 
abandoned her years before the earthquake and left her with two daughters. There 
were neither divorce deeds nor permanent marriage deeds. The husband now lives 
with his new wife in another city and the daughters receive no alimony. After her 
husband left, she started to work as a servant in a school with a minimum wage. It 
was hard to provide for her family. Her aim was to raise her daughters in a decent 
way so that having no father to support them does not damage their social reputation. 
Due to the earthquake, their house was destroyed. There was no money to rebuild the 
house and for a while no school to serve for, hence no income. She asked the Emam 
Khomeini Relief Foundation for financial support, but since she was not 
Box 7.3. Before the earthquake we were living in the property inherited by my mother-in-law 
after my father-in-law died years before the earthquake. The earthquake killed both my husband 
and my mother-in-law. The house then was inherited by my oldest brother-in-law. He did not let 
us live there anymore; we were not even allowed to put our tent in the yard. Consequently, I and 
my two children went to the camp.  Having no source of income and no guardian we registered 
with the Welfare Organization to benefit from subvention but it hardly covered our expenses. 
Subventions are very small and take long delays before they are paid: eighty thousand Toman 
(about USD 80) per month. We moved to a camp. A few months after the earthquake, I married 
the camp‟s manager. After a while, we divorced because I did not agree  to send my children 
from my previous marriage away. To keep my youngest child from the second marriage I was 
forced by my husband to give up my Mahrieh (a traditional custom in the form of the amount of 
money a husband agrees to pay the wife whenever she asks, and by the time of the divorce it had 
to be paid totally), since legally my child‟s custody would be given to his father after divorce. 
There was me again, with three children and no support. I went to my brother-in-law and asked 
him for my children‟s share of the inheritance of the land. He had told us before that when the 
property was built, the children could have their share. I called on him as my last hope, but he 
would not give me the share because I was remarried. My son has asthma and this increases our 
monthly expenses. I started to provide and sell dried prepared cooking herbs but since women of 
Bam are usually housewives and have a lot of time for cooking there were few customers. I 
started sewing to be able to afford to provide for my family. The House of Mother and Children 
found us and provided us with shelter. If they did not help us, I have no idea how we could have 
survived (a Bami young mother of three children). 
 





unemployed, the foundation's policies did not cover her situation. Her next hope was 
the State Welfare Organization; she hoped that she could benefit from WO as the 
female head of her household. However, as she couldn‟t prove her marriage, her 
application failed. Now her only source was a nine million Toman bank loan. At the 
time of the interview the loan was completed but not the house. She was still living 
in prefabricated units with her daughters and a nine-million-Toman debt to the 
government which she has to repay at 120 USD per month from her wages.  
The centralised approach disregards the local networks and norms and this may 
increase the vulnerability of some groups. Social capital in the form of trust was of 
much importance among Bami residents and especially in the bazaar of Bam. The 
informal networks and trust among retailers in Bam's bazaar had created a safety 
network that made them less concerned about their formal and legal networks and 
situations; which after the disaster brought about vulnerability for many of them. As 
one of the Bami respondents explained:  
I had rented a small shop in the bazaar before the earthquake. Through the 
social credit I had among other retailers since my father was a well-known 
businessman of the bazaar for a long time I had not made any effort to apply 
for a business license from the municipality. After the earthquake, because 
my business was selling glass, I lost all my capital. Legally, I had no right to 
appeal for my loss of the business. In reconstructing the bazaar, the retailers 
of the bazaar were marginalised. The National heritage organisation became 
the main body for physical reconstruction of the bazaar. The plan was to 
build the bazaar according to the design that was provided in Teheran, and by 
contractors employed by the Heritage organisation. The shops then would be 
allocated to previous owners who had formal permissions from the 
municipality. After six years, the bazaar is still incomplete. The reason is said 
to be through lack of budget. The new bazaar lacks Bami character and new 
shops are different from the previous ones in terms of shape and size: they 
are all the same. Hence, those who had larger stores were given stores that 
were smaller than their previous ones. The bazaar is built without the 





involvement of the real owners' ideas and efforts. It is said that the 
municipality has taken over the basement of the bazaar for its own interests 
without the permission of the real owners.   
The following conclusions can be taken from the above story: First, the bonding ties 
among businessmen of the bazaar was very strong; second, despite the fact that 
strong bonding ties brought about a safety network among the retailers themselves, it 
made them vulnerable to legal factors because they felt safe among their informal 
network and found no necessity to ask for additional safety (including formal work 
permission) from the local government (the dark side of social capital); third, the 
centralised planned reconstruction process not only alienated the Bami retailers 
through marginalising them from the reconstruction process, but it damaged their 
sense of belonging through creating forms and shapes that were not familiar with 
Bami retailers; fourth, by not feeling a part of the reconstruction process, the story 
implied that some Bami retailers feel they were given less than what they should 
have been given in some cases, reduction in size of their stores or not benefiting 
from the reconstruction outcomes due to their legal vulnerability (i.e. not having 
legal job permits); fifth, while local government could play as a mediator between 
local retailers and the central decision makers, the municipality was regarded by 
Bamis as a threat rather than as an associate. This was due to the lack of financial 
support from the central government so the municipality applied opportunistic 
behaviours to add to its financial resources; in this case by occupying the basement 
of the bazaar. 
Based on the above stories, the centralised-designed reconstruction policy had 
shortcoming in terms of addressing the vulnerability of some vulnerable groups. 
Along with the structural weaknesses of the designed policies, implementation of the 
projects was also unsuccessful in delivering the objectives of the designed housing 
reconstruction schemes. This research attributes following a blue-print approach to 
the implementation of the projects, as the main cause of its short-comings. 





7.4 The Blueprint Approach 
One of the disadvantages of Bam's reconstruction was that it followed a blue-print 
approach. The projects were inflexible, prioritising efficiency over social learning, 
standardised, and not based on local people's demands. It resulted in marginalising 
local people in physical reconstruction and de-skilling young workers. As a result of 
prioritising efficiency over learning and local participation, non-local workers piled 
into Bam. According to an Afghan refugee worker in 2004, because of the high scale 
level of construction, Bam was the best place to work as a construction labourer in 
Iran. For that reason, the opportunity that reconstruction created  could have been a 
learning opportunity for local builders - to learn construction techniques, for 
example, safe building, or for the young Bamis to become experienced in 
construction. As it turned out, this opportunity was wasted. 
Bam has become the market for construction business and because there is no 
limit on the use of local workers, the supply of non-local workers has 
increased. It would not be efficient for the contractor to employ local workers 
just for the sake of local participation. The opportunity to transfer money 
from the reconstruction to the Bami people has been wasted. Bamis are 
mostly unemployed and depressed; construction could have helped them in 
terms of their livelihood and to overcome trauma (Local newspaper 




In order to standardise the process and to prevent any obstacles that may occur from 
unprofessional residents, The Housing Foundation laid down conditions for 
Box 7.4. In applying our project, all of the workers were Afghan refugees. They were 
more efficient than Bami workers. The construction market of Iran benefits a lot from 
Afghan refugees. They work hard and expect less. Even Bamis for rebuilding their 
homes applied Afghani workers (a Tehrani contractor working in Bam, 2010).  
 





applications for reconstruction facilities. All applicants had to sign a written 
undertaking that they would not interfere with the process of construction and would 
let the contractors accomplish the task based on the contractor‟s priorities. For the 
same reason, the local organisations were also put to one side. 
In practice the City Council is not considered seriously by the central 
decision-makers. In meetings to design the city plan there is no call for the 
City Council. When the City Council as a formal organization of Bam is not 
being included in planning how can the voice of the people of Bam be 
reflected in the plan? (Head of Bam‟s City Council, 2004). 
At the initial phases it was understandable to put aside local agents in 
decision-making because of the trauma we had all gone through. But now 
after one year since the earthquake I see no reason for marginalizing us in the 
design and implementation of physical reconstruction. If they believe we are 
not professional enough, they have to consider that it was Bami people who 
built Arge-Bam which is now one of the UN Heritage sites. At least give us a 
six-month window where we can show we are capable of handling the task or 
not. I assure you we are capable technically in reconstructing Bam by 
ourselves" (Head of City Council of Bam, 2004). 
This process of dictating technical details to dwellers made the "participation" rather 
a hassle for Bamis.  
Contrary to the ubiquitous optimistic assertions about the benefits of public 
participation, there are numerous documented examples of situations where 
individuals find it easier, more beneficial, or habitually familiar not to 
participate (Adams et al, 1997; Zwarteveen and Neupane 1996) (Cleaver, 
2001, p51). 





The building process is a waste of time. We are not allowed to build our 
houses by ourselves; it is the task of Setads. But they postpone the 
construction for trivial reasons. Initially, when I applied, they told me to 
move the prefabricated unit to the other side of the land. Then they rejected 
the one hundred and ten square metre house plan that I had chosen because 
they believed it was not suitable for the size of my land; despite the fact that 
my four hundred fifty square metre land is big enough for such a house. After 
a lot of hassle, I finally got the license for construction, but again when it 
came to implementation the contractor said I had to change the location of 
the house and put the prefabricated unit on another part of the land. Now I am 
too exhausted to follow the construction to-do list, hence I have put the 
construction on pause (Opinion of a Bami man). 
The housing reconstruction process of Bam was also highly bureaucratic. The 
applicants for building contractors and loans had to initially complete an application 
form in the setad of his area. A building professional from setad had to approve the 
location of the house in line with urban and engineering regulations.  
Then the applicant had two choices: either the design of the eighty five square metre 
scheme, or if he wanted another design with different sizes he had to apply to one of 
the construction consultants (who had come from main urban areas like Tehran and 
Kerman and organised branches in Bam since the earthquake). The new scheme 
would be sent to the supervising consultant of the reconstruction situated in Bam and 
after approval would be sent to the main city of the province i.e. Kerman for the final 
approval. Then the approved scheme would be sent to the setad for the applicant's 
area. The process would last for a few months. This means that if a Bami applicant 
did not want the scheme, his construction process would be delayed for at least for 
two months. In such circumstances, most of the applicants chose the design which 
would enable them to access their shelter earlier and with less hassle. According to 
the local newspaper, shahrvandan-va-mosharekat printed on November 2004, by 
November 2004 one thousand houses and building licenses had been requested from 
the local government which were all in the eighty five square metre design type.  





The case then would be sent to the central Housing Foundation in Bam which is in 
charge of controlling setads. The application would be checked to see if the applier 
had made any other application form to other setads. This would be to prevent any 
abuse of the system whereby applicants could benefit from more loans. Then the 
case would be sent to Kerman to be assessed under the building regulations and also 
assessed in line with the engineering constitution.  After that, the case would be sent 
to the municipality for final corrections and calculation of taxes before a construction 
permit would be granted.  
At this point, the applicant was able to apply for a loan. In order to obtain the loan, 
the applicant had to complete an application form with the bank and provide a 
record. The loan would then be transferred in five instalments to the account of the 
contractor (not to the account of the Bami landowner) based on the physical progress 
of the house construction. If the applicant wanted to benefit from subsidised building 
materials, he had to complete another form and prepare one more case.  
This process of transferring the reconstruction budget was designed to ease the 
control over the process by HF: 
Loans were specified for building of houses and were not supposed to be 
spent on any other project. For this reason, the idea was not to hand the total 
loans to the applicants in cash to prevent the misuse of it. Gradual injection 
of loans based on the report of the contractor keeps the local applicants in 
continual contact with setads and keeps the participatory approach alive (A 
member of Setad, 2007).  
The cost of preparation for the schemes, plans, designs of the houses, along with the 
municipality taxes of the building construction less than one hundred square metres, 
was covered entirely by the central government's budget and Bamis‟ paid nothing for 
these services, albeit for an estimated period of time. In the fall of 2008, the HF left 
Bam. From the State's point of view, the housing reconstruction in Bam had been 





completed by the end of 2008. According to the HF reports by January 2009, 21,051 
houses were completely built (out of thirty three thousand demands mentioned by 
Saidi-kia, in other words the housing scheme succeeded in reconstructing sixty three 
percent of total demand). 
This approach not only prevented local people from participating in the 
reconstruction of their city but also took financial resources out of Bam. Some parts 
of the budget for reconstruction were even given to setads whose staff were non-
local. 
The idea of entering different provinces of the country to reconstruct Bam was new. 
The Bam Housing Foundation decided to benefit from having some of its branches 
in the country to facilitate the reconstruction process. For this reason the city of Bam 
was divided into ten sections and each section was given to a representative from the 
Housing Foundation in one of the provinces of Iran (the division was geographical); 
these representatives were called setads. Ten provinces out of twenty five provinces 
of Iran had a Housing Foundation representative in Bam. In an interview with the 
Head of the reconstruction centre from the Housing Foundation in Tehran it was 
discovered that the idea of using setads in reconstruction was merely an 
implementing means and had no social participatory implication concept behind it. It 
was not an initiative to involve other provinces in spreading experience and 
knowledge or creating bridging ties among provinces. The sole idea behind this was 
technical.  
We found out that the extent of disaster was huge. The central Housing 
Foundation [Tehran based HF] did not have the capacity to cover the 
reconstruction. For that reason we invited other branches of HF in other 
provinces to help the central HF especially in terms of providing construction 
machineries. There was no obligation for provinces to participate. The 
provinces that participated were those who showed interest in our invitation 





and saw reconstruction of Bam as a source of income for their province. 
(2006).  
The accountability of setads was non-existent. There were several cases where the 
contractor took the money and left the project without completing the buildings.  
Different setads from different provinces had used the workers and engineers 
and contractors mostly from their own provinces. The contractors in Bam 
were not top contractors. They were mostly low ranking contractors and 
apparently setads had less control over them. Many of them had run away 
with people's money leaving no trace behind. The money would only be 
given to contractors and not to people. The reason for many of the unfinished 
houses is as a result of these fraud contractors. Those people facing this 
problem could not continue to build their houses: the price of the material  
increased and the loan was stolen (A social activist in Bam. The interview 
took place in 2011).  
 
 
The state did not fraud, it had a policy, plan and allocated a budget for 
reconstruction, but it was the staff members of the governmental 
organisations or contractors who were corrupt and fraud. The policy created 
such an opportunity and hence those who could, abused it. In my case, the 
contractor disappeared with ten million Tomans of my money (One of the 
residents of Eishabad in Bam, 2007) 
In an interview with Etemad newspaper in September 2009, Saidi-Kia, the Chief of 
the Reconstruction Bureau (who later became the Minister of Housing for Iran), 
shared his experience of reconstruction as follows: 
Box 7.5. The contractor had run away with our money. We are about fifteen people 
who put in an appeal to arrest the contractor but there was no clue as to where he was 
(a Bami woman, 2007). 
 
















I was the Head of the Housing Foundation in Tehran at the time of the 
disaster. After the earthquake, I became the Head of the Bureau of 
Reconstruction for Bam. All the administrative decisions for the 
reconstruction and the design of the bureaucratic process were the 
responsibility of the Bureau. Twenty three thousand houses were destroyed 
including demand from new couples. We had to build thirty three thousand 
houses (not including rural houses). The initial idea was to build houses for 
the Bamis people but the Housing Foundation finally decided to apply a 
participatory approach. The participatory approach that HF had in mind was 
Box 7.6. With the eleven million Toman loan for reconstruction we were successful 
building this seventy square metre house with two rooms, but the house is still not 
complete. The outside façade has no cement cover and it is bare bricks. The contractor 
has run away with our last loan instalment; three and a half million Toman. There were 
many in our area whose contractors had stolen their loans and left them with semi-built 
houses (A thirty five year man - the head of a family of four of Khayyam st, 2010).  
 
Box 7.7. The loan that was allocated to the Bamis was designed to be given to 
contractors instead of directly being handed to the people. But in my case, the 
contractor who was building my house has run away with the loans without building my 
house. Setads instead of giving him instalments in segments based on satisfaction paid 
him four segments at once and the contractor ran away with the money that was 
supposed to pay for the construction of my house. The problem was that the housing 
foundation which invited these contractors from all over Iran did not know them and 
had no knowledge of their experience. We took legal action against him but nobody 
knows where he is. I could have built my house because I am a construction worker, but 
setad made us use the contractors if we wanted to get a loan. Now I have neither a 
house nor any loan (A Bami man, 2006).   
 





to prepare financial and material support for Bamis from the central 
government and help people to remove the debris created by the earthquake. 
People started participating in the reconstruction of their houses, instead of 
having houses built for them  
The approach was as follows: each applier would refer to the consultant of 
his area the plan of his land. Then they would consult on the design, size and 
material for the house. After two months, the scheme would be prepared and 
the contractor would start building. HF would supervise the process. There 
were comments made that the earthquake-affected Bami who had lost close 
family and friends in the earthquake would be so depressed that they 
wouldn‟t want to spend time choosing the design of their house. But my idea 
was that the process would force the Bami to participate in building his house 
and through making him busy with the process he would gradually get back 
to normal life…by participation we meant people had the choice [the style of 
his house]. 
Through this definition, the idea of HF helping people to participate in 
reconstruction resulted in the Bamis being involved in a process of bureaucracy 
through the application of loans, material, schemes, contractors and more.  
In practice the focus on efficiency and standardisation decreased the quality of 
service and inflexibility of the process to unexpected outcomes: 
There is evidence that many construction companies responsible in the 
reconstruction of Bam lack the managerial and technical capacity for the task 
at the level required for Bam in the given time.  Moreover, inefficiencies in 
Bam‟s reconstruction process by these companies often made these 
companies ask lower ranking and cheaper construction companies to 
supervise the construction which will result in substandard supervision and 





decrease the expected quality of service (Parliament website, 16 November 
2006). 
The unplanned incidents affected the reconstruction process and proved that 
standardised approaches do not suit the development projects - especially in a large 
scale project like Bam.  
Even the initial designs were different from what we had planned; we had designed 
traditional houses but according to the demand of the people some modern facts 
were inserted into the schemes: like an open kitchen which was not our suggestion 
but was applied in most of Bam's new homes based on the demand of the Bami 
people. Another fact that we had not taken into account was the division of land into 
pieces. We had designed the houses based on pre-earthquake large pieces of land, as 
big as five to six hundred square metres, but after the earthquake the lands were 
divided among heirs and were smaller. Another fact that we did not considered was 
the inwardness of new non-Bami residents. The amount of inflow of newcomers was 
considerable and has changed the homogeneity of Bam. The new Bam demographics 
were different from pre-earthquake Bam (the Head of Naghshe-Jahane-pars, winter 
2010). 
The increase in the price of material was another unconsidered outcome that affected 
reconstruction.  
7.4.1 Increase of the Price of Material and Inflexibility of 
the Reconstruction Policy 
One of the problems of the policy scheme was its inflexibility to the price increase in 
the building material. The initial loan for reconstruction was nine million Toman per 
household which later increased to fourteen million Toman including the grant. 
According to Saididkia (Head of the Reconstruction Bureau), at the time of the 





earthquake the cost of building a house was one hundred and eighty thousand per 
square metre (Etemad newspaper, September 2009). Hence, for building a typical 
eighty five square metre house about fifteen million Toman would be needed 
(180,000 * 85 =15,725,000).  
During the research it became apparent that a few months after the earthquake, 
despite the financial support from the State and international organisations like 
World Bank
3
, the price of building materials, especially cement and sheet iron, was 
increased. As early as the fall of 2004 (about one year after the earthquake) the 
supply of iron sheet decreased. According to an Iran newspaper on 26 November 
2005, while the daily demand for cement in Bam was two and a half thousand tonnes 
the daily supply of cement in Bam had not passed one and a half thousand tonnes.  
According to a report by Construction Engineering Disciplinary Organization of Iran 
(on February 2008), by 2006 the price of material has two to three hundred percent 
growth compared to the first year of earthquake. Based on this, the cost of building a 
house in 2006 would be two to three times more than the price of building a house in 
2004. The inflation rate of Iran in 2004, 2005 and 2006 was 20.6%, 17.0% and 
12.1% respectively (World Bank data). Hence, the initial loan for housing 
reconstruction would not be enough for those who were in the process of 
constructing their houses in 2006 and onwards. According to the Governor of Bam 
in an interview with Hamshahri newspaper (25 December 2006), three years after 
the earthquake, the number of completely built houses was fourteen thousand (which 
was less than half of the thirty three thousand demanded by the people).  
Due to the inflexibility of loans and the rapid increase in prices, the time and speed 
of housing construction was of crucial importance for Bamis. One successful case in 
reconstruction was for a fifty seven year old Bami, the father of six children, who 
                                                 
3
 The World Bank had provided a 220USD million loan for reconstruction in Bam, a large 
part of which was used by the HF to purchase materials for housing reconstruction (Safer 
Homes, Stronger Communities: A handbook for Reconstructing after Natural Disasters, 
World Bank, 2010, p218).  





had not lost any members of his close family. He started the process of building his 
house nine months after the earthquake and after two years he had completed it.  
In another case, a Bami woman who had not lost any members of her close family, 
revealed that they had started reconstruction two years after the earthquake, and 
despite their house being completely built, the loan only covered fifty percent of the 
cost; the other fifty per cent from a personal budget. The construction of her house 
took two years. 
In cases where people applied late (due to depression, mourning or for any other 
reason) or who faced technical or managerial problems, these factors decreased the 
speed of construction and the completion of the houses became difficult. Ali is one 
of the Bamis who after seven years of earthquake still lives in prefabricated unit. He 
is a teacher. In the earthquake he lost three hundred and fifty members of his close 
and distant relatives. This put him in deep trauma and he was unable to start the 
construction process during the early phases. Moreover, the plan of his land was 
designed incorrectly and this postponed the process of building. He was so depressed 
that even now after seven years, the construction of the house costs much more than 
the allocated loan.  
To conclude, the blue-print approach which looked for standardisation and speed in 
projects increased the inflexibility and bureaucracy of the process. Loans were not in 
accordance with people's needs long term and left many Bamis in debt to the 
government without providing them with appropriate shelter. The timing of 
construction then became of crucial importance; those who started late had less 
chance to finish their houses especially if they had no personal budget to cover the 
expenses. This increased the vulnerability of Bamis in terms of their access to shelter 
and sense of security and livelihood.   
 


















7.5 Seeing the Housing Reconstruction through the eyes of 
Thirty Seven Bamis 
To better understand the view of Bami people in relation to their surrounding more 
in-depth interviews took place with thirty seven of the Bami residents. Interviews 
took place in 2010 and interviewees were selected randomly through the encounter 
of the researcher with local people. They were met by chance in the streets or public 
social spaces like the bazaar.  The theme of the interviews were: coping capacity of 
the interviewee: i.e. how long after the earthquake they had started rebuilding their 
houses and relationship to the level of depression (i.e. how many members of the 
households were killed by the earthquake); the affluence of the households; the 
numbers of members of the household; their access to networks that would increase 
their access to resources (i.e. what resources they used in reconstructing their houses 
Box 7.8. Because of the loss of my loved ones I was too depressed to start the 
reconstruction in the early months. After a few months, I started the process of 
application and construction of my house, but because of the fault of the contractors a 
part of our time and budget was wasted. As time passed, the price of material increased 
and my loan was totally spent without the completion of the house. Now I live in 
prefabricated unit with my family and am in debt to the government for the loan. There 
is no money, no house, and no hope for finishing my house. 
 
Box 7.9. I live in a prefabricated unit with my four daughters. The contractor took the 
loan, built the house up to the completion of foundation phase, and ran away with our 
money. I put a case against the contractor but it was ineffectual. Now the government 
expects me to return the loan completely. Some of my colleagues in the cultural 
heritage organization of Bam had suggested supporting me financially to finish my 
house (A forty year old man, 2006) 
 





beside the governmental and formal aids, what informal institutions or agencies 
eased their way through their access to resources, how the process of rebuilding the 
houses increased their networking capacity and made them connected to different 
organisations or agencies). Another theme in the interviews was the notion of social 
self/sense of belonging of the residents to the new Bam. This was explored through 
the following indicators: their view about the new Bam; the effect of reconstruction 
on the shape of their houses, palm groves, and social spaces; and views on who was 
the key figure in reconstructing Bam. To get a clearer view about their interpretation 
they were also asked to briefly reveal their opinion about the reconstruction process: 
advantages and disadvantages and their role in the reconstruction. 
A fifty seven year old respondent, the only interviewee that started the rebuilding of 
his house four years later stated:  
Due to the depression I was experiencing after the earthquake because of the 
loss of two of my children, I started the reconstruction process of my house 
too late [four years after the earthquake]. Hence I had trouble in applying for 
loans because the deadline for the application had almost passed. Finally I 
succeeded in benefiting from the loan and a contractor was allocated to 
rebuild my house. The contractor was unprofessional and because of his 
mistakes the work got suspended for a while. After this problem was resolved 
the reconstruction started again, but not much later, the contractor, who was 
not Bami, left Bam for good. I tried to finish the house by myself but we had 
run out of budget and the house was left unfinished. 
This story reveals that the central role of the contractor in reconstruction made the 
reconstruction success very contractor-dependant: if the contractor was professional 
and responsible the process of reconstruction of the house would be easier but if the 
contractor was irresponsible or unprofessional it would bring about problems. 





Through the in-depth interviews, it was revealed that sixty percent of the 
interviewees' households that failed to finish the building of their houses blamed 
their contractors for the failure. The other forty percent indicated that the increase in 
the price of building material was the reason for the suspension of the building 
process. Seventy percent of the interviewees did not consider the application process 
for loans and its amount problematic or deficient. In fact, forty percent of the 
interviewees mentioned the loan (i.e. its amount and process of allocation) an 
advantage of the reconstruction, thirty seven percent did not find any positive factor 
in reconstruction, eleven percent mentioned the quality and shape of governmental 
and official buildings as the positive side of reconstruction; others had miscellaneous 
ideas about positive factors. As the negative factors: twenty two percent  mentioned 
the contractor-centred nature of reconstruction of houses, twenty two percent 
mentioned the irresponsibility and fraud of local officials like members of the City 
Council and municipality, 22 per cent mentioned the increase in the price of building 
materials, twenty five percent mentioned the marginalisation of people in decision-
making,  others had diverse ideas including the ugly façade of the city after six years, 
bad supervision of the reconstruction process, and inaccessibility of the city structure 
for disabled people.  
Based on the above data, it can be concluded that the interviewees were unsatisfied 
with the malfunctioning of the contractors, irresponsibility of local officials, increase 
in the price of material and the marginalisation of people in decision-making. These 
factors could leave a negative effect in their sense of self-governance and their 
ability to change their surroundings. The factors that they had least control over (like 
the price of material and the malfunctioning contractors that were allocated by 
setads) had great influence in their dissatisfaction towards the reconstruction 
programme and their failure in accessing shelter. While local government could play 
an active role in easing such problems and lobbying for people, because of the 
malfunctioning and weak performance, local government was mentioned as one of 
the negative factors of reconstruction by the interviewees. The positive factor about 
this attitude towards the local government is that there is an expectation by Bami 
resident and people to believe in the institution, just not in its members. 





Table 7.1. Satisfaction of thirty seven Interviewees of Reconstruction Process 
Percentage 1. The main reason for not finishing 
the reconstruction of the houses of 
those who were still living in 
prefabs: 
60% Fraud contractors 
40% Increase of the price of building material 
 
Percentage 2. Positive points about 
reconstruction 
40% Mechanism of distribution of the 
governmental loans 
37% None 




Percentage 3. Negative points about 
reconstruction 
25% Marginalisation of people in decision-
making process 
22% Irresponsibility and fraud of local officials 
22% Increase of the price of building material 




Percentage 4. Have the size of the house changed 
compared to before the earthquake 
78% House got smaller 
15% No change in size 
7% House got bigger 





Table 7.2. Networking, Key Figures and Sense of Belonging 
Percentage 1. Has any long-term linkage been 
created between applier s and 
officials to be used for future help 
89% none 
 
Percentage 2. Who was the main actor in 
reconstruction 
40% Housing Foundation 
11% Bami people 
11% Foreign NGOs 
11% Central government and Bami people 
others Miscellaneous 
 
Percentage 3. What organization or person 
helped them financially 
30% None 
3% Martyr Foundation 
3% Sport Organisation 
3% Foreign NGO 
3% Cousin 
 
Percentage 4. Damage to the Palms 
40% Palms have been damaged seriously 
20% Palms have been partially damaged 
others No comment 
 
In answering the question: Who do you think was the main actor in reconstruction in 
Bam, forty percent of the interviewees answered „the Housing Foundation‟, eleven 
percent answered Bami people themselves, eleven percent mentioned foreign NGOs, 
eleven percent stated the central government and Bami people together, seven 
percent said the Ministry of Housing, and others had various opinions: One 
interviewee mentioned the Iranian people's donations along with the allocation of the 
National budget and foreign NGOs and another said "No one, Bam was built 
haphazardly, though I cannot say it is built yet". The fact that most people stated that  
the Housing Foundation was the main organisation active in the reconstruction of 





Bam can be accounted for by the fact that the Housing Foundation was in charge of 
the implementation of the "designed-in-Tehran-by-Tehrani-Professionals" plan. This 
plan focused on the reconstruction of houses and retail stores. There was no 
organisation or plan for regeneration of businesses and livelihood improvement, 
Reconstruction was defined as rebuilding the destroyed buildings including houses, 
official and governmental buildings and retail stores. The budget, consequently, was 
channelled to cover those expenses. Presenting HF as the main actor of 
reconstruction by a high percentage of interviewees shows the central nature of 
reconstruction. It also implies that, to people, reconstruction of houses are of the 
greatest importance. This highlights that housing can be a vehicle for improving 
participatory projects in future plans and programmes. 
Regarding networking, 89% of interviewees indicated that no long-term link was 
created with any agency organisation during their application and the process of 
reconstruction of their houses. In one case, the interviewee stated that "the links were 
created but there was no use of the links, no one was responsible enough to do their 
job properly or help us dedicatedly". Or as another interviewee revealed, “The 
process was too formal and bureaucratic that informal connections became useless". 
 According to another respondent: "To get an answer from the governmental 
organisations and setads, you had to make visits to the organisation twenty times in 
order to succeed in having one direct contact with the officials". 
 Another respondent stated: 
Local officials like the governor or the members of the City Council were not 
professional to give us any help or advice regarding the reconstruction of our 
houses. The members of setads and others that could help us regarding the 
reconstruction of our houses were always out of contact; they only made 
weekly or monthly visits to Bam from other parts of Iran and usually were 
not there to answer our questions. 





In order to realise what social linkages the interviewees benefitted from during the 
reconstruction they were asked what organisations or people helped them financially. 
Thirty percent stated no one, three percent mentioned the Martyr Foundation (since 
one of the members of that household was a martyr from the Iran-Iraq war and they 
could benefit from the Para-governmental Martyr Foundation), three percent 
mentioned The Sport Organisation since he was a teacher there, one person 
mentioned foreign NGOs since he was disabled in the earthquake and that NGO 
focused on helping the disabled, one person mentioned her cousin, and others 
mentioned the governmental loans as their sole financial source.  
As a result of the reconstruction process, which could have been a good opportunity 
to create links between people and officials, such connections among the 
interviewees' sample community were not made. The reason for that was the 
marginalisation of local organisations in reconstruction. Another reason can be the 
high death toll caused by the earthquake that damaged the pre-earthquake social 
links (including neighbourhood connections and family ties) to a great extent.  
The research came across some evidence that some households with social linkages 
were more successful in reconstruction of their houses. The researcher encountered 
two workers from the citadel who had similarity in terms of their personal and social 
access to resources: they were both the head of households of large families, and 
they were both in their early forties and both had the same job. In both cases the 
loans were not enough and the contractors had left the project due to lack of budget. 
One of the workers had asked his co-workers to help him to finish the building of the 
house. At the time of the interview, the house was close to being finished but the 
other worker was still living in a prefabricated unit with his four daughters.  
In terms of the feeling of sense of belonging of the interviewees, two factors were 
prominent among their stories: change of forms and size of houses and damage to 
palms. The loan for reconstruction was designed for sixty to eighty square metre 
houses. Middle class Bamis used to live in 120-150 sqm houses before the 





earthquake. Moreover, there were loans allocated for newly-wedded households who 
were not house owners before the earthquake. These two resulted in more but 
smaller houses. Seventy eight percent of the interviewees mentioned their post-
earthquake houses got smaller than their pre-earthquake ones. Fifteen percent of the 
interviewees mentioned no change in the size of their houses and seven percent 
mentioned their houses got bigger. 
Our house has got much smaller. We do not have spaces that we previously 
had like stores and dining area. Bami people have large families but the 
rooms and especially the kitchens are designed for smaller households and 
have become a lot smaller and we are in inconvenienced (One of the 
interviewees). 
Palms were of great importance for Bami people since palms need great and long-
term care and were one of the main characteristics of Bam. According to one of the 
interviewees, palms were important resources in Bam. Forty percent of the 
interviewees believed that the reconstruction process caused severe damage to the 
palms and twenty percent of interviewees believed that the reconstruction partially 
damaged the palms and palm groves. Their main reason was: replacement of palms 
with houses especially by young and newly-wedded households.  
Bami households used to live in one big house together with their in-laws and 
siblings, but the reconstruction policy changed this tradition: they now live in 
separate houses, so the number of houses increased which resulted in being 
cut off from the palm-groves.  
Another respondent stated: 
New generation does not value palms; they think they are more hassle than 
benefit. In cases where parents died in the earthquake and the palm-grove 
was inherited by their children, they tried to change the use of the land from 





groves to residential to build new apartments and sell them. To achieve this 
ambition, they let the palms dry out or even, I have heard, some had the 
groves intentionally burned down to get legal permission to change its use. 
Comments like "the city has got ugly, pre-earthquake Bam was beautiful and full of 
palm-groves" was common in the interviews.  
The city is not the Bam that I once knew. It's like entering a new city (One of 
the interviewees - a Bami woman in her fifty's) 
The following section explores in more detail the effect of reconstruction to the 
sense of belonging by residents from Bam. 
7.6 The Reconstruction Effects on the Sense of Belonging 
of People in Bam 
One of the most important social factors that the earthquake affected was the sense 
of belonging by the Bami people. Due to the large scale of physical destruction, 
places and people that Bamis had memory and felt safe among were lost. One Bami 
asserted that due to the earthquake, more than three hundred of his close and distant 
relatives had died. Neighbourhood networks were damaged as well.  The reasons 
cited were: the death of the residents, replacement of the houses of many residents 
especially those who did not own their house formally, and of the influx of new 
residents to Bam. This means that the social network that a Bami used to 
communicate with and define himself through vanished at once. 
The incident of newcomers increased the feeling of insecurity and alienation of Bami 
people. During the field visit and through completion of questionnaires and life 
stories it became clear that the Bamis believed that after the earthquake the city was 
filled with residents from the surrounding villagers (whom were referred to as 
Narmashiri) to take advantage of loans for reconstruction. They believed that many 
of these newcomers‟ submitted false data to show that they were Bami, owned land 





before the earthquake, but benefitted from loans while many Bami people were not 
granted loans because they were in too much in trauma to apply on time.  
To find out the most prominent problems people faced because of the earthquake and 
reconstruction the local bulletin of Bam was studied. The local bulletin 
Shahrvandan-va-mosharekat, reflected the problems expressed by local people 
through many interviews. For six months (from January 2004 to July 2004) the 
bulletin continued its activity publicising people's problems. This research has 
categorised the problems by gender and the severity of each problem based on the 
number of times it was indicated. Two hundred and eight people were interviewed 
and three hundred and ninety four problems were mentioned. After categorising the 
problems it was established that all three hundred and ninety four problems can be 
classified in seventeen categories (Table 7.1).  
The most prominent problem was fear of being left homeless. Most of the 
interviewees who mentioned this as the main problem were among the landless 
people. Some of them were afraid that they may not meet the application deadline. 
The second problem was low job opportunity. In many cases people mentioned that 
non-local people had stolen job opportunities away from the Bamis. They also 
mentioned that no effort had been made in reconstruction regarding job opportunities 
for Bami. The remains of dust and rubbish are another fact that has increased Bamis' 
anxiety. According to most of the interviewees, the streets of the city were not very 
different from the early days after the earthquake. Waste was all around the city 
which resulted in the increase of leishmaniasis disease (the sixth most concerning 
issue in Bam according to the people). The high cost of living was the fourth most 
mentioned problem. Low job opportunity and loss of capital in the earthquake put 
Bamis in difficult situations regarding livelihood. The fifth prominent problem was 
the feeling of insecurity because of the existence of newcomers. By newcomers they 
did not mean merely Narmashiris, but they also meant the labourers who had filled 
the city. Most interviewees who mentioned this as the most prominent problem 
added that burglary had increased in Bam.  





Men and women had different views in prioritising prominent problems (Tables 7.2 
and 7.3). Being homeless and low job opportunity were more serious problems for 
men (21.9% and 18.4%) than for women (12.1% and 10.6%). Women felt more 
insecure because of non-local people (12.6%) than men (5.1%). Fear of the future, 
especially the future for their children and loneliness were more felt among Bami 
women (5.1%, 4.5% and 2.5% respectively) than among men (0.5%, 0.5% and 0.5% 
respectively).  


















Table 7.3: Most severe problems of Bamis in 2004 (descending and in 
percentage) 
W+M Problems 
17.0% Being homeless 
14.5% Low job opportunity in Bam 
11.2% Remains of dust and rubbish 
9.4% High cost of living 
8.9% 




4.1% Increase of substance abuse 
3.3% Missing loved ones 
3.0% Destruction of social values 
2.8% Fear of the future 
2.5% Future for the children 
2.5% Repaying loans 
2.5% Being disabled 
2.3% Price of construction material 
1.8% Built houses not being safe 
1.5% Loneliness 





Moreover, Bamis believed that after the earthquake the new community does not 
install moral values. Of the most mentioned problems printed in the local newspaper, 
destruction of pre-disaster social values was one of the prominent problems that 
people mentioned. 
People do not care for each other anymore; anyone is looking for its own benefits 
and not for collective achievements; people are not kind to each other, real Bamis 
have either died or left the city, city is in the hands of Narmashiris (A Bami man in 
his late thirties, 2006). 
The vulnerability of Bami people in terms of livelihood was another factor that 
disconnected Bamis from their pre-disaster social sphere. They could not afford their 
pre-disaster life-style, family gatherings which were routine in Bamis' life-style 
decreased substantially because it was unaffordable. Weekend vacations to the 
countryside were cut because it was not considered reasonable anymore. 
Weekends were spent with another ten to twelve families either gathering at 
each other's house, or travelling to surrounding cities. But now there are not 
many relatives left to visit. Those who remained are too depressed or broke to 
greet us. We do not visit each other even once a year. The weekend trips are 
also cancelled because we cannot afford the cost of fuel anymore (A Bami 











Table 7.4: Most severe problems for Bami men and women in 2004 
Men Problems 
21.9% Being homeless 
18.4% Low job opportunity in Bam 
12.8% Remains of dust and rubbish 
10.2% Leishmaniasis 
8.7% High cost of living 
6.1% Depression 
5.1% 
Feeling insecure because of 
newcomers 
3.1% Price of construction material 
3.1% Being disabled 
2.6% Repaying loans 
2.0% Built houses not being safe 
1.5% Missing loved ones 
1.5% Increase in substance abuse 
1.5% Destruction of social values 
0.5% Loneliness 
0.5% Future for the children 




Feeling insecure because of 
newcomers 
12.1% Being homeless 
10.6% Low job opportunity in Bam 
10.1% High cost of living 
9.6% Remains of dust and rubbish 
6.6% Increase in substance abuse 
6.1% Leishmaniasis 
5.1% Missing loved ones 
5.1% Fear of the future 
4.5% Future for the children 
4.5% Destruction of social values 
3.0% Depression 
2.5% Loneliness 
2.5% Repaying loans 
2.0% Being disabled 
1.5% Price of construction material 









Paying attention to livelihood regeneration schemes has vital importance in 
reconstruction policies. It directly affects the new urban shape. In absence of a 
proper livelihood regeneration policy, many houses remained unfinished because the 
households could not afford the remaining process of the building. There were signs 
of alternative and new ways to access livelihood with available resources by local 
Bamis: 
Many prefabricated units that were provided for Bamis in the transitional 
phase, and later were moved to their lands as an extra room, have got a new 
use these days. Many Bami households let them to workers and university 
students (One of the residents of Bam, 2011) 
It is possible to marginalise local people in formal decision-making of urban 
planning, but local people have great power is shaping their surrounding in their 
favour, whatever the formal plan be. They shape their surroundings based on their 
needs and even affect the designed and formal policies and structure. A number of 
the non-local workers that came to the city during the reconstruction phase did not 
leave the city and remained in Bam. Some Bami households used these people in 
their farming businesses. They have merged into society and can hire the 
prefabricated units. However, in the long-term, they may become the marginalised 
vulnerable groups, the new Narmashiris.  
Bamis also found alternative social places. One of the most visited places of Bam 
after the earthquake was the cemetery. This shows the strong bonding ties of Bamis 
with their families and the level of their grief. Due to the intensity of visitors, the 
cemetery has changed its feature from a grief space to a social gathering space. In a 
visit to the cemetery it became evident that the cemetery has become a sharing space 
for Bamis: they share their grief, memories and even food with each other. 
Compared to other parts of the city, the cemetery still looks like it did pre-disaster. 
People feel connected and as if they belong there. Papoli and Garagian (a couple 





who studied the anthropological aspects of reconstruction in Bam) in an interview in 
2007 asserted: 
In reconstructing the approach of Bam designed by the State the 
emotional aspects of the situation were not considered. The focus of the 
approach was merely technical. People were still mourning and shocked 
when the debris was removed. Setads surpassed each other in a 
competitive way in this regard. Immediately after that, people were given 
designed blueprints of their houses with distinct measurements and a 
mission to apply for loans and construction contractor. The new bazaar 
had Arabic design and all houses had similar typical designs prepared in 
Tehran. The houses built in dehbakri had the same design of the ones in 
dashtabad, despite the fact that in dehbakri land was much more 
expensive. Even construction workers were not from Bam, they were 
either Afghani or from other parts of Iran. These had increased the feeling 
of being alien to the new place and unsecure among Bamis. In physical 
reconstruction of Bam what was missing was the taste and voice of local 
people. The best public space that Bamis met each other and still felt safe 
and familiar was the cemetery of Bam. That was the best place that Bamis 
could communicate with, not only for mourning, but even for dating: This 
had even become the meeting place for young boys and girls.  
The researcher came across a woman taxi-driver - which was a rare and new 
incidence in Bam at that time (2007). She explained that because her husband had 
died in the earthquake and was buried in the cemetery she felt the only place she 
could find comfort was at the cemetery. As her house was in a neighbouring town it 
was not easy for her to ask family and friends to drive her to Bam every day. Finally 
she decided to learn how to drive and get a license - she realised that driving gave 
her a source of income. This woman stated that there were more women in Bam like 
her. This example shows that a sense of belonging and bonding ties to memories and 
spaces are strong incentives for people to overcome limitations and decrease their 
vulnerability. 





A report by Zand-Razavi (2004) shows that a few months after the earthquake 
people in Bam showed an interest in recovering palm groves and fostering and 
collecting dates. Palm groves for Bamis were a symbol of Bam and reminded them 
of their responsibilities to their environment. Unfortunately after the earthquake, 
because proper attention was not paid to them, many palm groves were destroyed 
either during the process by replacing them with new houses, or by letting them dry. 
This was done by new owners who wanted to change the functionality of the land 
from farming to housing for financial benefits. The dates of Bam that once were the 
most famous dates in the world are now mostly blighted. "Palms were the capital of 
Bam, but they went through substantial damage since the earthquake. For that the 
city is losing its identity" (A Bami man, 2010). Paying attention to factors that 
intensify a sense of belonging is important in increasing voluntary participation.  
7.7 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed how the reconstruction policy of Bam affected the social 
structure and sense of belonging of the residents. It was argued that the 
reconstruction policy, despite being labelled „participatory‟ by designers and 
decision- makers, it actually marginalised local residents from being able to shape 
and govern their surroundings. Participatory parts of reconstruction for residents 
were seen through applying for loans, contractors, and providing building materials. 
Based on the reconstruction policy, the people benefitting from the facilities of 
reconstruction were people with land, and being in a good condition to apply for 
loans. This shows the desire to restore the status quo situation pre-disaster. However, 
this approach increased the vulnerability of people more than their pre-disaster 
situation. This was in contrast to the expectation of local people; their expectations 
were security, less control over their construction process, more involvement in the 
process, job, public spaces and not letting non-local people benefit from the 
construction benefits in an opportunistic way. Vulnerable groups, in terms of land-
holding title and capability, widowed women, renters, informal dwellers, and women 
with absent husbands, were left susceptible. The experience of Bam showed that 





divorcing community links especially in large scale projects decreases the 
effectiveness and appropriateness of mechanisms for targeting local vulnerability. 
For Tehran-based decision-makers reconstruction was letting people build their 
houses which in practice turned to building houses for people. This makes 
reconstruction an application process from Bamis demanding shelter, and not letting 
local people interfere "too much". This increased the inflexibility of the housing 
projects and along with the increase in the price of material put the local residents 
often in difficulty in terms of access to proper resource and services. 
In this chapter, it was also discussed how reconstruction affected the sense of 
belonging by the local residents. To do this, two sources were used: secondary data 
from a local newspaper and in-depth interviews with thirty seven residents of Bam. 
For the interviewees, the most prominent problems of the housing reconstruction 
scheme was the malfunctioning of the contractors, irresponsibility of local officials, 
increase in the price of material and the marginalisation of people in decision-
making. The interviewees mentioned lack of local social contacts to help them to 
solve future local problems. Additionally, after the earthquake, houses became 
smaller and people felt many palm trees had been damaged, this, along with unpaved 
streets created a feeling of alienation of Bam's residents to their surrounding, which 
was not the case pre-earthquake.  
Through using the secondary data, at the early phase of reconstruction, the most 
disturbing problems of Bamis were fear of being left homeless, low job opportunity, 
the remains of dust and rubbish in the streets, the high cost of living, feeling insecure 
because of newcomers, and leishmaniasis. While most problems mentioned by men 
were: the fear of being left homeless, low job opportunity in Bam, the remains of 
dust and rubbish in the streets, and leishmaniasis; most of the women mentioned 
problems of fear of newcomers mostly as labourers, being left homeless, low job 
opportunity and the high cost of living. To summarise lack of access to shelter, 
livelihood and security were the top fears of the Bami residents during the early 





stages of reconstruction. However, there were signs of new coping strategies in Bam; 
prefabricated units are used in many cases as sources of income. Newcomers are 
regarded as work force by the Bami residents but there is also the threat of them 










The scale and breadth of activity of NGOs in Bam during reconstruction was a novel 
experience not only in Bam but also nationally. Involvement of NGOs in the 
governing of the reconstruction of Bam was a great opportunity for Iran's civil 
society to practice participation. Not only in terms of contesting social structures for 
power and a stake in governance, but also in confronting the limits of its own 
capacities and competences in dealing with the social environment of Bam post-
disaster.   





Civil society is often regarded in development debates as a concept that contributes 
to a more just distribution of power: 
"[Civil society empowering approaches] challenges the apparent power 
relations in society by recognizing the control that certain individuals and 
groups have over others. This is based on the recognition that those who 
wield little power have limited opportunities to express their interests and 
needs and are generally excluded from key decision-making processes, and 
that their knowledge is considered insignificant (Kothari, 2004, P142).  
Many contemporary development theorists call for greater equity in the distribution 
of power through development (see chapter three). Concepts like the state, caste 
structures, clientalistic relationships, and western cultural dominance are seen as 
legitimate targets for civil society‟s struggle to advocate for or enhance the position 
of marginalised groups. NGOs are conceived as catalysts for a move away from 
hierarchical systems of government towards potentially more resilient and inclusive 
systems of governance (Pelling, 2003). 
In case of Bam the arena for local and especially international NGO for activity was 
limited by the state. Following the opinion of Habermas it is the role of the state to 
create such an atmosphere for participation that people from different social 
categories could practice action cooperation and mutual understanding. In the 
absence of such mechanisms a Foucault-style dynamism between the state and 
grassroots communities and NGOs are expected to change the governance system 
towards a more balanced distribution of power. However due to the deficiency of 
local active NGOs and grassroots movements, and the political, financial and 
technical limitations of national NGOs, the attempt to achieve a more balanced 
structure of power through a Foucault mechanism becomes a matter of question. 
This chapter studies how NGOs involved in the reconstruction of Bam applied 
concepts such as an active civil society, social determination and social inclusion – 





ideas not in the mainstream of Iranian politics. It asks: what were the aims of NGOs? 
What were their incentives? What was their recognition of empowerment? How far 
did the reconstruction of Bam become an opportunity for the evolution of Iranian 
NGOs? How far did Iranian and northern NGOs, setads, city council and Bami 
people collaborate? Who was influenced most by the efforts of Iranian NGOs? How 
did they change the governance structure? 
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first Section studies the role of NGOs 
in the relief phase of post-earthquake Bam. The earthquake of Bam and the vast 
extent of damage attracted many volunteer groups from all over the world to help the 
victims of the earthquake. Their activities at the early stages are noteworthy. The 
second section discusses how these NGOs at the later phases of reconstruction tried 
to connect to the local community and how they affected the structure of power. To 
address these questions, NGOs can be classified into three forms based on their 
system and perception of empowerment: traditional NGOs, new forms of NGOs with 
focus on enriching social capital, and appearance of local NGO. A section about the 
activity of foreign NGOs and international agencies and their relation with Iranian 
NGOs will follow this. The final section explores the main focus of Iranian NGOs – 
women and children. 
The data of this chapter were gathered through different interviews and studying 
published documents. Choosing the NGOs was based on their activity and scale of 
work. Social activists, researchers, and academic staff who had experiences and 
knowledge about the reconstruction of Bam were approached and they introduced 
some NGOs whose activities were relevant to the research. Snowball sampling 
method was used through different contacts and NGOs to get access to more key 
informants and enrich the research. UNICEF and UN-Habitat were also studied. To 
study their activities, visits were made to their branches in Tehran and Bam.  
 





8.2 Bam in the Relief Phase 
It has to be noticed that when we talk about civil society activity in Bam, three 
geographical areas are involved: the region of Bam (comprising of the cities of Bam 
and its neighbouring city Baravat and some small villages), the city of Kerman (the 
capital of the province that Bam is located in), and Tehran. Unlike other prominent 
disaster case studies such as the Marmara or Gujarat earthquakes (which were 
sufficiently urbanised to have a history of active civil society), the city of Bam 
before the earthquake was a semi-urban semi-rural area: it had about one hundred 
thousand residents before the earthquake which distinguished it from rural areas but 
achieved its identity from its palm groves, orange orchards and date farms and had 
an almost homogeneous society influencing its character as an urban area.  
After the earthquake Bam became a field for reflection of mainly Tehran-based, 
some Kermani, a few Bami and foreign NGOs. About ten to twelve NGOs of the 
total thirty three Iranian NGOs that entered Bam after the earthquake, had 
demonstrable experience in disaster relief, and the rest were young with little 
experience of responding to disasters. Ninety percent of the NGOs were involved in 
Bam because Iranian citizens trusted them and gave donations to be used in Bam, 
despite having no specific plan how to spend the money (Ekhlaspour, 2005). Many 
of them later became involved in more specific activities mostly working with 
women and children in educational activities.  
Based on a study by Ekhlaspour (2005) on twenty six Iranian NGOs who worked on 
the Bam earthquake response, the central branch and origin of fourteen of them were 
in Tehran, five were from Kerman, two based in Bam and five from other cities of 
Iran. A Japanese NGO's staff from Kobe also noted this multi-polar organisational 
character of NGOs active in Bam: 
"During the two stays in Iran we visited several international and local NGOs 
in Tehran, Kerman and Bam… [We entered Tehran on Jan 25]. On Jan 26th 





[2004] we had a joint meeting with several local NGOs and individuals in 
Tehran…on Jan 29th we left Tehran for Kerman and a meeting was held with 
Kerman NGOs House and the joint team of Technisches Hilfswerk 
(THW)…subsequently we left Kerman for Bam. In Bam we visited two tents 
of local NGOs…on Jan 31 we left Bam for Kerman to attend a meeting with 
international and local NGOs held by Kemran NGOs House. On Feb 1 we 
left Kerman for Tehran. On Feb. 3rd a workshop was held for members of a 
young organisation…we shared our experiences from Kobe. On Feb. 4 we 
left Tehran for Japan"(Okano and Atsumi, 2004, p171).  
According to the Kerman-based NGO House and UNOCHA (United Nations Office 
for Coordination of Humanitarian affairs), within days of the earthquake more than 
eighty international relief organisations and NGOs from about sixty countries arrived 
in Bam to provide in-kind and monetary contributions (Okano and Atsumi, 2004). 
However, most of them had left Bam by mid April after three months of operation 
(ibid). 
While the earthquake was the initial shock to the Bam region, relief and emergency 
activities can be regarded as the second shock to Bam. Due to the huge impact of the 
earthquake on human and physical losses and great coverage of the media, Bam 
became over crowded by the surge of NGOs and people offering relief supplies, 
which in turn brought another flow of people from unaffected regions also 
demanding aid.  
"Relief supplies were enthusiastically but inefficiently distributed and injured 
people were transported haphazardly to the neighbouring city of Kerman for 
medical treatment in cars, vans and even rubbish trucks…people from 
neighbouring areas went to Bam and started to steal their fellow 
countrymen's belongings from among the debris of the city… genuine 
survivors of the earthquake found that their immediate needs were not being 





met because of the rapid influx of poor people from the surrounding 
unaffected area claiming relief food and goods" (Aghabakhshi, 2007, p349). 
Due to the influx of non-local people to the area, pre-existing norms of trust and 
reciprocity were stretched and eroded among genuine survivors
1
. Their previous 
social networks (family networks, neighbourhood networks, and even citizenship 
networks) were largely lost. In such situations it is of great importance to create a 
supportive atmosphere for affected community members to organise and collaborate 
with aid agencies and social workers. It is often argued that it is beneficial for non-
local volunteers and NGOs to partner with local networks to help in the needs-based 
distribution of goods and services (Blaikie et al 2004; Maskery 1989).   
"Bonding, solidarity or social cohesion provides the basis for reciprocity and 
exchanges within the social groups. But when the power and resources of 
these social groups is limited bridging or linking social capital with other 
groups becomes important to access different resources, information and 
power "(Narayan et al, 2004, p1184).  
In the case of Bam, due to the high death toll, there was hardly any locally active 
civil society with almost all government social workers having lost their lives 
(Aghabakhshi, 2007). Hence it became almost completely the job of outsiders to help 
survivors mentally and with financial support to overcome the catastrophe. For this 
they had to get familiar with local knowledge and needs. Many problems of the relief 
phase came from this lack of a link between people's needs and the services 
provided. 
In such circumstances it becomes the role of governmental and non-governmental 
organisations to become involved and address the needs of the most vulnerable.  
Aghabakhshi (2007) describes the immediate short-term relief operation as follows:  
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 See Chapters six and seven. 





"Adding to the inefficiencies of some of the Iranian governmental agencies 
was the fact that administrative staff rather than volunteer professionals were 
being used in the field. Many of them operated under the belief that injured 
people were unable to make decisions for themselves. They did not act as 
advocates for the survivors and ended up working contrary to their wishes on 
occasion. For example many of the survivors particularly women and 
children required toiletries and other hygiene products but were given food 
instead, much to their frustration" (p350). 
Many of these problems could have been avoided had a strong local voice been 
available to help the volunteers in distributing goods and services. This might also 
have helped distinguish local people from opportunists and better manage the huge 
influx of non-local people. Bami people have blamed the outsiders for an 
undermining of social values, a decrease of the sense of security, an increase in the 




After the earthquake people were accommodated in tent-camps which were 
organised by the Iranian Red-Crescent across the city. These camps became very 
beneficial for NGOs and volunteers to communicate with each other and with 
people.  
"At the emergency phase all NGOs resided in camps. This eases our situation to 
communicate and meet people and other NGOs and present our services and find 
proper help seekers" (a volunteer respondent, 2010). 
In terms of Iranian NGOs, though most of them were inexperienced in disaster 
situations they learned to work with local actors (Boxes 8.1 and 8.2).  At the 
beginning they operated independently of each other and of the government. 
Together with the chaotic situation (Box 8.3), this resulted in a discordance of 
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services and goods with needs and discrimination among survivors. For example it 
was reported that baby nappies were distributed among all tents regardless of the 
existence of any baby in the tent (Akhlaghi, 2005). 
As time passed, NGOs started assessing needs and tried to approach the most 
vulnerable (Box 8.4). Gradually people were settled and things became more 
organised with the establishment of an agency to coordinate the activities of NGOs 
to prevent parallel services. According to Goda and Shaw (2004) such coordination 
problems at the time of emergency are frequently reported in both developed and 
developing countries. UNICEF, UN-OCHA, WHO and Iranian NGO Task Force 












Box 8.1. "After a while I noticed that young ladies were still wearing black as a sign of 
mourning for their loved ones. I asked them when they would consider the end of the 
mourning time and they said that in our custom usually senior people would offer us light 
color cloths as a sign of end of mourning time.  I communicated with some of the senior of the 
tent-camp to end the mourning time by offering the light cloths (which I had provided) to 
young women. A few days later most of the young ladies of the tent-camp had changed their 
black cloths" (A Tehrani social worker in Bam, 2011).  
 
Box 8.2. "My aim was to make all people especially the most vulnerable to communicate with 
each other and socialize. We started our task from the tent-camps. We invited the people of the 
camp we resided to gather at each other's tents and share their problems. We faced cases that 
resisted participation. For example there was a lady who had lost one of her feet who did not 
participate. We told her that this week we are gathering at your tent; she was not determined 
enough to say no. We forced her to participate. Sometimes we tricked people to participate; for 
instance there was an old lady who would not communicate with other people of the camp and 
spent all day in her tent. I asked one of the boys to play with a ball outside of her tent while I 
was talking to her in her tent. While talking to the lady I often asked the boy to be careful with 
the ball; this way I was making the lady concerned with the boy who was playing. While I was 
leaving the lady I asked her to watch the boy not to disturb people with the ball. After a while a 
group of boys joined the boy to play with the ball. She supervised the boys and was in charge of 
the ball. Since then the front of the lady's tent became the playground of the boys of the camp; 
she was in charge of the ball and through that communicated with the children and other people 
of the camp" (A Tehrani social worker in Bam, 2011). 
 










"Shortly after the earthquake UNICEF organized weekly child protection 
meetings among active NGOs working with children in Bam. For the first 
three months the meetings were routine and active but later they became 
occasional. There were also UN-OCHA meetings and also Task Force 
weekly meetings which was a governmental organ to report the activity 
of NGOs. But as soon as Bam passed emergency phase and entered 
temporary shelter phase, the meetings got infrequent. One of the reasons 
for that was that at the beginning of the reconstruction there was a 
possibility for NGOs to do parallel activities and also their activities and 
objects were ambiguous. But after a while each NGO's categories and 
fields became clearer and got on with their jobs, keeping the links with 
each other but needless of weekly meetings (a member of NGO Swiss 
Academy for Development, 2010).  
Along with the creation of links to other NGOs through coordinating organisations 
and with the end of the emergency phase, some NGOs started to create links with 
local communities. As Shaw (2003) rightly argues activities of NGOs and voluntary 
organisations are successful when they are coordinated and rooted to the people and 
community. Studying the ways these links are created is of great importance since it 
relates to the outset of change of the distribution of power and the situating of Bami 
residents in their new environment. 
Box 8.3. At the time of the earthquake I was a social worker at Welfare Organization of Tehran. 
My subject was psychotherapy.  We were sent by the state two days after the earthquake.  I 
went to Bam with fifteen students of social care. The city was totally devastated. We went to 
the Welfare Organization center of Bam and found it totally destroyed.  We settled there 
anyway. We started to find the lost children and gather them in our place. But it was useless. 
There was no secure space to keep the children and they used to run away. I saw that under that 
situation I can be of no use, hence I returned Tehran. Three months later I was invited from the 
department of health and psychology to join them in Bam. My experience in Bam started from 
then (A Tehrani social worker in Bam, 2011). 
 










8.3 Connecting the NGOs to the civil society 
Bami people were approached by NGOs in different ways. The methods NGOs used 
can be studied through their epistemological constructions of society, based often on 
the time and environment in which they were organised. In the case of Bam, NGOs 
can be categorised into three types: traditional NGOs which had a top down view 
and followed a charity style (i.e. giving money and services to a selected group of 
deprived people) method and were totally independent from the government 
(especially in terms of their definition of the problem); they tried to cover the gaps 
that the state was failing to address.  
The second group determined participation of their target group as a priority. This 
group believed in the empowerment of society and sought policy change through 
educating people about their civil rights. They were familiar with recent discourses 
of social capital and in their projects tried to strengthen networking for long-lasting 
social and economic improvement. They invested in the active participation of 
citizens in public projects as a tool for empowerment.  
The third type consisted of one prominent local NGO that was founded by a Bami 
affected individual.  This case is valuable in indicating the significance of 
Box 8.4. "I was a member of Yari NGO in Tehran. Our objects were fighting 
against substance abuse, HIV, and hepatitis. After the earthquake we added a new 
subject to our activities as: natural disaster. We entered Bam on the second day of 
the earthquake. It was absolute chaos. In Rudbar earthquake the army would not 
let us enter the city in early days of the earthquake, but in Bam the situation was 
out of control. We set up our tent at the place of one of the health centers, which 
was totally ruined by the way. Initially in th early days we helped in distribution 
of goods and food among people. After a few days we started assessment. We 
studied how many households had small children, infants, pregnant or 
breastfeeding women. After recognizing those households we provided them 
with milk, cheese and eggs. This was our plan for over six months. In the 
meantime we had collaboration with international organisations namely WFO 
and UNICEF" (The lady in charge of Yari NGO).  
 





indigenousness and the affluence of its organiser on strategy and outcomes.  These 
facts fostered its sustainability and local accountability. In June 2011, about seven 
years after the earthquake, the organisation was still active. The fact that the founder 
had lost his closest family members in the earthquake and used his own money to 
run the projects instead of being dependent on national and international donors, 
characterises it as an organic organisation without Western or Tehrani perspectives 
on civil society. This organisation is valuable in terms of being created as a claimed 
space for participation rather than an invited space formed by external actors: 
Cornwall (2002) realizes two spaces for participation: invited and claimed. 
Invited space is created by development agents in a formal and ordered way 
to create forum for stakeholders to reach a consensus. Claimed spaces are 
those which evolve in an organic way and are created by powerless to gain 
stake and is usually conflictual (Desai, 2008, page 47).  
 Here these three types of NGOs will be studied in detail. 
8.3.1 The First Group: Traditional NGOs 
These NGOs are charitable service delivery groups, called „traditional‟ because they 
have a long history in Iran. Their objective was to financially support vulnerable 
groups, mostly single mothers and children, in Bam.  
According to these traditional NGOs, vulnerability was considered as a lack of 
access to basic resources due to the social structure that was imposed on the target 
group, like the fragile social image of women in society, limited employment 
opportunities, and the physical and social weakness of children preventing their self-
reliance. The group‟s approach to vulnerability reduction was to find short term 
solutions such as providing livelihood assets, shelter, cash, and school places (Boxes 
8.5 and 8.6). 











Their activities in Bam did not include lobbying and advocacy for change of policy 
or legislation for social vulnerable groups. Their view was: until the state solves 
problems like legislative reforms for women and the creation of jobs, they consider it 
their duty to provide basic facilities for affected Bamis. Their methods were 
paternalistic and they created a relationship of dependency between the beneficiary 
and the NGO.   
Despite their traditional approach there were signs of networking and creation of 
social capital among the leaders and participants of these groups. In the case of the 
House of Mother and Child, their project of accommodating single mothers in a 
well-built gated development is prominent. Despite the distrust single mothers 
initially had towards each other at the development, social ties intensified as time 
passed. During the first research visit, which took place in spring 2008 at the 
inauguration of the project, signs of distrust among the new residents were observed. 
Some of the residents felt superior to others and did not let their children go out and 
play with other residents‟ children. Another household claimed that at night a great 
number of households leave their properties; she claimed that they have other places 
to go and only remain there during the day time for staff to see them and benefit 
Box 8.5. The House of Mother and Child is an Iranian non-profit NGO established in 1990 
following the devastating earthquake of Manjil, North of Iran. They supported 550 post-earthquake 
orphans of Manjil by providing education facility and twenty houses for households in need. In the 
aftermath of Bam‟s earthquake, based on the experience of Manjil, The House of Mother and Child 
focused its activities in Bam on children who have lost one or both of their parents in the 
earthquake of Bam. Four hundred children were chosen prioritized by their level of need to be 
financially supported. The households are selected from the Iranian National Organization of 
Welfare (as is the legal process for all NGOs active in family support projects). Children‟s family 
would get a fixed amount of money each month (minimum of 20 thousand Toman equal to 14 
pound per month) for each children and the organisation often cover occasional expenses of the 
families like buying computer for children or small costs of construction of their houses. Three 
pieces of land were donated by the local people to the charity for its family support purposes: in 
one piece the office of the organisation was built, in another one sixteen 60 m2 type houses were 
planned to be built to accommodate sixteen female headed households, and in the third one twenty 
eight 85 m2 type houses are built to accommodate another twenty eight female headed households. 
Houses are built totally with financial support of private donors. The houses composed a gated 
development with twenty four hour porter. Among the youngsters, four young boys were elected 
by the staff to act as the mayors of the development in charge of cleanness and gardening. 
Moreover, once a month, the residents will have a meeting with the head executive of the charity 
and staff to talk about their problems. 
 





from foods and goods distributions; she was afraid that the empty houses might 
make the development more insecure at night (despite the existence of porters).  
"Now we are here, we have a shelter but I don‟t trust neighbours. I have told 
my children not to make friends with the children of neighbours, now that I 
know how dangerous is the Bam after the earthquake and now that I have 
gone this much harshness to keep my children away from damage, I won‟t 
risk entering new people in their lives" (one of the residents of the 

















Box 8.6. Banouye Bam (the Lady of Bam) was an organisation set-up in Bam by a Kermani 
woman in 2005. The target group of the organisation was young single mothers. Mrs Akhlaghi 
(the founder) started her activity in Bam in the early days after the earthquake through 
transferring the aid gathered by her friends and relatives to Bam. She had no experience in 
running or participating in any NGO; she was a retired teacher from Kerman in her fifties. Her 
sense of sympathy made her reside in a tent in one of the camps provided for affected Bamis 
(like many other non-local volunteers) with other Bami earthquake affected people and do 
whatever she could in relieving their pain.  Camps were helpful places for volunteers and 
NGO staff to communicate with people and also to get familiar with each other. Mrs Akhlaghi 
got acquainted with IRAC NGO in the emergency phase. IRAC (the Iraqi Refugee Council) 
was an NGO supported by ACT Netherlands (Action by Churches Together). 
IRAC left Bam at the end of winter 2004 and gave responsibility for distribution of the 
remaining aid to Mrs Akhlaghi. Mrs Akhlaghi decided to use the remaining budget to organise 
a workshop for single mothers to learn sewing and sell their products. Seventy Bami women 
participated in the project. In summer 2005 with inauguration of the workshops and 
completion of the IRAC budget the formal link of Mrs Akhlaghi and Banouye Bam 
Organization with IRAC terminated. Since then Banouye Bam became a Bami organisation 
run by a Kermani manager. According to Akhlaghi it was at that time that she decided to 
transfer the organisation from a charity style workshop to cooperation; she believed Bami 
women participants could become the shareholders of the organisation and Banouye Bam 
would become totally local and she could leave Bam for good. 
It took six months for her to accomplish this task. Two factors accounted for the lengthy 
process: first the bureaucracy and second the problem of finding a new manager. None of the 
participants or Bami people she knew accepted to get the responsibility. The reason was that 
the organisation had no success in finding a market for its cloths. Finally at the end of the 
winter 2006 she found a volunteer and left Bam for Kerman.  
 
 





Through the author‟s second visit, one year later in summer 2009, it was observed 
that links of trust among neighbours had been created and the residents had a higher 
sense of security and happiness:  
"Here we feel safe and comfortable. Our children are more relaxed and 
happy. Our expenses have also decreased: we pay no rent fee; neighbours 
often share food and transport expenses.  Here we do not feel alone or 
helpless, if I do not come out of my house for three days one of the 
neighbours will come to see if there is a problem. We have more hope to live. 
We asked the founder to organize courses for us to read Quran and learn 
working with computer and now we participate in the courses. We feel more 
relieved and empowered" (one of the residents of the development, 2009). 
Through the creation of horizontal bonding ties with each other some of their 
expenses like food and transport were reduced and they gained a higher sense of 
security: they shared food and taxi. However in the absence of vertical ties with 
other organisations their livelihoods and solidarity depended on the sustainability of 
the host organisation. The House of Mother and Child has a strong leader with high 
controlling power and access to affluent families in Tehran to support the project. 
Being a lady with religious commitments she has a high level of accountability 
among the foundation's beneficiaries. But the organisation is highly dependent on 
her activities and the sustainability of the organisation depends on her commitment 
to continue the task. Consequently, the residents‟ reliance on this organisation could 
increase their vulnerability. To increase the sustainability of the project, the House of 
Mother and Child could create vertical links with other formal and informal 
organisations to facilitate women‟s active participation in other social and formal 
networks.  
Dependency on the leaders is further exemplified through the NGO Banouye Bam 
(The Lady of Bam). Despite its humane incentive and valuable efforts, this group 
suffered from the same top-down approach coupled with fragile access to funds, 





which threatened its longevity. During this project, which focused on empowering 
Bami women through the creation of a sewing workshop and cooperative, none of 
the participants were sufficiently empowered to develop leadership skills or to take 
on the responsibility of managing the cooperative and running it after the founder 
left. Instead, another outsider was given the project to take over and manage.  
In such projects, while the 'outsider' may have come with good will to reduce the 
suffering and vulnerability of the poor, imposed leadership diminished local and 
personal capacity. At a minimum such projects are lost opportunities and only 
maintain the existing power asymmetries in society. Worse, some participants may 
see the programme as being run by the outsider for their own interests. As long as 
such a situation exists it becomes challenging for the target group to trust the project 
manager. In terms of social reconstruction, without the creation of a link of trust, a 
sense of belonging is less likely to develop amongst the participants. The participants 
see the programme merely as a source of income rather than a space to share, feel 
safe and evolve.  
"More than one year of the establishment of the organisation had passed. One 
day I got a call from the governor that some of the ladies working in Banouye 
Bam had put an accusation against me. They claimed that I had got money 
from the municipality for ladies' transport but did not share the money with 
them; which was not true. In another case, some of the ladies claimed that 
some of the women were given sewing machines and others were not; but the 
fact was that the sewing machines were given by a donor for newly wedded 
ladies. Such skepticism was common among Bami people who were 
supported by NGOs, one of my colleagues told me that I do not even dare to 
visit a dentist or go to a restaurant because I may be accused of using the 
Bam's budget for personal use " (Mrs Akhlaghi, 2007). 
Banouye Bam also suffered from limited fund resources. According to Edwards and 
Hulme (1996) the dependence of any NGO on external funding is something of an 





Achilles heel. After IRAC's budget had been fully utilised the organisation relied on 
income from the selling of the products produced at the workshops, which had little 
success during Mrs Akhlaghi's presence. Banouye Bam is no longer an active self-
run organisation.  
In another NGO, Ehya, the leader had long-term experience in social work. He 
started working with disabled communities in the 1980s and expanded his activities 
to cover other socially vulnerable people, which resulted in the establishment of the 
Society for the Protection of Socially Disadvantaged Individuals (Ehya) in 1999. 
Ehya in Tehran is a well-known organisation financed through people's donations.  
Ehya provided goods and services to a number of people in Bam (Box 8.7). Female-
headed households, young women and orphaned children were the main focus of 
Ehya's activities. The services provided were minimal and lacked any significant 
long-term impact on participants‟ underlying capacities. A sizeable piece of land was 
donated to the charity, which was used to run a small nursery and sewing and 
computer courses (with 133 women graduates at the time of interviewing). Female 
empowerment efforts like sewing and computer courses; the provision of a cooking 
herb dispenser; and oven for baking bread to sell had failed to address the livelihood 
vulnerability of the beneficiaries. The main reason was a lack of demand for such 



















"Bami women do not buy dried or prepared herbs from us because they are 
mostly traditional housewives and are used to preparing their cooking herbs 
by themselves" (one of the respondents). 
Despite this, at the time of the second interview, in the summer of 2011, Ehya was 
still active in providing these services. In the absence of a planned and coherent 
livelihood regeneration scheme and high unemployment rate, any income generating 
activity from NGOs would be welcomed by vulnerable residents. 
8.3.2 The Second Group: Investing in Social Capital  
The second classification of NGOs differs from traditional NGOs in encouraging the 
active participation of beneficiaries in its projects. This group realised the potential 
disadvantages of top-down approaches and was focused on empowering Bami 
Box 8.7. Ehya (the Society for the Protection of Socially Disadvantaged 
Individuals) is a non-governmental and non-profit Iranian organisation that started 
its activities in Tehran in 1999 to support socially disadvantaged people affected by 
poverty, prostitution, homelessness and divorce. Their activities in Bam started 
soon after the disaster by providing shelter, hand-washing facilities, safe drinking 
water, warm clothes and blankets (Ehya‟s official website). After emergency 
activities, the focus of Ehya turned towards the most vulnerable groups namely 
children, female heads of families and young girls. Ehya provided protection to a 
number of children who had lost one or both parents and supported their families to 
prevent further family separation. Female heads of households were provided with 
vocational training, income generating programs and income-generating 
programmes such as sewing classes and computer studies. Ehya also cared for a 
number of handicapped individuals. One charitable individual donated a house built 
on 2500 square meters in which Ehya established its headquarters. Their activities 
included provision of rehabilitative equipment including wheelchairs, walkers, 
crutches, casts, bandages and canes; counselling and psychological support to 
tackle trauma for earthquake affected people; thirty six orphans were selected to be 
supported financially by sending them remittances on a monthly basis; 
establishment of a Technical and Professional Learning Center offering computer 
and sewing classes for disabled, orphan and female-headed households; providing 
income resource for female headed households through giving them vegetable 
dispenser to sell vegetables and a furnace for baking and selling bread. 
 





people through investment in social capital.   However, since NGOs in Iran do not 
receive open financial and political support from the state, they were mostly 
dependent on the donations from foreign donors and private Iranian agencies.  Three 
projects will be discussed here: the Empowering Project of the Blue Crescent, 
Poshtrood and the Citizens in Participation Bulletin. 
8.3.2.1 The Empowering Project of International Blue Crescent  
International Blue Crescent is a Turkish NGO with experience of post-disaster 
activities. It became active in Bam in the early months after the earthquake (Box 
8.8). The staff used trust as the main driver for creating incentives among 
participants. They created links with local people through living with them in their 
own ward under the same situation they were living: 
"At the beginning it was hard to communicate and attract the trust. Residents 
were reluctant to participate because of fake promises some NGOs had made 
but failed to fulfil. Moreover, because the area had a reputation for drug 
dealing and prostitution, residents were afraid NGOs and governmental 
organisations might report them to the police authorities. In this regard, two 
to three weeks were spent on situating ourselves in the community and 
gaining their trust. Our team, tried to use local people for knowing the area.  
The object of this project was to realise the problems of the district, prioritise 
them and have the residents solve them themselves. To start, meetings were 
arranged in the house of residents to make the connections. At the beginning 
it was hard to gather them; we had to knock on each door every time to ask 
them to come. It was also hard to establish the purpose and concept of these 
meetings for them since it was new to them. But after three months, people 
welcomed these meetings and tried to follow them themselves. Residents 
asked each other each time to participate and not to miss the meeting. 
However, it was not without challenge: women and aged people were much 





more willing to participate than men and youngsters. One reason for that can 
be the addiction (more general in men than women) that reduces their sense 
of responsibility. Another reason was willingness of women to come out of 
houses and lack of public spaces for them to go. These meetings created a 







Gradually along with connecting people to each other, the group tried to connect 
people to their environment – to build on the sense of belonging and association with 
place. They encouraged them to take responsibility for their ward and ask for proper 
service from formal organisations, but the IBC‟s method was paternalistic:  
"Problems were gradually identified and solved by the people.  IBC helped 
the community to become active in reconstruction through debris removing. 
Trucks were hired by the organisation and residents removed the debris. 
Another problem was the toilet. The government had built a big public toilet 
and bath to be used by the residents; at the time people were still in tents or 
prefabricated temporary shelters and did not have proper access to a private 
toilet. It was especially a danger for women because of a lack of privacy. 
With another NGO private bath containers were provided and distributed in 
the community. Another issue was the garbage collection. The street was 
Box 8.8. International Blue Crescent (IBC) is a Turkish NGO initiated in 1999 in 
cooperation with the United Nations World Food Programme providing humanitarian 
relief all around the world to improve lives of people suffering in disadvantaged parts 
of the world (from its official website). The organisation utilises its experience gained 
in post earthquake activities from the devastating earthquake that hit Marmara, Turkey 
in 1999. In the aftermath of the Bam earthquake IBC entered the field immediately. 
First steps were delivering food packages, blankets and cloths from Turkey. In August 
2004, IBC inaugurated a rehabilitation and community participation project in one of 
the most deprived areas in Bam called by the inhabitants as the “Black area” (Siah-
khooneh). A team of four young members shaped which two of them were from 
Tehran, one from Kerman and one from Bam. The aim of this NGO was to 
communicate with the residents, gain their trust to participate and gradually empower 
residents to claim their rights and run the ward by themselves.  
 





insecure at night and the municipality rarely collected garbage. Moreover, 
though the ward provided waste bins, the bins were often stolen and attempts 
to place new bins failed. Heavy bins fixed to the ground were provided by 
IBC to help the garbage problem of the ward" (ibid).  
"Since making men and youngsters participate was hard, we focused our 
participation project on women and children. For women, sewing classes 
were established. The first series of sewing trainers became sewing teachers 
of the next courses. For children, a children centre in the local park was 
established by IBC. Significant negotiation took place with the municipality 
to gain permission to establish the children centre in the park. One of the 
local girls was trained as a teacher to run the centre and classes were started 
for free with one free meal for children. The park transferred from a centre 
for drug addicts to a centre for children. Children now had a safe place to 
play instead of being locked in prefabricated temporary shelters or playing in 
insecure streets" (ibid).  
IBC failed to act as a sustainable organisation. Because it was a foreign NGO, 
officially it had limited time to operate in the field. For the long term sustainability 
of its projects an indigenous organisation was needed with incentives and funding. 
IBC failed to create or find such an organisation and subsequently left the field in 
2005 and its projects were suspended: 
"Children centre and women sewing classes lasted for one year and a half. 
The teacher‟s salary was cut and it was hoped that the teacher will continue 
her job voluntarily. IBC decided to gradually finish its projects in Bam and 
let people run it them themselves. To leave the city, projects should be given 
to another NGO still active in Bam or to the Government‟s Professions 
Organization (Sazmaan-e-Fani-herfeh-ee). IBC decided to give the centres to 
the Professions Organization. The Professions Organization closed the 
centres stated that the shutting down was temporary until we relocate it 





somewhere else; this never happened. People learned to ask for their rights 
through rehabilitation and participation in the project. The residents provided 
a formal claim but their claims resulted in no satisfying answer. The 
children‟s centre was closed and the children from the Black area were 
reluctant to go to another kindergarten like those provided for UNICEF 
because of their marginal background they would be bullied" (ibid). 
Activities of IBC in "the black area" (i.e. Hafezabad) resulted in some improvement 
in local participation of the residents of that area. Chapter six investigated this issue 




Poshtrood is a town near Bam with about two thousand three hundred residents. 
Eight hundred of its residents died in the earthquake. The main occupation is farming 
and mostly the cultivation of dates. According to a study by WHO of one thousand 
of the residents of Poshtrood, fifty percent of them did not own the land they were 
working on. Due to the earthquake many people lost their livelihoods, which were in 
many cases in forms of livestock. World Relief
4
 targeted the women of Poshtrood for 
its community participation project. The project was rotating micro-credit to be spent 
on income creating activities. Through Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) 
approach forty five women were initially involved in the project and they chose eight 
women from among themselves to benefit from the first credit based on the level of 
their access to a livelihood. With an increase in the number of members, they divided 
into groups of fifteen to twenty five; the groups were expected to be composed of 
people with most similarities in terms of social ties and objectives. Meetings were 
held once a week. Each participant would give a small amount of money to the group 
and sum of these small amounts of moneys would become a considerable amount 
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 Despite the fact that this research focuses on the activities in the city of Bam, the project of 
Poshtrood is included as a case which is influenced by the reconstruction's social movement and was 
one of the new approaches introduced to Bam in community governance. 
4
 A Christian international NGO which equips churches to help victims of poverty, disease, hunger, 
war, disaster and persecution; it was one of the active NGOs in Bam 





that would be the credit of the week. The recipient of each week's credit would be 
chosen by lottery; in other words each week there is a winner of the credit either by 
random or by the acceptance of all participants to dedicate the money to the most in 
need participant. The number of participants increased to two hundred and eighty 
three; twenty three percent of them were illiterate and twenty six percent had a 
college degree or higher.  Seventy participants had no economic activity before the 
earthquake while one hundred of them were economically active. Less than forty 
percent had experience in social participation activities. Twenty women out of the 
forty five recipients of the credits used the credit for animal husbandry and thirteen 
of them, who had no economic activity before the earthquake, used the credit for 
starting an income earning activity. By spring 2011 the project was still running, 
through with decrease in activeness and the number of participants.  
Poshtrood Project (Box 8.10), despite the decrease in its activeness after a few years, 
can be regarded as one of the more sustainable participatory projects in the aftermath 
of the Bam earthquake, and one that has influenced the life of its participants. All of 
the recipients of the micro-credit stated that they achieved a higher and more 
respectful position among their family members after winning the credit. Participants 
believed that these weekly meetings increased they social confidence and was a great 
source of social knowledge. They felt more confident and comfy in sharing their 
problems (Ekhlaspour, 2008).  
There were also disadvantages about the project. Despite the fact that benefiting 
from credit was a great incentive for participants, after a while repaying these 
credits, which were in form of loans, became a matter of concern: "I become anxious 
on Wednesdays because I won a few times but was not able to repay the loans" (one 
of the respondents).  Another participant said: "I bought a goat with my loan but the 
goat died and I have no money to repay the loan". Making money the incentive for 
participation increases the opportunistic and self-interest behaviour among 
participants and affects their sense of good will for all. Participants often claimed 
that the leaders of the group favoured their relatives and friends and disregarded the 
need of participants. Or in other cases they complained that winners, who were 





supposed to use their loans for money raising capital like livestock, cheated and 
showed the goat of their neighbours' as their new asset. Another problem with the 
project was that marginal residents (a group of seasonal labourers called Narmashiri 
who move for work and are among the most deprived) had also often been excluded 
and became further marginalised within the groups.  The Narmashiri are mostly 
illiterate; their communication skills are low and they hardly communicate even with 
each other. Their attendances in the meetings were occasional.  
Poshtrood lacked the vertical ties with other organisations that could have increased 
access to recourse and information for its participants. Like the project of the House 
of Mother and Child, it became a gathering place for the most vulnerable groups: 
according to Della Giusta (2008), excluded and vulnerable members of communities 
need cross-cutting social networks to facilitate their access to legal support and other 
resources; having strong ties with people who suffer from the same lack of resources 
as oneself may not be useful and can even hinder social inclusion. 
8.3.2.3 "Citizens and Participation" Bulletin  
This project aimed to organise neighbouring communities and link these to local 
formal and informal organisations. The means used was the publication of a local 
bulletin and the fostering of local journalists. The leader, coordinator and designer of 
the project was a university lecturer from Kerman. He, being a sociologist, along 
with his wife had long-term experience in practicing empowerment projects in 
Kerman. They had access both to local knowledge (since they were from same 
region) and scientific resources.  
"My university degree is on social science and it is twenty eight years that I 
am researching on social subjects. I was familiar with the debates that UN 
raised regarding disaster management based on empowering civil societies 
after the earthquake of Kobe. Based on my studies I decided to apply a 
community based management approach. After two weeks of the earthquake 





I designed a community-based management plan and offered it to the 
governor and city council of Bam through the Kerman University. I 
immediately entered the tent-camps where affected people were sheltered 
after the earthquake and was accompanied by the head of city council. This 
has increased my legitimacy and accountability in applying the task. We 
asked the citizens to choose two representatives from their neighbours, one 
man and one woman, to act as a link between them and the officials and 
transfer their ideas and problems to them. We were assisted by a Japanese 
NGO and they shared their experiences with us about Kobe. WHO also 
helped us in publicizing our activities through a local bulletin and organizing 
workshops for local people to get familiar with their civil rights and take civil 
responsibility and enter voluntarily to social space" (Zand-Razavi, 2005, p4). 
This project was applied in two wards in Bam and a few wards in Baravat (the 
neighbouring city of Bam). The Chancellor of Kerman University presented the plan 
to the governor of Kerman Province (in which Bam is located) soon after the 
earthquake. The governor passed it to Setad and the plan was accepted to be applied 
temporarily and be tested in two districts of Setad (Setad had divided Bam into ten 
function districts to facilitate reconstruction). The plan started at a local level and a 
bulletin was published every two weeks to inform the participants about the project, 
opportunities and policies and to reflect their voice and problems. The bulletin was 
published in fifty two volumes (over one year). According to Zand-Razavi (2005) 
after the emergency phase when people got back to their houses and left the tent-
camps the project was suspended. Despite the failure of the designed plan, the 
bulletin continued to be published and reflect the problems of Bam in general by 
young Bami journalists for some more months. With the end of the project, Dr Zand-
Razavi diverted his attention to other projects like Poshtrood, and studies to create a 
child-friendly urban space in Bam with UNICEF.  
 










Hamrahan-e-Bam was an NGO launched by a Bami individual who lost his wife and 
only daughter in the earthquake along with about one hundred of his relatives. The 
financial source of the organisation was the personal budget of the founder.   
The target group of Hamrahan was single mothers who had lost their husband in the 
earthquake, children who had lost their parents and children who had drug addicted 
parents. In inaugurating this organisation Mr Sabzevari (the founder) was helped by 
a Tehrani lady who had long-term experience in social work.   
Mr Sabzevari had a great incentive in helping reduce the vulnerability of Bami 
people. Almost all his family and friends had died in the earthquake, and those who 
survived left Bam after the earthquake for other cities. He was wealthy enough to run 
a good life in a big city like Tehran. But he had stayed and established the NGO. He 
is a religious and spiritual man who believed that if he is alive and has not been 
killed by the earthquake then there should be a reason for it. He believed he was 
given a task by God to help Bami people.  
Despite being one of the wealthiest persons in Bam, after three years since the 
earthquake he was still living in a prefabricated temporary shelter. In explaining his 
situation he asserted:  
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 As discussed in chapter four, section 4.5, NGOs in Iran can be categorised as traditional and 
modern; however, the importance of Hamrahane-Bam as an indigenous NGO that fostered after the 
earthquake made it hard for the author not to emphasize on it as a separate category. In other words, 
presenting it as a separate category was a way to show its importance.  Access to more data was not 
possible due to distance, accessibility and time limitations.  





"In the new city design of Bam the function of my land was allocated 
industrial by mistake. To amend the mistake I had to follow a long 
bureaucratic process. I made an appeal two times but both times they told me 
that my case was lost. Besides, the responsibilities and tasks of the NGO give 
me no time for such things".  
Being an affected Bami who had lost his loved ones and lived in the situation that 
other Bamis were living under was a great incentive. This emotional and physical 
unity with those impacted also made it hard for him to see the bigger picture. The 
stress of loss and reconstruction period also resulted in a confrontational and 
emotional approach. 
"When I first met Mr Sabzevari I found him very determined in his task to 
help vulnerable people especially orphaned children. But as an experienced 
social worker I noticed that since I had started to work with him he had not 
mentioned anything about his passed wife and daughter. Whenever there was 
a meeting between NGOs or governmental organisations he started 
arguments and disagreements. Even other organisations called him in an 
advantageous way to fight for them in their clashes with other organisations.  
He did not apply for work permission for the NGO. He said "I have no 
business with the government; I have enough money to follow my targets". I 
gradually approached him and encouraged him to share his pain. One night 
he suddenly told his story and started to cry for three nights. He got better 
since then but is still aggressive in his approaches. In a recent case I noticed 
he was very forceful in giving marriage consultation, which was not in his 
profession, to one of the Bamis he was helping" (Ms Dehbashi, a social 
worker and one of the members of Hamyaran NGO).  
This case shows that together with a great incentive and source of funds, technical 
capacity and experience are important factors in creating a culture of rational 
negotiation and influencing the structure of power in the long-term. Aggressive 





behaviour will create a behaviour of resistance towards the leader from different 
agencies and is an obstacle in creation of norms of reciprocity.  
8.3.4 Discussion 
After the earthquake many national and international NGOs started their activities in 
Bam. Some were well established with previous experience while others evolved 
through the reconstruction of Bam. Some of the NGOs followed traditional methods 
of service providing for the vulnerable and some tried to encourage the activation of 
civil society through advocacy and building self-esteem among Bami people and 
empowering them to claim their rights to resources. Though theoretically these two 
groups had different perspectives on addressing the vulnerability, in practice the 
boundaries between these two groups on the ground was less clear. Some of the 
traditional style organisations succeeded in creating networks and increased the self-
esteem of their beneficiaries, and some of the NGOs aiming to create organised civil 
society ended in merely providing short-term services. 
The experience of national NGOs in Bam demonstrates that those NGOs that 
succeeded in creating vertical ties among people and different organisations and 
communities along with horizontal ties were more successful in transferring the 
sense of self-determination among Bami people and were more likely to survive over 
time. Funding has also been identified as a critical determinant of the longevity and 
success of NGOs. Another lesson that can be useful is the importance of leadership. 
While charismatic leaders are important factors in increasing the trust, reputation and 
success of NGOs, especially in making vertical links, it also makes them vulnerable 









8.4 Foreign NGOs in Bam 
Foreign NGOs in Bam can be divided in to two types. The first group was those who 
preferred to apply their assistance in financial form. Their donations were a political 
and humanitarian gesture. They financed construction of some new schools and 





The second group was those who had a policy advocacy intention. They applied their 
objectives through Iranian staff. Because of the problem of communication their 
main contacts were Tehran based young people who could speak English fluently but 
were often alien to Bami norms and values. The young Teherani staff often lacked 
the voluntary and humanitarian spirit needed for such activities and regarded their 
job as an opportunity to improve their resume as a worker of an international 
organisation. Even in their stay in Bam they were distanced from the affected Bami's 
situation. Staff members of many of the international NGOs had great negative 
effects in presenting NGOs in Bam in terms of their negligent behaviour: 
"Despite the expectation one would have from United Nation as a great and 
experienced international agency, UN in Bam did not appear as effective as it 
should. Its members were mostly from western style Iranian families who 
were fluent in English but no experience with living in harsh conditions. The 
non-Iranian staffs were the least experienced and the most amateur. The 
Box 8.9. Muslim Aid is a UK based NGO. After the earthquake of Bam one of my 
friends who was a member of Muslim Aid asked me to be their representative in 
Bam. Their object was to build a multi-purpose clinic in Bam. The project started 
two years after the earthquake. Despite the fact that Muslim Aid showed interest in 
helping Bam the project did not start till two years after the earthquake. The reason 
was they did not have the right link in Tehran. They did not want to be involved 
directly in Bam. At the time of the earthquake I was not in Iran. It was seven 
months after my arrival to Tehran that I got the offer. The project lasted for 
eighteen months (The representative of Muslim Aid in Bam, 2010).  
 





equal job opportunity as the fundamental of human right is not being applied 
in UN branch in Iran" (Mansourian, 2008).  
"International agencies like UNDP, due to the fact that they had access to 
substantial budget, had lavish expenditure. For example for a simple 
workshop they had spent huge amount of money to serve their participants in 
a luxury style in middle of a devastated city" (a researcher of social 
consequences of Bam's reconstruction, 2010).  
"When entering the field we [non-Bami volunteers] were ignorant of our alienation 
to the social norms of these people. UN especially has affected the Bami society in a 
negative way. For example, the average salary that UN gave to its employees was 
higher than other NGOs and much higher than average salaries in Bam. This has 
increased the expectation of workers; someone who had worked with UN could 
hardly get satisfied with other jobs or lower salary. Another example was applying 
western manner and style in the religious traditional city of Bam. While Bami 
women used traditional dress code and most of them use long black chador in public 
spaces, NGO workers (especially workers of foreign organisations) were negligent in 
covering themselves in a religious style. Many Iranian young workers of foreign 
NGOs looked at Bam's reconstruction as an opportunity to make links with 
international agencies for their future jobs and not as a place for humane 
volunteering place" (Manager of Yari NGO, 2010). 
Another problem facing foreign NGOs that aimed to apply a policy advocacy 
approach was the need for organised grass-root Bami communities to communicate 
with and implement their projects. Such local communities were absent in Bam. 
Oxfam GB, for example, had a programme to increase the capacity of local 
communities. Initially the plan intended to implement through Bami community 
organisations, but since no proper local community was found, they decided to apply 
their project through a Tehran based NGO. But according to studies by Ekhlaspour 
(2005), since foreign NGOs had limited time to stay in Iran (at the end of the second 





year after the earthquake they had to leave) the Iranian NGO was pressured to speed 
up the project that Oxfam had designed to encourage the community participation. 
But such projects needed time and patience. For that reason the Iranian NGO 
withdrew cooperation and suspended the project unfinished. Hence Oxfam's 
activities were limited to a few workshops. The limited time that the foreign NGOs 
had was a big obstacle and caused programmes to be short-term and mostly limited 
to the construction of public facilities.   
Iranian NGOs, compared to foreign NGOs had a higher sense of volunteerism. 
However the higher wage levels of foreign NGOs created an opportunity for using 
reconstruction for self-interested purposes rather than social good. While some 
Iranian NGO staff tolerated the harsh situations to help Bami people and often spend 
even their pocket money on Bami people, local staff of international NGOs saw their 
situation as mercenaries who only had to accomplish the limited tasks they were 









Box 8.10. "Foreign NGOs had higher marginal expenses. Their staff were more 
immoderate than national NGOs' staff. Staff of foreign NGOs expected better 
shelter, food and other facilities than workers of national NGOs. Workers of 
foreign NGOs had less volunteering spirit and altruism than national NGO 
workers. They were rather mercenaries than selfless volunteers. They lived in 
"Arge-jadid" a comfort gated development at the margin of Bam which was 
unaffected by earthquake. We as workers of a foreign NGO had less contact with 
local Bamis because we had resided in Arge-jadid. Our role in the field was 
different from workers of national NGOs. We had rigid schedules to follow; but 
workers of national NGOs were more flexible and could change their 
programmes upon change of the situations or with demand of the local people" 
(an Iranian staff member of Swiss Academy of Development, 2010). 
 
Box 8.11. "Staff members of international NGOs were mostly upper class Tehrani 
dwellers who got used to a semi-western style lifestyle in Tehran. Being mostly 
young, they used to party and had night life in Arge-Jadid, where they resided in 
Bam. This not only increased the expenses of staff but also was in contrast with 
local values" (an Iranian staff member of IBC). 
 









In Bam after the earthquake a group of Tehrani and foreign agents entered the field 
and brought with themselves a space that symbolised a special class membership and 
life-style with western codes that was distinct from the religious and less-urbanised 
people of Bam
6
. An intangible sense of power was hidden under their practices that 
created a sense among Bamis of being regarded as inferiors. This often resulted in 
alienation of Bami people towards these NGOs. But since most of the foreign NGOs 
left Bam after a few months of the end of the emergency phase (and at the end of the 
second year of the earthquake the remaining foreign NGOs were asked to leave) 
such behaviours did not result in long-term damage.  
Another disadvantage of foreign NGOs was their lack of awareness of local 
knowledge, which increased their inefficiencies.  
"Lack of local knowledge increases the cost and decreases effectiveness. In 
Bam UNICEF had distributed some expensive dolls among Bami children as 
a way to make them play and get happy.  Many Bami mothers treated the 
dolls as precious properties and hided them in safe places. Many others 
claimed that they did not get dolls and demand for dolls increased. In one of 
the camps a Bami mother approached me and claimed that "my son has got 
depressed but he was not given any toys from NGOs" I grabbed some stones 
from the ground and started to play haft-sang [a local game played like 
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 Based on the definition and opinion of Bourdieu (1986) about the power of class 
membership (see literature review) 
Box 8.12. "I gradually gained trust among Bami people. The fact that they 
realized I as a woman could live my life safely in Tehran at my home but am 
single handedly there living in tent tolerating harsh situation just to help them 
gave Bami encouragement and sense of being supported and cared. I realized 
that children had no place to play. I prepared a tent for children to play in and 
study. People were happy to send their children to my center due to the link of 
trust that was created" (representative of Iranian NGO Association for 
Protection of Child Labourers in Bam, 2010). 
 





marbles but with small stones]. I told her for making your son happy he does 
not need expensive toys, you can teach him how to play haft-sang" 
(Dehbashi, social activist in Bam, 2011). 
"One problem with NGOs, especially foreign NGOs, was that they mostly 
did not use local Bamis as staff but instead used Tehrani workers. This did 
not cover their gap to local knowledge. Because of that in some cases they 
spent their funds on unnecessary goods and services. For example UNICEF 
spent a lot on buying PCs but a lot of them remained unused. Iranian NGOs 
were more influential in Bam in this regard than foreign NGOs. The reason 
was that they had better knowledge about the social norms and needs of Bam 
and could communicate better. But foreign NGOs worked from rigid 
instructions" (The manager of Iranian NGO: Yari, 2010). 
One of the merits of Iranian NGOs was that they mostly used female staff in Bam. 
This facilitated communication with the most vulnerable, namely women and 
children, and created strong links of trust between NGOs and the people.  
"When I entered Bam [from Tehran] on the second day of the earthquake, 
there was chaos everywhere. We were shocked when we got to the field. Our 
organisation was focused on child labourers of Tehran and we had no 
experience in disaster. We did not have any plan or structured program. We 
had collected money from people in Tehran but had no idea how were we 
going to spend it.  Red Crescent gave us three tents. These with the money 
we had collected from people in Tehran were all I had to deal with the 
situation. We were lucky that one of the staff had a Bami contact. We were a 
small group of women. This was a merit in terms of gaining trust and because 
of that the contact who was a woman as well got comfortable with us and 
helped us" (the lady in charge of the Association for Protection of Child 
Labourers, 2009). 





"I hired my first staff from local Bamis. My intention was knowing Bam 
better through a Bami and also through this way the cost of hiring the staff 
would be spent to a Bami. She was a woman who has lost her husband and 
child in the earthquake. I hired her as a teacher. This way she could help 
children and it also would be a healing process for herself" (ibid).  
"My concern was mostly women and children. I realized that women did not 
have a public space to be comfortable and unveiled. Hence I ordered a large 
tent with capacity of two hundred people. I also hired a local gym teacher for 
children and a lady from Tehran to practice music with children. We even ran 
a small concert in a nearby city and even another one in Tehran. Concerts 
gave children self-confidence and enthusiasm. Because I was a woman it was 
easier for local women to trust me and communicate with me and leave their 
children with me" (ibid).  
Despite the discouraging outcomes of many foreign NGOs due to their lack of local 
knowledge, their efforts can be appreciated for two reasons: their higher technical 
and financial capacities compared to Iranian NGOs, and the networking that foreign 
NGOs, especially UNICEF and UNDP, created among all active NGOs in Bam to 
communicate and share their experiences and resources, in fact many Iranian NGOs 







Box 8.13. "We shared a project with a Japanese NGO. There was a great 
advantage in working with a Japanese NGO: it was a great source of learning. 
They were very organized and had long-term plans. Most national NGOs that we 
knew had far ambitious objects which were often not within their capability but 
Japanese' NGO objects were in small scale, practicable, functional and were 
applied successfully. The project we shared with them was focused on women. 
They suggested that we organize an art course for women making handcrafts. It 
was amusing for women and created a social space for them to interacts and 
communicate. We developed our categories and added computer and sewing 
courses. Later we applied therapists to help them and let them share their 
problems" (the lady in charge of the Association for Protection of Child 
Labourers, 2009). 
 
















Despite being connected to each other through different non-governmental 
organisations, NGOs in Bam suffered from poor co-operation and ties with 
governmental organisations like the municipality and Setads. This fact not only 
created clashes between the local government and NGOs but also threatened the 
longevity of their projects. NGO staff indicated that while the governor and 
municipality could maintain security in the field (especially of women) they refused 
to do so (Boxes 8.17, 8.18, and 8.19): 
"The government had different policies in dealing with national NGOs and 
international NGOs in Bam. There where limitations for international NGOs. 
The ministry of interior was harsh on them on giving permission to work in 
Box 8.14. "One common object in most NGOs was their focus on children. 
Hence they all needed professional and preferably local teachers. Here UNICEF 
came in assistance. It organized teaching courses for local volunteers. Through 
this process not only NGOs had got professional local teachers to employ but also 
it became a forum for NGOs to meet and share projects" (the lady in charge of 
the Association for Protection of Child Labourers, 2009). 
 
Box 8.15. "UNICEF organized weekly meetings among all NGOs. In one of these 
meetings a foreign NGO approached me and asked if I could help them in 
conducting their resources to where it is most needed. I bought a small library for 
my center. Later it became a gathering place for mothers and children" (the lady 
in charge of the Association for Protection of Child Labourers, 2009). 
 
Box 8.16. "Initially I was working with a Czechoslovakian NGO called "People 
in Need". In UNICEF gatherings I met deputy director of Swiss Academy and I 
was asked to join them. It was a pilot project to study the effect of sport on 
traumatic child to overcome trauma. We covered two hundred and fifty children" 
(one of the Tehrani staff members of Swiss Academy in Bam, 2010). 
 





Bam and there was lot of control on them.  National NGOs did not have that 
problem. They were more emancipated. But non-Iranian NGOs had better 
access to financial and technical resources and were more experienced in the 
subject. This resulted in collaboration among national and international 
NGOs. Most foreign NGOs applied their projects through Iranian NGOs. The 
policy of the state to the Iranian NGOs was neutral: there was neither control 
nor support. The link was pale. Bam was divided into setads by the 
reconstruction plan but we had no business with the setad of our ward. It was 
hard for me to stay and work in Bam as a single woman. The governor was 
capable of creating security for me but it did not. They were all good in 
words in seminars and social gatherings but in practice there was no support 












Box 8.17. "In an incident, due to the poor service provision in the camps, the water 
pipes were broken and the water covered the electricity cables which were damaged 
in some parts. It was a very dangerous situation. I contacted the electricity 
department of Bam but they said the service of camps does not relate to their activity 
area. I contacted the municipality and they said it is the responsibility of NGO's 
coordinating organisation. The contact with the clergy of Bam had the same result; he 
contacted the water supply department and they said since the water piping system of 
that organisation is not provided by us we have no knowledge or responsibility about 
that. I contacted Mr Zand-Razavi (one of the social activists and runner of the 
shahrvandan-va-mosharekat bulletin) and shared my problem with him. He 
published my problem in the local bulletin. But it was useless. We had no other 
option but to do the job by ourselves. The next day I and the participants started to 
dig a channel to divert the flowing water to the waste land at our nearby. Even the 
children were helping us in this task" (Founder of Banouye Bam NGO, 2005) 
 
Box 8.18. "There was a park in Bam which could be a great place for children but 
instead had become a waste place and a center for substance uses to market drug. Its 
land belonged to the municipality and the plan was to change it to a social center. We 
as the staff of IBC did many liaising with the municipality to allocate the land to 
children as a nursery. After severe efforts we won the land and changed it to a play-
yard for children. A Bami woman volunteered to be their teacher. The place changed 
to a nursery and was free. As long as we were there the children's center was active. 
But as soon as we left there the municipality started to build there a social 
center"(Tehrani staff member of IBC, 2007). 
 
 










8.5 Focus of most Iranian NGOs on women and children: 
ccording to Ekhlaspour's studies (2005) two months after the earthquake, thirty three 
Iranian NGOs had entered the field since the earthquake. At least seventeen of them 
had considered children in their projects (eight of them were solely focused on 
children). The next significant population that most NGOs covered was women. The 
interesting fact about national NGOs in Bam is that most were run by women and 
about eighty percent of the active staff in Bam were women (Ekhlaspour, 2005). 
The large presence of women in the NGOs increased the sense of trust and comfort 
among vulnerable Bami women to participate in the projects. Women, especially 
single mothers, were the target group of most of the NGOs active in Bam either 
directly or through their children. Before the earthquake women of the Bam region 
tended to stay inside and were religious; social interaction with men other than their 
relatives and families was limited and women felt uncomfortable in such situations. 
Female activists from Tehran and Kerman were successful in approaching them and 
addressing their problems. Activities that national and international NGOs 
considered for this group were mostly sewing and computing courses.  
"NGOs filled all over the city and a large group of them were focused on 
women; and almost all of them run computer and sewing courses which were 
Box 8.19. There was a project that was given to us by UNICEF. It was an inter-
provincial sport competition. The subject we were given was boys' football, but we 
also added gymnastic and tekvando for girls. For practicing we needed a place to 
exercise, but the municipality did not give us any place. They said because it was a 
UN project you have to ask them to provide you all the facilities including practicing 
space. If you want us to help, you have to direct the project's budget to city's sport 
section. We rejected to do so hence the project was suspended for a while. Later on 
we found an abandoned play yard in a destroyed school and started our practices 
there" (the lady in charge of the Association for Protection of Child Labourers, 
2009). 
 





demanded by Bami women themselves" (the staff member of Swiss 
Academy of Development, 2010).  
Are Bami women more powerful after the disaster? The following stories suggest 
that some improvement in socialising Bami women and addressing their 
vulnerabilities occurred during reconstruction: 
 "Women of Bam are much more empowered now. There are more women 
who work outside their home. There are more women in Bam driving cars. 
Women of Bam are more social these days. More than half of the sellers in 
bazaar are women now. There are more nursery and fast-food restaurants in 
Bam compared to before the earthquake which shows that women spend less 
time in kitchen and are more outgoing. This shows that Bami women had the 
potential to participate in social activities and even get the men's position. 
After the earthquake the traditional social structure of Bam changed 
substantially towards a more modern structure" (Papoli, 2007). 
"One year after the Bam earthquake another city of Kerman province was hit 
by an earthquake. The first group that reached there even before the Red 
Crescent was people of Bam. Some of our NGO participants who were 
mostly Bami women also joined them to help. This gave our women sense of 
responsibility and sympathy. It also increased their self-confidence" (the lady 
in charge of the Association for Protection of Child Labourers, 2009).  
"During my long-term contact with Bami people since the earthquake I 
realized that there were a group of Baluch women in Bam whose identity was 
recorded in no formal organisation. They did not have any birth certificate or 
identity card. Because of that they searched for social security and identity 
through marriage with Bami men. This had eased and increased the culture of 
polygamy among Bami men. The earthquake had created made them more 
vulnerable and at the same time created an opportunity for them to be seen. I 





faced three cases in my activities in Bam that these Baluch women were in 
severe livelihood condition.  One of them was a nineteen year old girl with 
children who had lost her husband in the earthquake. She could not benefit 
from any kind of social help from public and governmental organisations as a 
single mother because she had no civil identity. We were unsuccessful in our 
application for getting her civil identity since she had no birth certificate but 
after a few years of anticipation we succeeded to get her children legal 
identity certificates" (A Tehrani social worker in Bam, 2011). 
"There was a lady donating money to our charity once a while. She was a 
wealthy Bami woman who had lost her family in the earthquake. She was so 
depressed and for that reason rarely would leave the house. We invited her 
many times to participate in our projects but she resisted all times. Once she 
provided food for Ramadan iftar, we asked her to help us in distributing the 
food among Bami people around the city. She accepted and joined us. She 
was surprised that we dare to enter house of people's we have no relation to. 
She realized communicating is much easier than she thought. Since then she 
gradually participated in some of our projects. Now she is an active member 
of our organisation and also one of the boarding managers" (A Tehrani social 
worker in Bam, 2011).  
Increased power sharing at the local level may not automatically translate into 
increased power for women (Fordham 2003). Development and other initiatives 
cannot be seen as static events but rather as dynamic processes of social relations. 
Despite the efforts made to reduce the vulnerability of women after the earthquake 
there was no effort to involve men in increasing their awareness on gender equality. 
"Calls for integration are easy to make but integration is difficult to achieve on the 
ground" (Fordham, 2003, p70).  
"Women of Bam are much stronger than before the earthquake. We see more 
women work, drive and take social responsibilities. Actually I believe the 





city is run by women now. But the fact is our men counterparts do not take us 
seriously. Despite our social evolvement we face problem when it comes to 
formal applications and policy makings. For example if a man applies for a 
piece of land from the municipality it would be much probable for him to get 
it than if a woman apply" (a Bami woman active in Poshtrood NGO). 
When we talk about gender we have to consider that gender-sensitive approaches 
should probe deeper into gender issues. Gender inequality is multidimensional. 
Femininity is hidden in deeper levels of the human arena: there is the feminine 
space, feminine mind, and feminine view of the world. In participatory discourses 
the involvement of women in development projects is insensitive to deeper levels of 
femininity.  Women are expected to be involved in projects that are highly 
masculine. In feminine discourses it is highly encouraged to empower women in 
decision-makings through involving them in governmental and legislative decision 
making in highly masculine ways. The question remains whether empowering 
women equals distancing women from their feminine nature? If there are more 
women drivers or female workers in Bam does this mean they are more empowered? 
And if yes, in what regard? "The question is not 'how much' people are empowered 
but rather 'for what' are they empowered?" (Henko et al, 2001, P182) 
"One of the chief dangers is that the rhetoric of integration and inclusion 
masks a largely technocratic concern; one that may advance incrementally 
but still fails to grasp the difficult challenge of the root causes of 
vulnerability at the social and political level" (Fordham 2003, p70). 
Gender-sensitive activities of NGOs in Bam and the image that female NGO workers 
in Bam created made a channel for Bami women's voices to be heard. Studying their 
effects on deeper levels of femininity is important but does not fall under the remit of 
this research.  
 






This chapter explored how post-earthquake Bam became an opportunity for national 
and international NGOs to practice how to be a part of urban governance in times of 
crisis. The relief phase became an opportunity for NGOs to enter the field and 
communicate with the local residents while later phases of reconstruction helped 
them grow. Based on the activities of national and international NGOs active in 
social empowerment projects three categories of NGOs were determined. The first 
group applied a top-down approach and regarded the effected people as victims who 
were unable to address their own needs. Due to that view these NGOs chose the most 
deprived households to provide them with goods and services.  Their activities 
created a norm of dependency on the NGO. The second category tried to empower 
residents through participatory projects. This group achieved some success in the 
field. The third classification was an indigenous organisation founded by an 
earthquake-affected person whose activity in the field, unlike the other groups, had 
direct effects on his own life because he was trying to affect his own place of birth 
and residence. The chapter then examined the collaboration of foreign NGOs with 
Bami people and national NGOs. It was followed by a section that tried to see the 
problem of Bam through the eyes of these NGOs which appeared to be gender 
inequality. A considerable number of projects of NGOs in Bam were focused on 
empowering women.  Iranian NGOs regarded gender-inequality as a more important 
social issue to be tackled than hegemony of class, religion, or state. There were also 
signs of disapproval from local and Tehrani people in Bam towards the application 
of western behaviour and dress code in the field.  
In practice activities of different NGOs in Bam did not result in any political reform 
in the area. The municipality remained distant from Bami people and, as was 
observed in the previous chapter, was not empowered by the central government.  
The empowerment approaches of NGOs in Bam did not result in any major 
economic and livelihood improvement among beneficiaries. Most NGOs applied a 





paternal style in their approach towards the most vulnerable women and children of 
Bam which in turn created a relationship of dependency on NGOs. At the same time, 
limited resources constrained the longevity of many NGO activities.  
There was no indigenous local demand for non-governmental organisations, 
nevertheless the earthquake created a huge supply of NGOs to Bamis. Most of the 
residents had no previous experience of NGOs or knew what an NGO could assist 
with. If Bami people had been informed of the potential of NGOs in parallel to their 
arrival or soon after at the commencement of reconstruction, they may have 
collaborated further or negotiated for better outcomes. NGOs at the best were 
successful in presenting Bami people an idea of a new form of governance, albeit in 
theory rather in practice.  
"The activities of NGOs in Bam were very influential in institutionalizing 
these organisations in the region. I can say with confident that Bam is the 
only city in Iran that its citizens are well familiar with NGOs and trust them. 






Conclusion: Towards Better 





9.1 Concluding Remarks 
The intention of this thesis was to study the social resilience of Bam after the 2003 
earthquake. The research aimed to explore how the city of Bam changed 
institutionally and characteristically after the earthquake. In this regard the research 
examined who the most prominent stakeholders in reconstruction of Bam were and 
how they interacted with each other. The following agencies were studied as the 
main stakeholders of reconstruction: the residents of urban Bam, the designers and 
planners of the reconstruction scheme, Housing Foundation (as the executive body of 
the reconstruction scheme), national NGOs, foreign NGOs, international multilateral 
agencies and the local government. Three empirical chapters analysed how these 





stakeholders interacted and how their views, interests and efforts shaped the new 
structure of power in post-earthquake Bam. The research contributes to the concepts 
of NGOs, social capital, urban governance, civil society, participation, and 
vulnerability, which are all inter-related.  
A study of the contemporary history (last two centuries) of Bam showed that the 
social structure of Bam was highly influenced by livelihoods and access to resources. 
The main economic activity in Bam was agriculture. Situated in an arid area, access 
to water had vital importance for Bamis. The scarcity of water created a society built 
around class, in which those who were in charge of providing and maintaining water 
distribution became upper class and petty farmers, who were reliant on the water 
distribution, constituted the lower class. Despite land and political reform in 1960s 
this class structure existed until the revolution of 1979. Access to resources, 
especially legal land ownership and shelter, was historically very difficult for petty 
farmers and seasonal migrants. Over time a marginalised group was shaped whose 
livelihood was highly dependent on their access to the bazaar of urban Bam. The 
social reforms that the revolution of 1979 invoked were influential in breaking the 
traditional khan-rayat (landlord and landless petty farmer) structure of Bam but were 
ineffective in addressing the vulnerability of this marginalised group’s livelihood. 
Bam was regarded as an urban area due to its active service and industry sectors and 
large population; nevertheless it is highly dependent on agriculture.  
Family bonding ties in Bam are strong and the average family size in Bam in 1996 
was 5.2, which can be regarded as large families. The earthquake revealed that Bami 
people were more reliant on informal institutions than formal institutions in their 
everyday life. Informal housing and land occupation instead of formal legal 
permission, and a reliance on social links and trust in the urban bazaar were 
indicative of a society who felt independent of formal institutions and legal 
registration. There were even a group of people with no formal registered identity. 
Strong family ties and large families provided Bamis with a social structure that 
acted as a coping system in times of difficulties. There were cases where families 
used their bonding ties to survive the disaster and overcome their plight. However, 





the earthquake largely destroyed this structure and revealed their social vulnerability. 
The reconstruction plan was designed on a loss-based approach in which the loss 
would be evaluated through a legal and bureaucratic process. Many families lacked 
the formal capabilities to access resources.  
The government’s loan giving policy weakened these strong bonding ties 
(intentionally or unintentionally) by giving loans to newly wedded households. The 
norm had been that young married couples shared a house with their parents, but the 
loans were also allocated for the building of separate shelters for the young couple. 
The level of independence between parents and their married children differed 
between areas; affluent areas had a higher level of independence, while deprived and 
old areas had a higher level of dependence. The reconstruction also created new 
districts with younger and more independent residents.  
It can be concluded that post-earthquake Bam became less traditional and favoured 
young residents. This change was not intentional but the young residents, either as 
new comers or existing residents, had significant power in influencing the 
reconstruction of Bam; they appeared to be the main consumers of the reconstruction 
services. They had an important role in reshaping the new urban form of Bam by 
using the loans allocated to new wedded couples: the urban form of Bam changed 
from large mud-built houses in palm groves to smaller but more numerous brick-
facade designed houses. New Bam also has more socially active women than before 
the earthquake, the number of female drivers increased substantially. There are more 
women running retails and they are seen more in public service providing positions 
like in banks, travel agencies and airport than before the earthquake.  . 
Reconstruction process of Bam had effects on the social structure of the area. People 
of Bam, especially women are more outgoing and social than before the earthquake. 
This change was not a direct outcome of governmental policies but occurred through 
the process of reconstruction: due to the demolition of houses and private spaces by 
the earthquake, people had to share public spaces during the emergency phase. 





Consequently women had less privacy and had been forced to contact society more 
to get access to their basic needs. In some cases people were encouraged by some 
NGOs to spend less time in privacy and communicate more with their neighbours. In 
later phases of reconstruction, for better access to livelihood, some people rented 
their rooms or prefabricated units and shared their private spaces. Having less access 
to financial resources, to cut the expenses, many people limited their social relations 
with their families and family meetings and consequently family and relative 
bonding ties decreased. Moreover, the entrance of new comers from different regions 
made social structure of Bam more heterogeneous: complains of many Bami 
residents about the entrance of Narmashiri's or rural dwellers to the city shows that a 
new form of social structure is shaping.  
The main body responsible for reconstruction was the Housing Foundation whose 
main objective was to provide shelter to existing landowners. The reconstruction 
plan for Bam designed by the Council of Architecture and Urban Development was 
based on three aims: 
a) Preserving the city’s identity in urban design, 
b) Strengthening the new houses against earthquakes through the implementing the 
national building code, and 
c) Ensuring householders' participation in the process of rebuilding. 
However, there was a greater focus on the façade and resistance of the buildings than 
on the participation of people in shaping their surroundings. There were efforts, 
nevertheless, to find a way to involve people as much as possible in the housing 
reconstruction process. The HF exhibited a number of built houses in different 
designs and invited people to choose their favourite design from the provided 
models. People were concerned with their ability to afford the construction by the 
loan, especially in the absence of an effective livelihood regeneration policy and 





mostly chose the cheapest model. In a survey to determine the most prominent 
worries of residents of urban Bam in 2004 (as explored in the Participatory Housing 
Reconstruction Approach chapter of this research) access to shelter, low job 
opportunities, and high cost of living were among the top five. These results indicate 
that reconstruction programmes should expand into livelihood regeneration 
programmes to allow for a more encompassing approach to vulnerability reduction.  
The focus on architecture and resistant buildings coupled with the minimal role of 
local people in reconstruction reduced any flexibility in the reconstruction approach. 
In order to build resistant houses based on the designed plan, the role of contractors 
increased. Consequently the extent of participation of people was limited to 
completing applications forms and providing building materials. Formally they were 
prohibited to intervene the building process. There were signs of irresponsibility of 
the contractors who failed to finish the building according to the allocated time and 
budget or in an opportunistic manner left the field with the loans that were allocated 
for building Bami people without completing the projects.  
An increase in the price of building material was another problem that occurred 
during reconstruction phase. The absence of an effective control of prices of material 
placed many Bami households in a vulnerable situation. For many, especially those 
who did not start reconstruction in initial phases, the allocated loan was insufficient 
to cover the increased cost of materials, and led to only partially finished houses for 
many families. According to HF reports, by January 2009 sixty three percent of the 
total demand for new housing had been met and thirty seven percent had not yet 
been covered. If the plan had been designed in a more flexible way, such as 
enforcing fixed prices of building materials; an increase in the size of loans to match 
the higher cost of materials, or if there had been better supervision of the contractors, 
the number of unfinished houses in urban Bam may have decreased and more people 
could have received better access to shelter.  





The Tehran-based professional planners were removed from the realities faced by 
the earthquake-affected population of Bam, which put already vulnerable groups in a 
more vulnerable position. The reconstruction policy was loss based rather than need 
based. Those groups who had insecure land-titles like tenants, migrants and informal 
dwellers were less able to benefit from the reconstruction services. The cultural and 
fragile legal position of women also put many of them in a vulnerable position: in 
cases where a man had married more than one woman and hence had more than one 
household, he could only apply for one of his households. Women whose husbands 
had left them without formally divorcing them also had problems in legitimising 
themselves as a legitimate applicant for a loan. Women whose husbands had died in 
the earthquake also faced problems since legally they could not inherit the land as it 
belonged to their husband. If there had been a local community that could 
communicate with the planners and make them aware of such situations, more 
people may have been able to benefit from the reconstruction and reconstruction in 
turn could have increased the social resilience of Bam.   
The result of a central and professional biased approach was that not all three aims of 
the reconstruction plan were met. Active and encompassing local participation was 
neglected in favour of building resistant and aesthetically pleasing houses. The 
extent of the new houses resistance to earthquakes cannot be determined until 
another earthquake happens, but the aesthetical aspect of the new houses was not 
what the planners had in mind.  
"What was implemented was different from what we had in mind. The huge 
demand for houses and the limited time we had to prepare schemes for 
twenty five thousand houses for people who were in instant need of shelter 
ended up in repetitious schemes. People were too desperate to pay attention 
and communicate with the schemes. Moreover, it was easier for contractors 
and setads to control and apply the projects in this way" (the head of 
Naghshe-Jahane-pars, one of the main designers of reconstruction plan, 
winter 2010). 





Further, the approach negatively affected the Bamis' sense of belonging. The influx 
of workers from all over the country to Bam to do labour work has increased the 
sense of insecurity and alienation among Bami people and especially Bami women. 
The survey showed that Bami people did not find the new designs beautiful or 
desirable. The damage to palms during the reconstruction process exacerbated this 
feeling. Many people believed that the destruction of social and urban borders 
brought into Bam new residents who do not share the same moral values. Hence 
social trust in Bam has decreased. 
While reconstruction could be an opportunity to empower local government and 
create essential links between people and local government and the local government 
and the central governmental, this did not happen in Bam. The local government was 
marginalised in decision-making, appeared weak in urban refurbishment, and a sense 
of distrust and dissatisfaction was observed towards the members of the municipality 
and city council. 
The research showed that the efficiency of NGOs was correlated with their 
legitimacy and relationship with the central government; their understanding of the 
grass-root communities; their access to financial resources; experience in post-
earthquake situations; and the level of trust and acceptance they could achieve from 
the target communities. 
In Bam the state’s distrust towards the activities of foreign NGOs meant the state 
restricted foreign NGOs’ activities to only the first two years after the earthquake. 
This forced the foreign NGOs to focus on physical construction projects rather than 
longer-term social empowerment projects. There were also signs some foreign NGO 
staff disrespecting local values, which hindered the creation of trust among foreign 
NGOs and local Bamis. 
Iranian NGOs did not suffer from the same issues; a number of Iranian NGO staff in 
Bam were women and most of these women respected, shared and valued the 





religious beliefs of local Bamis. This was very helpful in the creation of trust 
between Iranian NGOs and the Bami target communities, especially Bami women. 
However, Iranian NGOs lacked technical and financial expertise or capacity: without 
sufficient financial support from the government's budget, many Iranian NGOs relied 
on their foreign counterparts to cover their expenses. With the suspension of 
activities of foreign NGOs in the field after two years, many of these Iranian NGOs 
became financially vulnerable. They also lacked the proper experience and 
knowledge for appropriate budget execution. Consequently, many of their 
empowering projects were unsuccessful in addressing the basic financial needs of 
their target groups.  
The people of Bam felt highly connected to their unique surroundings; they were 
concerned about their palm-groves, their neighbours, and their city. They thought 
their city was beautiful before the earthquake and they believed the earthquake had 
damaged their identity and sense of belonging through the influx of opportunists 
from other towns and cities and labourers from across the country. The 
reconstruction scheme could have been designed in a way to involve people using 
their sense of belonging and experience in taking care of the palm groves, re-
designing the urban areas, houses and construction. But the reconstruction plan was 
applied based on the provision of only shelter for Bami residents. The logic was that 
involving people in designing the plan would have been time consuming when 
people were in need of immediate shelter. The rationale behind the use of non-local 
labourers was that it was more efficient than using local people, who were mostly 
depressed and expect more wages for less work.  
The result neither favoured speedy reconstruction, nor encouraged civil participation 
in urban governance, nor favoured the main designers of the plan. Due to the 
increase in the price of reconstruction materials, the houses took longer to construct 
than expected. In many cases fraud contractors received money from the applicants 
but left the building project unfinished. This increased the vulnerability of these 
residents who remained homeless and in debt to the government.   





One of the main aims of the reconstruction plan was to preserve the identity and 
character of the city of Bam. However, reconstruction actually changed the 
traditional character of the city. One of the factors responsible for this outcome was 
the loan policy for newly-wedded couples, which resulted in more smaller houses. 
The large-scale development of smaller houses damaged the palm groves, with many 
trees and palms making way for the new houses. This shows that the designers did 
not see the plan through the eyes of Bami people and did not know what is important 
to them. This disconnection between the designers and new residents resulted in a 
new form of urban design that created the sense of alienation and dissatisfaction 
among Bamis towards their surroundings and the main bodies of reconstruction.  
The author studied and observed the changes of Bam for five years, from 2005 to 
2010. During this period along with the changes of the façade of the city, changes of 
people's behaviour and viewpoint were also notable. At the initial phases local 
respondents were more loud, emotional and demanding (from the government) in 
their responses. In later phases interviewees on average became more still and were 
happier to give short answers to the questions. In their eye-sight one could find signs 
of depression and loss of hope. However, in later years, in 2009 and 2010, the 
researcher spotted signs of dynamism and liveliness, especially in young women.  
To finalise, it can be concluded that, despite all the shortcomings of designed 
policies, the new Bam is more resilient than before the earthquake.   Due to the harsh 
situation of affected people after the earthquake and lack of an effective livelihood 
generation policy, people have faced their vulnerabilities and found alternative 
methods to increase their coping capacities in terms of either access to livelihood or 
getting over the social boundaries. Women precisely are now in more ease to 
communicate with strangers or their male counterparts and participate in social 
spaces.   
Social capital has increased in Bam. The increase of social capital was not in form of 
norms of reciprocity or trust of people to each other: in chapter six it was realised 





that residents of the studied districts have lost their trust to the new citizens due to 
the entrance of new comers; however, as it was found out in chapter eight, the trust 
of people to social spaces has increased along with social networking. It can be 
concluded that studies about social capital are better to be more precise in terms of 
definition of the concept. Social capital is generally defined as a combination of 
trust, norms of reciprocity and networking. But in case of Bam, while trust of people 
to each other and norms of reciprocity have decreased, the social resilience of Bam 
has increased through the increase of networking which is a form of social capital.  
9.2 Implications for Governance to Increase Social 
Resilience 
The case of Bam shows that despite the local people being marginalised in the design 
and implementation of the reconstruction, they had great power in influencing the 
policies and plans since they were the consumers of the services. The residents 
changed the centrally-designed plan based on their needs, i.e. using a combination of 
prefabricated units and built houses, not welcoming the exhibition of houses to 
choose from, applying for the cheapest design, using prefabricated units as sources 
of income. They had the power to legitimise, accept or deny the services the NGOs 
provided for them. They also had the power to either endorse the local government 
by regarding it as an influential organisation or to discredit it by marginalising the 
authorities in urban governance through disconnecting themselves from it.  
In Bam, due to the weak performance of local government in urban governance, 
people rarely sent liaising and grievance letters to the local government but preferred 
to send their grievances to the Presidency Office. Central government policies have a 
great role in empowering local government and sharing power with local residents. 
However, this did not happen in Bam as central state policies marginalised local 
government in decision making around the reconstruction. The responsibility of local 
government in governing the city remained limited like its budget. Local residents 
were not allowed formally by the central decision-makers to participate effectively in 





designing and implementing the reconstruction plan. Chances to strengthen the links 
between local residents and governmental organisations were not utilised, which left 
people feeling unsatisfied with the reconstruction. With the deterioration of 
livelihood opportunities and the previous family-centred social structure people felt 
insecure.  
Most active NGOs in Bam were focused on covering the livelihood deficits and 
acted as charities. However, there were signs of NGO activities creating civic links 
and new local NGO’s activities might develop the lost sense of care and 
responsibility among local Bamis. Much work is vitally needed to educate grassroots 
organisations on their role in urban governance and participation. This could be done 
through the following ways: 
 NGOs can educate people about their civic rights and the ways they can 
make authorities responsible to realise their rights and answer their claims.  
 NGOs can encourage the grassroots communities to mobilise especially 
regarding disaster mitigation and risk reduction 
 NGOs are needed to create effective links with governmental organisations to 
legitimise civil society activities and secure access to financial support.  
 Non-local NGOs need to achieve a correct understanding about the norms 
and values of the target community and respect their values in order to 
achieve legitimacy and acceptance from the target community 
 There is a need to consider the context dependant nature of development 
projects and value the social and demographic study of the target community 
before applying empowering projects 
 Paying attention to vertical links along with horizontal ties in empowering 
projects and facilitating the campaigning of community priorities to 
appropriate agencies 
 To get sustainable achievements in empowering projects, projects need to be 
long-term to let the institutionalisation of participatory norms occur 





 Greater technical capacity of NGOs in terms of having experience, 
knowledge and management skills is needed to increase the effectiveness of 
their efforts 
 International links need to be created among international NGOs to share 
knowledge and resources 
 
The central government can play a great role in encouraging grassroots and local 
organisations to practice transformative participation since it’s the target community 
that benefits from its outcomes or conversely pays the cost of failure. The success of 
development projects increases the trust of local community towards formal and 
governmental institutions and encourages them to step out from their closed tribal 
communities and engage in social and civic projects. The success of development 
projects relies highly on creating essential links with the local people. This could be 
achieved through the following ways: 
 Create spaces for local residents to share their views and local knowledge 
with central decision-makers 
 Increase the capacity of local governmental organisations to play an 
influential role as mediator between local residents and the central 
government 
 Create a legitimate and influential space for national NGOs to educate the 
grassroots about their rights and responsibilities and increase its financial 
support from NGOs 
 Invest in academic and administrative research to find applicable and 
effective ways to decentralise urban governance 
 Value local knowledge and trust local experience and ability in 
developmental projects 
 Focus on livelihood programmes since they are the cornerstone of 
vulnerability reduction, and without creating a proper livelihood strategy for 
the target community other projects including housing would not get the 
satisfactory results 






It was discussed, particularly in chapter seven, that applying urban and professional 
biased approaches not only waste the opportunity for local workers to increase their 
skills and local capacities, but are also ineffective in meeting the centrally defined 
objectives of the reconstruction and housing projects.  
 
A lack of social and livelihood regeneration programmes in reconstruction 
programmes of Iran is felt. The main executive body of reconstruction in Iran is the 
Housing Foundation. This organisation focuses on the physical aspect of housing 
and follows a rigid blue-print approach which is insufficient for addressing social 
vulnerabilities. In such a governance setting that NGOs do not have sufficient 
capacity and support to address social vulnerabilities in regional scales, there need to 
be responsible governmental bodies to do the task.  There are Social Welfare 
Organisation and the Ministry of Welfare and Social Security, but they have very 
pale or no role and support in reconstruction programmes.  
9.3  Study Limitations: 
The interdisciplinary nature of this research made the researcher cover a broad range 
of literature and concepts. In order to study the social resilience of Bam to the 
researcher addressed the concepts of vulnerability, resilience, governance, social 
capital, reconstruction, disaster, civil society, NGOs, participation and the inter-
relations of these concepts. These concepts were framed in Bam's social context and 
Iran's disaster management and reconstruction framework. To conduct scientific 
research the process required precision and cautious considerations to relate and 
present the ideas and set a fair scenery for the reader.  
Data collection had to be impartial and representative. The hardest task was to 
overcome the subjectivity of the process and seeing the facts through reasonable and 
scientific lenses, since the researcher had strong emotional feelings about the subject.  
Data then had to be analysed using the best existing approaches to provide useful and 





reliable findings. The whole process was a challenge for the researcher since the 
research has to be truthful to the academic arena and the researched community. 
Key limitations of this research were: 
 Limited time and budget 
 Subjective ontology of the social research that may not have covered a 
thorough picture of social resilience of Bam 
 The reliability of the findings on the gathered data – the answers of the 
sample communities might not be a just representative of the whole residents, 
or even may have changed since the interviews 
 The limitation of explaining and exploring the situation through the existing 
literature to increase the validity of the research 
9.4 Further Research and Recommendations: 
Further literature is needed on the role of NGOs in transferring society towards a 
more engaging attitude. There is considerable literature on the importance of NGOs 
supporting civil society development. There is a need to further research the ways 
NGOs can communicate with grassroots organisations and especially how they can 
use this link to activate civil society.  
Further studies are required on how NGOs can diversify their strategies from a 
charity style approach towards more empowering strategies considering their largely 
limited budgets. Moreover, how, in the absence of livelihood supportive policies and 
vulnerable livelihood situations, people would welcome non-charity style 
approaches. The fragility of NGOs in terms of financial and technical access 
questions the role of NGOs as the "Third Sector" or even as an influential body in 
urban governance. Further research is needed to find sustainable ways to increase the 
financial and technical capacities of NGOs.  





Two changes are recommended to occur in development studies: first, local people 
should not be regarded as powerless in affecting their surroundings where they are 
marginalised in central decision-makings. People have the greatest power in 
affecting their surroundings (albeit based on their needs and capabilities and not on 
their ideal picture of life style); non-participatory approaches only results in 
unsatisfactory results. Second, the attitude towards the state as an obstacle of 
participatory governance and decentralisation needs to change towards a powerful 
contributor, especially in studies of developing countries. The state, with 
collaboration of academics and non-governmental agencies and organisations with 
experience in the field, has the greatest power to foster the space for public 
participation. Further studies are needed to find ways that states can create such 
spaces. 
9.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the essence of this thesis. It has presented the contributions 
this research made to the concept of urban governance, NGOs, vulnerability, 
resilience, social capital, reconstruction and participation. It has discussed how 
vulnerability in Bam was shaped and how the earthquake revealed the vulnerability 
of Bamis. It was discussed how NGOs, central government, Housing Foundation, 
and local government shaped the framework of reconstruction; and how they 
affected the social resilience of Bam. The necessary measures to help achieve better 
governance towards increasing social resilience were also presented. The chapter 
highlighted the limitations of the study and the areas that would benefit from further 
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Hello. I am sorry to disturb you. I am Ahoura Azarian, a university student working on reconstruction in Bam. 
I am trying to find about your household and life in this area. Could you please help me by answering a few 
questions, which will be treated with complete confidence. It may take 10 to 15 minutes. I would like to talk to 
the head of the household. 
 
Address:  
Name    Position in household:    Gender:             Age: 
 
Part A: Livelihood access 
1. Pre-fabricated unit  Built House   Undestroyed house 
 Others 
 
2. Number of rooms (except kitchen, bathroom, toilet)? 
 
3. How many households live in here?  
a. One  
b. Two  
c. Three  
d. Four  
e. More  
 
4. Do the households relate to each other?  
a. Yes  
b. No  
 
5. If the answer is "Yes", what is the relation?  
 





7. The occupation of each household's members:  
 
Occupation Household 1 Household 2 Household 3 Household 4 Household 5 
Pupil      
Student      
Unemployed      





 P.T F.T P.T F.T P.T F.T P.T F.T 
Farmer P.T F.T P.T F.T P.T F.T P.T F.T P.T F.T 
Services P.T F.T P.T F.T P.T F.T P.T F.T P.T F.T 
Other      
 
  








8. Incoming of each household before earthquake:  
 
Household 1 Household 2 Household 3 Household 4 Household 5 
     
 
 
9. Do any of the households receive help from Imam Khomeini Relief Committee or 
Welfare Organization? 
a. Imam Khomeini Relief Committee 
b. Welfare organization 
c. None  
 
10. How much? How often? 
 



















Clean drinking water      
Before the earthquake     
Gas     
Before the earthquake     
Swage     
Before the earthquake     
Garbage collection      
Before the earthquake     
Electricity      
Before the earthquake     
Phone      
Before the earthquake     
Personal vehicle      
Before the earthquake     
Public vehicle      
Before the earthquake     
Health Service      
Before the earthquake     
School Service      
Before the earthquake     
School     
Before the earthquake     
Cradle     






14. Who owns the land?  
 
15. To whom did it belong before the earthquake  
 
16. How about the building?  
 
Part B: Social capital  
 
Membership in Groups 
 
17. Are any of the household members a member of an association? (e.g. charitable 
associations, associations of mosques, parents and school teachers association, spinal 
injured association, guild associations such as farmers' guild, local community, UN, etc.) 
a. Yes (association name)  
b. No  
 
Social networks  
 
18. How many close friends have you these days?  
a. No one  
b. 1 or 2  
c. 3 to 5 
d. More than 5  
 
19. If an emergency came up that you need money, except for first-rate family, how many 
people are there that you can ask them to for borrow money and they are willing to help 
you?  
a. No one 
b. 1 or 2  
c. 3 to 5 








21. Do you think that the neighbourhood people will help each other in difficult 
circumstances?  
a. Yes  
b. No  
 
22. Has this issue changed compared to before the earthquake? (If you have come to this 
place after the earthquake, is it different compared to the previous neighborhood?)  
 
23. How have your weekend leisure time changed compared to before the earthquake? 
 
Trust and integrity  
 




25. Do you think that most of the neighbourhood people can be trusted?  
a. Most of them can be trusted 
b. One should be careful of evil people  
c. Most of them will help you if you need  
d. Most of them are distrusted to each other 
 









27. How your trustfulness has changed to the following people compared to the time before 
the earthquake?  
 
 Very low Low Moderate High Very High 
Non-native residents       
Before the earthquake       
Neighbors       
Before the earthquake       
Bami citizens      
Before the earthquake      
 
 
Cooperation and group activities  
 
28. Have you done any group activity with your neighbours in last four years? For example, 
something like removing rubbles without previous coordination, or enrolling the kids in 
school, giving or taking charitable foods.  
a. Yes  
b. No  
 
29. How such cooperation has changed compared to the first days of the earthquake?  
 
30.  How about before the earthquake?  
 
31. Have you done anything in the past four years in corporation with others in Bam to 
benefit the whole city?  
a. Yes  




32.  If the answer is "Yes", what was it?  
 
33. If the answer is "Yes", was it voluntarily or was it asked?  
a. Was voluntarily  




31. How many times did you have guests in the past two months? How has it changed 
compared to before the earthquake?  
 
32. How many times have you gone to a party in the past two months? How has it changed 
compared to before the earthquake?  
 
Sense of empowerment and participation  
 
33. How much do you think that you have a role in improving Bam? 
a.  Very  
b. Slightly  
c. Nothing  







 Yes No Yes No 
Participating in local seminar or association     
Calling, writing letters to, meeting with the mayor, 
governor, member of City Council  
    
Vote for City Council     










Themes and Questions asked from Thirty Seven Bamis regarding the housing reconstruction 
and its effects on their sense of belonging 
1. Characteristics of the respondent and his/her family: 
2. How many people injured in the earthquake in this family? 
3. How long later after the earthquake you started the reconstruction? 
4. How long did the reconstruction of your house last? 
5. Problems of reconstruction of your house: 
6. What resources you got helped from? NGOs, neighbour, ... 
7. How much of the reconstruction was done by yourself and how much by others? 
8. Were contractors Bami? Or workers? 
9. How the reconstruction did make you closer to formal/governmental organizations? 
10. Did any agency (person) help you or support you in the process of reconstruction? 
11. Did your land or house changed in form or size after the reconstruction? 
12. Your opinion about the effect of reconstruction on palm-groves: 
13. The government's policies' effect on reconstruction: positives and negatives: 
14. What was the most influential institution in reconstruction in your mind? 
15. What were the disadvantages of the reconstruction? 




Appendix 4: Photos 
 
Photo1. The Housing Project of the House of Mother and Child NGO 
 
 






Photo 3. Runners of House of Mother and Child NGO have monthly meetings with 






Photo 4. Children and women have a safe space to play and gather in the housing 
























































Photo 11. Example of life in a prefabricated unit 
 
